

JPRS-NEA-84-150

5 October 1984

## Near East/South Asia Report

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5 October 1984

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UNION BETWEEN LIBYA, MOROCCO EXAMINED

Durability of Treaty

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 392, 25 Aug 84 pp 17-19

[Article: "Do the Arabs Need a New Unity Experiment"]

[Excerpts] Of all the unionist experiments known to modern Arab history, the new unionist experiment between Morocco and Libya seems the most difficult. Initially, it gives the impression that it is impractical, unrealistic and short-lasting.

However, the unity on which King Hassan II and President Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi agreed at the Oujda meeting last week may be more realistic, practical, successful and durable than several other experiments witnessed by the Arab region in recent years.

The Moroccan-Libyan eagerness to keep the ambitions of the new unionist experiment "implementable" has led to a realistic treaty that harbors within its folds the elements of success and durability. An examination of the mainstays and components of this treaty demonstrates the following:

To start with, the experiment agreed on is not a merger or federal union and will not lead to the fusion of the two states into a single state. King Hassan II and Colonel al-Qadhafi have agreed to "conclude a treaty in accordance with which a union shall be set up to include the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Kingdom of Morocco," with the new union called the Arab African Union. This union will have its institutions: the presidency of the union will be assumed by the heads of the two states alternately, a general secretariat will be attached to the presidency and will be hosted by each country for a period of 2 years (Tripoli will be the first headquarters of the secretariat and the first general secretary will be Moroccan) and the union will have an executive committee to implement the presidential resolution and an arbitration council that interprets the legal provisions organizing the union. On the other hand, the union's provisions stipulate that "each side shall respect the other's sovereignty and shall pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs" and that "each country shall keep the freedom to conclude any treaty that it deems fit, provided it is not damaging to the other side's interests." It has also

been agreed that each of the two countries will maintain its internal and external independence and that the various institutions will continue to be subject to the constitution and the laws in force in each of them.

The two sides have especially focused on entrenching and developing their bilateral cooperation in various spheres. The union calls for "achieving a joint policy in all spheres" seeking to "bolster the bonds of friendship between the two countries, to coordinate their diplomatic activities, to preserve the independence of each state and to strive for agricultural, industrial, commercial and social development in each of the two countries." The treaty considers "any aggression against one country an aggression against the other country." An informed Arab source said that the two sides have agreed to coordinate their external positions and to consult on the various important issues, but without this meaning that their viewpoints have to be identical on all issues. What this means is that the two sides will accept the presence of a difference of opinion or of interpretation and assessment on some issues, without allowing such a difference to be a cause of conflict between them and without permitting it to lead to the collapse of the union. Proceeding from this basis, there has been agreement that the union will have councils specializing in "policy, defense, economies, culture and technology." But the role of these councils will be an advisory role. It has also been agreed that the union will have an "institution comprised of Moroccan parliamentarians and members of the Libyan General People's Congress empowered to submit to the presidency any recommendation likely to bolster the union and achieve its objectives."

The new treaty (to become valid after a popular referendum is held on it in both countries by the end of this month) does not seek just to cement the ties between the two countries. It is not "closed." Rather, it is a step toward the unity of the Greater Arab Maghreb. On this basis, the officials of both countries consider this treaty complementary to the brotherhood and concord treaty concluded between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania in March 1983. This is why Colonel al-Qadhdhafi is eager to have a five-leader summit held in Tripoli on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the 1 September revolution, including King Hassan and the president of Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. The two Moroccan and Libyan leaders have made contacts for the purpose with the parties concerned. Thus, it seems that the new unionist experiment is a Maghreb experiment primarily while being eager at the same time to constitute "a historic step on the path of achieving the Arab nation's unity."

Is there a need for another unionist experiment in the Arab world?

Yes. Inasmuch as the Arab citizen has become cautious and suspicious of any unionist experiment in the wake of the failure of all the unionist experiments undergone by the area in its modern history, he is as much in need of a unionist experiment that bears within its folds the seeds of real success. No unionist experiment can succeed if its slogans are bigger than its advocates' ability to implement it or if it comes about by force and as a



result of sudden circumstances and not firm conviction. A unionist experiment does not lose its value if it is founded on truly realistic bases and if it is both out of the need of the two sides or the many sides for it and as a result of careful calculations, and not just as a result of attractive and resounding phrases.

The real surprise for the Arab citizen lies, perhaps, not in announcement of the unionist treaty between Morocco and Libya but in the success of this unionist experiment.

The bases on which Moroccan and Libyan officials have founded the new union seem to be bases capable of survival and growth because they build a unionist relationship different from the previous unionist relationships. The new unionist relationship is a relationship of integration, not a merger. It is a relationship based on the endeavor to utilize optimally the capabilities, resources and relations of each country and not a relationship based on changing the situation in one state so that it may become an exact replica of the other. Integration means that neither side should try to impose its views on the other. A successful unionist experiment does not impose shackles but rather opens the door wide to the possibilities of cooperation, development and progress.

Therefore, the new union can help settle the Western Sahara conflict which constitutes a burden to Morocco. Informed Arab sources said that Morocco and Libya have agreed to launch a joint movement in an attempt to find an "Arab formula of solution" to the Western Sahara problem. Al-Qadhdhafi declared his support for solving this problem "within an Arab framework" instead of the OAU framework, thus responding to the wish of King Hassan II. The reason is that Morocco has faced difficulties and obstacles in its attempts to settle this conflict within the framework of the OAU.

What does the Arab solution mean?

It means, first, that an Arab summit will be held--a mini-summit, probably--and that it will include the parties concerned with the Western Sahara conflict. It may also include the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A draft agreement will be reached at this summit. Second, the Arab solution means that a referendum will be held in the Western Sahara under Arab-international supervision so that the Sahara people may determine their own future. It is most likely that this referendum will constitute a step toward the unity of Morocco and the Western Sahara, which is something that al-Qadhdhafi supports.

Within the framework of this integration between Morocco and Libya, informed observers do not exclude the possibility that each side will play a role in the endeavor to improve the other side's relations with Arab and international circles. For example, these observers do not find it unlikely that Morocco will play a role in improving relations between the United States and Libya, or at least in opening a serious dialogue between the two countries, especially since Libya is not against this dialogue. Neither do the observers find it

unlikely that Libya will play a role in improving relations between Morocco and a number of Arab countries. Some observers even go so far as to ask: why shouldn't the new union take an initiative to end the Iraq-Iran war on the basis of having each side utilize its relations and contacts?

If this integration is actually crystallized, the new union will be successful, capable of survival and durable.

Some say that this new unionist experiment falls short of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's Arab unionist aspirations. The fact is that it is not necessary for a certain political step to achieve all the aspirations and objectives of the leader who embarks upon it. Al-Qadhdhafi's conclusion of this treaty does not mean his abandonment of his opinions and objectives. The Libyan president has big aspirations for his country and his revolution and he expressed them in a long interview conducted with him by three journalists (Hamid Burdah, Mark Krafitz and Mark Whittaker)--an interview published in the form of a book in Paris. Some of what al-Qadhdhafi said in this interview is: "I am an opposition leader at the international level. I lead not only the Arab opposition but also the opposition at the international level." Al-Qadhdhafi expresses his regret because the "Arab revolutions have been foiled." He wonders: "Where are the Arabs? They have no presence." But he added: "We possess all the means that enable us to shape the Arab nation's future. Those who want to establish relations with the Arab world must take Libya into consideration and must deal with the Libyan revolution whose influence is growing day by day."

#### Potentials of Union's Growth

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 392, 25 Aug 84 pp 20-21

[Excerpt] Rabat--The main axes of the treaty are centered in four areas:

First, in the political sphere in which the coordination of positions between the two countries will contribute to maintaining peace wherever it is founded on the basis of justice and fairness and characterized by perpetuity and continuity. The matter may reach the point of forming joint Moroccan-Libyan forces to maintain peace, should international conditions call for them.

Second, in the sphere of defense in which the treaty considers aggression against one country aggression against the other. Moreover, military cooperation can be established between the two countries within the framework of respecting the sovereignty of each state and defending its independence.

Third, in the economic sphere in which the treaty seeks to create joint establishment and to draw up unified economic programs that call primarily for exporting Libyan oil to Morocco, absorbing Moroccan manpower and setting up investment establishments.



Fourth, in the cultural sphere which concern the development of education, the exchange of expertise and the creation of joint establishments with educational and university experience.

But what is most important in this treaty, which both the Moroccan and Libyan peoples will be asked to approve on the 31st of August, is that it allows each side the freedom to conclude agreements and treaties that come under the category of acts of sovereignty. This is a reference to the independence of political decision-making when such independence is not in conflict with the contents of this treaty. Thus, it can be pointed out that in principle, this is the first time in which Morocco concludes an agreement of this kind which seeks to establish a framework for joint political, economic and cultural action while seeking at the same time to find satisfactory solutions to more than one issue, especially at the level of achieving Arab reconciliations that precede convocation of the Riyadh summit and of trying to place the Sahara conflict within the framework of the steps for building the Greater Arab Maghreb and extending bridges of cooperation between the area's countries.

Regarding reactions to the declarations of this union, it is noticed that this reaction is almost confined to the Arab Maghreb countries whereas the Arab capitals have remained silent. Aside from the United States, which received the declaration of the union with caution, with a spokesman of the U.S. administration stating that Washington had not been aware of the event, French official circles had been aware of the event, considering that a day before announcement of the union, the Moroccan king had discussions with Roland Dumas, the French minister of European Affairs, who is one of the "defenders" of the Libyan policy in the Elysee Palace, and that King Hassan II gave him a special message for President Francois Mitterand. As for Algeria, it has been careful to reaffirm its position that the brotherhood and concord treaty concluded between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania is the proper framework for building the unity of the Arab Maghreb. Tunisia has, in its turn, reaffirmed this tendency.

It remains to be said that integration between the Arab-African Union and the brotherhood and concord treaty binding Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania can find its way through reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the two treaties, especially insofar as the position toward the Western Sahara conflict is concerned. Whereas the brotherhood and concord treaty projects a solution to the Sahara conflict within the African framework through referendum on self-determination before considering the accession of the other parties in North Africa to the treaty, the Arab-African Union oversteps this point by underlining in its ninth article the preservation of the independence of each of the two countries in the sphere of defense. In a later article, the union stipulates that each state respect the sovereignty of the other state. This has perhaps obstructed the immediate accession of Tunisia and Algeria to the Arab-African Union. Meanwhile, the bridges of communication continue to be open, with the hope of finding a solution to the conflict in the interpretations. The observers believe that the

significance of the establishment of the Arab-African Union goes beyond fusing Moroccan-Libyan relations to establishing new Arab and African relations, because accession to the union, in case a country becomes convinced of the feasibility of this union, will not be confined to the Arab countries but will be open to any African country. In view of this accomplishment and of the current situation being experienced by the OAU--this organization which has experienced in recent years a considerable deterioration in relations among its members and in its relations with the international organizations--it is not by accident that Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, whose country hosted an Arab-African solidarity conference in recent weeks, pointed out the need to overcome Arab-African differences, especially at the level of finding an Arab solution to the Sahara conflict, to spare the African countries the dangers of Arab conflicts. It is also not accidental that in announcing the provisions of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty, the Moroccan king urged the African countries to join the Arab-African Union while avoiding any mention of the Sahara crisis even though it is the main focus of the disagreement disrupting the OAU. But what is most important about this interpretation is that the emergence of this union has come simultaneously with calls issued by certain African circles for forming a new organization for the African countries confined solely to the black African states. It can be said, moreover, that the Arab-African Union may, in case African countries join it, become a new framework for overcoming African crises. This is what may crystallize in the coming meeting of the African ministers of foreign affairs in Tripoli next year.

At the Arab level, the issue will continue to depend on how positive is this step which can move the Arab action to more mature and realistic levels. Once again, one of the rumors circulated a few months ago has come true--namely the rumor to the effect that Ahmad Qadhdhaf al-Dumm, one of the engineers of the treaty who was staying at a hotel in Rabat, the capital, was going to become a married relative to the Moroccans. The rumors of marital relations have come true with the foundation of the Arab-African Union.

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CSO: 4504/427

TREATY OF OUJDA ANALYZED

Doubts on Agreement

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 72, 25 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Fu'ad Matar: "Is It the Beginning of a Maghreb Cooperation Council"]

[Text] If the mere news of an agreement concluded between two countries to settle some differences evokes satisfaction and joy, then what would news of an agreement between two countries declaring a step on the path of unity evoke?

The reaction evoked in the soul by such news is joy in every sense of the word.

But insofar as the step taken by the Kingdom of Morocco and the Libyan Jamahiriyyah is concerned, the reaction has not risen to the level of the step announced. Questions and exclamation marks have replaced the desired joy or the joy that is supposed to occur.

This is normal because the Moroccan-Libyan step has taken place at a time when Arabs have despaired of the occurrence of any change in this psychological collapse and because it has taken place unexpectedly.

What is interesting in this Moroccan-Libyan step is that it has occurred between two sides about whom the prevalent impression was that they could not be compatible enough to cooperate according to a unionist formula or any other formula close to it whereas this has not happened between parties that were supposed to unite because of numerous common factors between them. These sides are the Libyan Jamahiriyyah, Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania.

It is the right of the Arab citizen to wonder: how can accord be achieved between a monarchic regime and a revolutionary regime when it is impossible to achieve this accord between parties united by numerous similarities? How can accord be achieved between a kingdom with a partisan life, a government, a parliament and a press with various tendencies and a jamahiriyyah which considers partisanship treason and a parliament a form of charlatanry against the people and which does not believe in the multiplicity of tendencies?

It is the right of the Arab citizen to ask because the true nature of what has been agreed upon is not sufficiently clear. When clarity emerges, the questions will diminish.

The mere agreement of King Hassan II and Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi on a step whereby the minimum is firm and coordinated cooperation and the maximum is unity will help overcome numerous obstacles facing Arab coexistence. This statement is made on the assumption that the step agreed upon is likely to make Colonel al-Qadhdhafi less radical or to put him on the path of moderation and coexistence with the Arab reality best represented by King Hassan II. It is natural to assume this and not the opposite, i.e., assume that the step will make King Hassan II a radical or will change him from the ruler in whose country and with whose efforts the most moderate Arab political steps have been taken, beginning with the courageous resolutions of the two Fez summits and ending with the more courageous resolution taken by the latest Islamic summit in Casablanca--a resolution through which Egypt regained, in the face of violent opposition by the Libyan Jamahiriyyah, its membership in the Islamic Conference Organization.

The biggest obstacle facing Arab coexistence is perhaps the Libyan-Iraqi disagreement which is countered by good Moroccan-Libyan relations and Libya's support for Iran whereas Morocco supports Iraq in its conflict with Iran, the Libyan-Palestinian disagreement at a time when Morocco constitutes a strategic political dimension for the Palestinian action, especially for Fatah Movement which is in extremely sharp disagreement with the Libyan leadership, the Libyan-Jordanian disagreement whereas relations between King Hassan II and King Husayn are very good and the disagreement characterizing U.S.-Libyan relations whereas Morocco's relations with the United States are very tranquil and understanding.

It may be said that these differences between Colonel al-Qadhdhafi and the others are old, that they concern al-Qadhdhafi and that King Hassan II has nothing to do with them. But logic dictates that it be said that the Moroccan king will not inherit these differences that concern his partner in the cooperation formula that may be reached. Moreover, if this cooperation will not eliminate these differences and help include Colonel al-Qadhdhafi in the Arab group, then what will it achieve and what is the justification for its coming into existence altogether?

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's turning toward Morocco is not a new condition in the game of alliances and quarrels of which al-Qadhdhafi seems to be fond. What happened between him and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the accord that replaced the disagreement by a strange power is perhaps still remembered by many. By the way, the Saudi leadership may be the Arab side that is most encouraging and most welcoming of the Moroccan-Libyan step on the basis that it is the step that makes up for the failure of Saudi Arabia's efforts to bring Colonel al-Qadhdhafi closer to the arena of Arab consensus instead of letting al-Qadhdhafi contribute to obstructing the achievement of this consensus and of the fruits desired from it.

It may be premature to speculate whether the Moroccan-Libyan step will crystallize or will just turn into a mere attention-getting move in the arena of Arab political action. It may also be premature to expect this step to constitute a precursor of a Maghreb Cooperation Council similar to the Gulf Cooperation Council which has proven that it is a possible and positive alternative to the



Arab unity that is impossible at the present time--a council that begins with Morocco and the Libyan Jamahiriyah and then awaits the others to join it. Without agreement between Morocco and Libya, such a council will not crystallize.

Such an accession will not occur unless Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania each feel that the two sisters (the Kingdom of Morocco and the Libyan Jamahiriyah) are utterly serious in implementing the Oujda agreement. But if the signs of such seriousness do not emerge, the Moroccan-Libyan step will have the same end as the step declared in Jurbah nearly 10 years ago--a step that evaporated like a daydream. We should keep in mind that the circumstances are different and that King Hassan II, unlike others, is not compelled to accept a maneuver whose achievement is doubtful. Moreover, the Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi of today is not the Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi of past days.

While waiting for these developments, the only thing we have to say is that we hope that this agreement between King Hassan II and Col M'ammār al-Qadhafi will happen because if it happens, it will help the Arab summit convene in Riyadh. If this summit is convened, it will succeed in abridging the final chapter of the Iraq-Iran war and in restoring Egypt which has found itself facing the threat of mines because it wants to return to the kinsmen who are perplexed and hesitant on the issue of its return.

It also remains to be said that these words harbor a degree of optimism in their folds. Let it be so because life is very narrow without the horizon of hope.

#### Impact on Sahara Conflict

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 72, 25 Aug 84 pp 12-13

[Article by Abu Bakr al-Siddiq al-Sharif]

[Text] Rabat--Col Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi's arrival on 13 August at Anjad Airport located near Oujda which is the capital of the eastern province of Morocco and which is 580 km from Rabat and whose borders meet with the Moroccan-Algerian borders, was not up to the level of the surprise [presumably meaning should not have caused the surprise it has caused]. Moroccan-Libyan relations have developed rapidly since the official visit made to Morocco by Colonel al-Qadhafi on 30 June 1983 and during which he met with the king of Morocco and with the leaders of the Moroccan political parties. In the wake of that visit, a higher Moroccan-Libyan committee was formed and this committee formulated afterward an ambitious program for political coordination and economic integration between the two countries.

But it seems that what has drawn the international media to the trap of speculation and expectations, some of which stressed that a mini-summit would be held in Tripoli and then in Morocco, is the fact that the Moroccan movement to complete the activities of a task always falls within the framework of the venerable Hadith, which says: "Abide by discretion in serving your needs."

Moreover, this is perhaps the first time that the international media with a distinctive presence in the Maghreb arena have scored what may be called a failing mark in all the topics concerned.

The reason for this may be the statement made by al-Qadhdhafi at the Afro-Arab Dialogue Conference which was hosted by Tripoli recently--a statement in which he dealt with the Arab character of the Sahara conflict and with the need to search for an Arab solution to this conflict--and the subsequent contacts which took place between Tripoli, Riyadh and Rabat and the Algerian-Saudi contact for the purpose.

It may also be that the reason for this failure on the part of the media is the strict security measures which preceded King Hassan II's arrival in the city of Oujda. In the minds of many, this visit by the Moroccan king was tied to the meeting which brought the king and the Algerian president together on 23 February 1983 and which produced limited relaxation between the two countries--a relaxation which vanished soon afterwards. But these justifications seem poor in comparison with Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's statement on the Sahara conflict--a statement understood in Rabat as a reaffirmation of the real nature of the intrinsic obstacles which continue to be in control of the affairs.

Thus, in an atmosphere charged with speculation unrelated to the issue, al-Qadhdhafi arrived in Oujda where he was received by the Moroccan king, the crown prince and members of the Moroccan cabinet. As of the first moment of his arrival, direct negotiations were held in the Eastern Hall of Anjad Airport and were followed by negotiations at the meeting hall of Oujda Governorate. Upon completion of the negotiations, a treaty was concluded setting up a union between Morocco and Libya.

The official communique issued afterwards was characterized by brevity, noting that the desired objective of the treaty is to set up a union between the two countries, with implementation suspended temporarily until the treaty is approved by the peoples of both countries in accordance with the procedures in force in each of the two states.

The communique also noted that the objectives that the treaty seeks strategically are the liberation of Palestine and of the venerable Jerusalem. At the bilateral level, the treaty seeks to cement the bonds of fraternity between the Moroccan and Libyan peoples and to expand cooperation between them in all spheres.

The two sides also expressed their desire to establish a union that will constitute a basic brick for the unity of the Arab Maghreb countries.

As for the crystallization of these aspirations at the level of reality, AL-TADAMUN has learned that the presidency of the union will be for a period of 2 years and will be assumed alternatively by King Hassan II and Colonel al-Qadhdhafi. The treaty also stipulates that a Libyan minister be appointed in Rabat and a Moroccan minister in Tripoli to express the views of their governments in all spheres. It is being reiterated in Rabat that the other contents



of the treaty, especially those pertaining to the instruments of implementation, will be declared at the beginning of the coming month of September on the occasion of Libya's celebration of the 15th anniversary of the 1 September revolution.

It has also been reiterated that the Moroccan people's opinion on the establishment of this union will be sought in a referendum scheduled to be conducted on 12 October 1984.

#### Immediate Unionist Step

On the evening of the same day, 13 August 1984, al-Qadhdhafi and his delegation departed from Morocco in the direction of Algeria and Tunisia. Al-Qadhdhafi was accompanied by Ahmed Reda [Guedita], the Moroccan king's adviser, and the two reviewed with President Chadli Bendjedid and with Mohamed Mzali the dimensions of the treaty and their desire to include the Arab Maghreb countries. The observers considered Ahmed Reda's presence with al-Qadhdhafi during these visits the first executive step for unionist coordination between the two countries.

Two days after al-Qadhdhafi's return to Tripoli, it was reported here that al-Qadhdhafi plans to call for a summit of the leaders of the Arab Maghreb countries to try to persuade Algeria and Tunisia to join the Oujda Treaty. According to the same sources, the agreement of these parties to attend is subject to all possibilities.

However, it has become certain that Morocco will participate this year in Libya's celebrations with a high-level delegation headed by the Moroccan crown prince. On the other hand, the same sources assured AL-TADAMUN that King Hassan II will send envoys to a number of Arab countries to clarify the objectives of this union. Ahmed Reda also announced that Syria has been invited to join the union.

#### Opinions of Party Leaders

In dealing with the official communique on the Libyan president's visit and on the treaty concluded between Morocco and Libya, the Moroccan parties expressed their full blessing for what was agreed upon. The Moroccan man on the street also responded quickly to the contents of the treaty. AL-TADAMUN polled the opinions of a number of leaders of the political parties. M'Hamed Boucetta, the Istiqlal Party secretary general, summed up his party's opinion on what is happening by saying that his party believes that what has happened between Morocco and Libya and the treaty to establish a union between the two countries seeks primarily and before anything else to strengthen the bonds of relations. "This is very important for building an Arab Maghreb that confronts the existing problems, be they political, economic or cultural, and" Boucetta added "that views in a balanced and unified manner what solutions have to be achieved for the Arab and Islamic issues, led by the issue of the restoration of Jerusalem and the liberation of Palestine." Boucetta further added: "We hope that through this union, which seeks primarily to build and not to turn to a different orientation, the positions taken by the two countries will be

in the interest of Arabism and Islam and of the Arab Maghreb so that we may emerge from the Labyrinths and may proceed on the path we should follow for the sake of the impregnable unity of the Arabs and the sake of building the Greater Arab Maghreb."

Maati Bouabid, chairman of the Constitutional Union Party, said to AL-TADAMUN: "We in the Constitutional Union cannot but bless any serious step for the unification of the positions vis-a-vis the fateful issues at all levels. Despite the difference in the political options of the Greater Arab Maghreb countries, we believe that these peoples possess ample possibilities for a coexistence that serves their general interest, especially in terms of the needs of the coming phase of life which actually requires some sort of union among all the group's countries. On this basis, we bless the Libyan-Moroccan union as a practical step for building the Arab Maghreb."

Ahmed Osman, the chairman of the National Rally of Independents, told AL-TADAMUN: "We cannot but underline the extreme importance of this major event, of its dimension to the Libyan and Moroccan peoples and of the efforts through which the leaders of the two countries seek to achieve Arab and Islamic unity and to support the Palestinian people in liberating their land. Moreover, we hope that the other Arab Maghreb countries will join this union."

The Socialist Union of the Peoples Forces, led by Abderrahim Bouabid, convened its Executive Bureau to study the treaty and the meeting resulted in inviting the Central Committee to convene in order to adopt the proper position. Commenting on the treaty, the party's newspaper said: "The treaty is an important event at the level of the Arab Maghreb, the Arab world and Africa because it can develop into something bigger insofar as financial, economic and other policies are concerned."

AL-BAYAN, the newspaper of the Party of Progress and Socialism (the communists), which is led by Ali Yata, raised several questions about the treaty's contents, saying: "It is premature to take a position on this unity because we have not yet been accurately and tangibly familiarized with the form and content of the treaty. But it behooves us to say as of now that whatever falls within the framework of unionist ties between us, the Arab Maghreb countries and the Arab countries cannot but receive our support, backing and blessing."

#### Moroccan, Libyan Gains

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 239, 25-31 Aug 84 pp 20-21

[Article by Talhah Jibril]

[Text] Rabat--On a Ramadan evening at the beginning of July 1983 and at the guest palace in Souissi Quarter of Rabat, Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi sat debating the Sahara problem with the leaders of the Moroccan political parties for 4 consecutive hours. Even though the debate was heated and reached at times the point of exchanging heavy-caliber words, that debate did constitute the prelude for a qualitative Libyan step toward the Sahara problem--a step which would later develop into the conclusion of the Oujda Treaty on 13 August 1984 which calls for the establishment of a union between Morocco and Libya.

Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi's visit to Morocco last summer was the second visit he made after 14 years of estrangement and of tense relations. With the start of the interactions on the Sahara problem in 1975, it seemed as if relations had reached the point of no return, especially since Libya supported the POLISARIO with money and weapons. But a hole in that wall embodied in Libya's non-recognition of the Arab Sahara Republic was enough for contacts to pass through from time to time and to keep the bridges between the two countries open. Those contacts were confidential and were made through unannounced visits to Morocco by Libyan envoy Ahmad Qadhdhaf al-Damm. On the Moroccan side, Ahmed Reda Guedira, the Moroccan king's adviser, took charge of the dossier of the contacts.

When the Moroccan monarch announced in Nairobi in June 1981 his initiative for a referendum in the Sahara, Libya held its peace in return for Morocco holding its peace on convening the next African summit in Tripoli.

But matters soon deteriorated anew to the point of estrangement this time and Moroccan diplomacy exerted active efforts to foil the convocation of the African summit in Tripoli. Matters did not stop at this point but rather went further and relations between the two countries nearly reached the point of confrontation in Chad when reports were circulated to the effect that Morocco might intervene militarily to support Hissein Habre' forces against the forces of Goukouni Weddeye in a manner similar to the Moroccan military intervention in Shaba Province of Zaire in 1978.

Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi's visit to Morocco last summer opened new horizons for the development of relations between the two countries. That visit also resulted in Libya suspending its weapons and munitions supplies to the POLISARIO and in Morocco declaring that Libya has historic rights in Chad. Even though Colonel al-Qadhdhafi declared in Rabat that the referendum was not enough to solve the Sahara problem, Morocco was eager for an end to Libyan support to the POLISARIO. It was the Moroccans' opinion that this would help create a suitable climate for solving the problem in accordance with the Nairobi African summit resolutions.

After the conclusion last year of the brotherhood and concord treaty between Algeria and Tunisia--a treaty which was later joined by Mauritania--Libya tried to join that treaty but an Algerian reservation obstructed Libya's accession to the treaty, especially since relations between the two countries were going through a phase of silent censure as a result of the Moroccan-Libyan rapprochement. At that point, the Libyans presented a new unionist plan to include the Arab Maghreb countries and within whose framework the Sahara problem would be solved. In the wake of the border clash between Morocco and Algeria last June, the Libyans hastened to play the role of the firefighter so that the two countries might not reach the brink of war. The Libyans linked those efforts to the renewed call for establishing a unionist entity among the Arab Maghreb countries.

#### Detailed Format

At the beginning of last June, Libyan envoy 'Umar Ishkal conveyed a detailed formula of the Libyan proposals and the Moroccan monarch expressed his approval

of that formula. Visits between the two countries came in succession and were made on the Moroccan side by Ahmed Reda Guedira, who is considered the god-father of the Moroccan-Libyan union plan.

Even though Libya has been eager to familiarize the Algerians and the Tunisians with the details of its proposals, Algeria approached these proposals with caution. But the Libyans did not despair and persisted with their efforts to convene a mini-summit, initially proposing Tripoli, the capital of Libya, as its site. It was the opinion of the Moroccans that there should be no rush to declare the unionist step and that careful preparations should be made for it, especially since the refusal of Algeria and Tunisia to join the proposed unionist format would lead the area to the policy of axes. But the Libyans were eager to bring their unionist plan into existence.

When Colonel al-Qadhdhafi came to Oujda to meet the Moroccan monarch, it became evident that the concerted contacts that had been made throughout several previous months could now permit announcement of the step embodying the establishment of a union between Morocco and Libya.

#### Greater Maghreb

Insofar as shuffling the cards in the Arab Maghreb area is concerned, the observers believe that Morocco, which has secured Libya's support, will undoubtedly bolster its position in any developments in the Sahara issue which constituted previously a focal point of disagreement between Rabat and Tripoli.

Whereas the Libyans believe that the solution to this problem lies in establishing a unionist formula for the Arab Maghreb countries--a formula that would act as a sponge absorbing the Sahara conflict--the Moroccans believe that neutralizing Libya and having it support Morocco after the union will bolster the future position of the Moroccan negotiator with Algeria. Moreover, Morocco will benefit from Libya's African relations and will neutralize them in its interest as long as the main arena of conflict is the African arena. If Libya departs from the Sahara problem as a main supporter of the POLISARIO, then Algeria will shoulder this burden, which is an exhausting burden under any circumstances.

#### Breaking the Isolation

On the Libyan side, the union step will undoubtedly contribute to breaking Libya's isolation and Morocco will constitute for the Libyans a channel through which to hold dialogue with some parties that are now in a state of alienation, or even confrontation, with Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi.

Another examination of the Moroccan-Libyan union plan will undoubtedly lead us to the conclusion that Morocco has obtained diplomatic, political and economic cards through this step and that Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi has satisfied his ambition to achieve a unionist plan and has found an ideal channel for dialogue with his opponents.

Even though the unionist step surprised everyone, many were convinced that King Hassan II of Morocco and Libyan leader Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi were able in



the wake of their meeting in July 1983 to lay down a firm foundation for dialogue and to explore the various aspects of each other's political tendencies and thinking despite the years of estrangement and conflict between them.

As for the Algerian position toward the declared union between Morocco and Libya, it is noticed that the Algerians have expressed an obvious reservation about this step. The question raised here is: will the position of President Chadli Bendjedid toward the Oujda Treaty be the same as the position of Houari Boumediene, his departed predecessor, toward the Jarbah Treaty between Libya and Tunisia when he was asked to join the treaty and when Boumediene responded: "Algeria does not climb into a train already in motion."

#### Maghreb, European Reaction

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 337, 27 Aug 84 pp 8-10

[Article by al-Salami al-Husni]

[Text] Paris--At the time when all the security precautions and steps had been taken in the city of Oujda and when it had become certain that King Hassan II was coming to the capital of East Morocco, the expectations were inclined toward the possibility of a meeting between King Hassan II and Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid. Those expectations were not offhanded because there had been reliable information on Saudi-Tunisian contacts with both Algeria and Morocco to hold this meeting with the aim of making some strides forward in settling the bilateral differences before the convocation of the Arab summit in Riyadh. In view of the security measures witnessed by the Moroccan city of Oujda last week, the observers thought that the Moroccan-Algerian meeting would be held, especially since it has been customary for both sides not to announce the date of such a meeting. Some Western press circles went as far as saying that king Fahd of Saudi Arabia was on his way to Oujda to attend the meeting. But all the expectations evaporated with the announcement of Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi's arrival in Oujda and his meeting with King Hassan II immediately upon his arrival. It then became certain that Chadli Bendjedid was not coming to Oujda and that the issue had nothing to do with an Algerian-Moroccan meeting but was rather connected to a purely Moroccan-Libyan summit for which hasty preparations had been made, according to the information available to the Western capitals. It seems that everything had been ready since the visit of Reda Guedira, King Hassan II's adviser, to Tripoli. The two sides announced in Oujda the signing of a unity treaty between the two countries, with each side maintaining its internal sovereignty and its defense affairs, although the treaty did not touch on military and defense affairs. The two sides also agreed on the method of the ratification of the treaty--a method which calls for submitting the treaty to a popular referendum to be held in both Morocco and Libya before the end of this month, i.e., before Libya's celebration of the 15th anniversary of its revolution. It is likely that the text of the treaty will be published very soon.

Even though the treaty can be summed up essentially as a joint cooperation treaty with firmer and stronger formats of cooperation than the ordinary formats, although it provides for maintaining the institutions and sovereignty of

both countries, the two sides concerned have called it a unity treaty between the two countries without this unity being a merger. Ultimately, it may be similar to any agreement calling for raising cooperation to its highest levels. Despite this, the treaty has presented to the official, political and even popular circles in the Arab Maghreb a new situation fraught with questions, led by the question concerning the failure of the two countries to join the brotherhood and concord treaty concluded between Tunisia and Algeria in 1983, a treaty which was later joined by Mauritania, instead of concluding a new treaty that is not different from the first one. The failure to answer these questions is perhaps what has made political and official circles in the Arab Maghreb countries take their time and weigh their words before expressing a position on the unionist agreement between Libya and Morocco.

In Morocco, the Istiqlal Party and the Socialist Union of the Popular Forces announced that they summoned their leaderships to meet in order to take a position toward the treaty. Within the framework of Morocco's economic and political conditions and circumstances, this position cannot but be a positive one. These parties welcome such a step and treaty that gives Morocco a new economic boost. M'Hamed Boucetta, chairman of the Moroccan Istiqlal Party, announced that the treaty did not touch on the military or defense aspects. In Algeria, the reactions have been very reserved and the Algerians have been content with signals. Immediately upon announcement of the agreement, Cherif Messaadia went to Tunis and met with President Bourguiba and Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali. Messaadia stated that after the meeting that Tunisia and Algeria would cling to the brotherhood and concord treaty concluded between them and joined by Mauritania. A few days later, Beji Gaid Essebsi, the Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, made a statement along the same line without expressing any other position toward the unionist treaty between Morocco and Libya. Meanwhile, the Algerian papers underlined the Algerian officials' meetings with the POLISARIO leaders and their assertion to these leaders that Algeria will not abandon their cause. Generally, none of the Arab Maghreb countries has expressed open opposition to the unionist agreement between Morocco and Libya. The position toward this agreement has been confined so far to references to the similar treaty between Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania and to stressing that this treaty is still open to whomever wishes to join it. Observers have noticed that the Tunisian and Algerian papers have discussed the treaty very briefly and in their inside pages, as if the treaty does not constitute an important event. These papers have been content with publishing the official comments and statements in the two countries without touching on a frank position toward the treaty.

Informed sources have reported that President Bourguiba was notified before the conclusion of the treaty and that King Hassan II took the initiative to inform the Tunisian president of this treaty and of its contents. Meanwhile, on his way back home, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi held a round of talks in Tunis and Algiers dealing with the treaty concluded between Libya and Morocco. Informed Moroccan circles report that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi proposed to President Chadli Bendjedid and President Bourguiba that a Maghreb summit be held to include the five Maghreb countries in Tripoli on the occasion of the celebration of the Libyan revolution's 15th anniversary. But such a summit is still uncertain because none of the other countries has expressed its intention to attend it. King Hassan II's participation is also uncertain.



On the other hand, President Chadli Bendjedid has been careful not to take a stance of opposition to the treaty, but without expressing pleasure with it. It seems that what has been circulated about Algerian-Syrian contacts on this issue is untrue because the main subject of these contacts has been the Palestinian issue and A'geria's attempt to mediate between the PLO and the Palestinian leadership. Meanwhile, King Hassan II has familiarized the Arab leaders with the details of the unionist treaty with Libya.

In fact, the reserve and reluctance displayed by the Maghreb capitals in taking any offhand stance of opposition to the Libyan-Moroccan treaty is due fundamentally to the fear of these capitals of an escalation of the competition in the sphere of treaties, especially in the wake of the Algerian-Tunisian treaty and of the new treaty because such treaties create in the Arab Maghreb area axes that do not lead to the desired unity but rather lead to subsidiary conflicts. Officials in the Maghreb capitals believe that the Libyan-Moroccan treaty emanates ultimately from the special circumstances being experienced by Morocco and that its fate may be similar to that of the other unionist treaties concluded by Colonel al-Qadhdhafi since he assumed power. This aspect has dominated the reactions of the European press in particular. On the day following the conclusion of the treaty, the European papers emerged with headlines similar in meaning: Al-Qadhdhafi marries for the seventh time. This is because this is the seventh unionist attempt made by al-Qadhdhafi. On 27 December 1969, the Tripoli charter on the tripartite federation between Libya, Egypt and Sudan was signed. The federation was jointed by Hafiz al-Asad on 27 November 1970, i.e., 2 weeks after he assumed power. But this federation did not survive long. On 17 April 1971, the Confederation of Arab Republics was declared between Libya, Syria and Egypt and on 12 August 1972, al-Qadhdhafi and al-Sadat decided to establish a merger between Egypt and Libya but this attempt ended with estrangement at the beginning of December 1973. On 12 January 1974, the Jarbah Treaty was concluded, calling for an immediate merger between Tunisia and Libya. But this treaty evaporated quickly even though al-Qadhdhafi continued to demand its implementation. On 10 September 1980, a merger between Libya and Syria was announced in Tripoli. But its implementation continues to be suspended. On 6 January 1981, al-Qadhdhafi declared a merger between Libya and Chad. This merger was broken upon Goukouni's return to power. For the seventh time, al-Qadhdhafi is trying the party of unity at any cost, this time with Morocco. After the unity treaty with Morocco, al-Qadhdhafi will have actually tried unity with all kinds of regimes present in the Arab homeland, beginning with single-party regimes, military regimes, a civilian republican regime and now with a monarchic regime. At the same time, he has established in his country a political system which he calls a "jamahiriyah" and which is incompatible with any political regime with which Colonel al-Qadhdhafi has tried to establish a merger or some other sort of union. As a result of the failure of the previous attempts, international circles have, perhaps, not taken the Moroccan-Libyan treaty as seriously as it should be and have been content to watch, excluding the U.S. position which reflects the U.S. Administration's concern over the consequences that this Moroccan-Libyan unity may lead to.

In any case, the Arab Maghreb area that has been witnessing for more than a year attempts to bring the viewpoints of its countries closer to each other and to rid these countries of the mutual and subsidiary disagreements and problems -- this area is now in the forefront of international conflict and is seeking an alternative to the previous policy of confronting these conflicts and of maintaining its independence. This alternative policy, which is still in the phase of search and formation, is also the subject of debate. There are those who believe that this policy is embodied in any form of unity between the Arab Maghreb countries and those who believe that it is embodied primarily in establishing the foundations of democracy which represents the impregnable stronghold against foreign intervention and gives peoples the right to make their own decisions. In any case, the treaties have replaced these options. These treaties may lead to this new policy and to all the options or they may lead to the creation of axes of conflicts of a new kind. Therefore, the danger of the transformation of the Arab Maghreb area into an area of bilateral treaties seems undoubtedly to pose a threat to the tendency of uniting the Arab Maghreb by creating useless axes. But if the Arab Maghreb leaders deals with this situation with a great deal of wisdom, which numerous signs indicate that they are doing, and without relinquishing the objective of renouncing the disagreements and of adopting the path of rapprochement and unity, then these bilateral treaties which seems outwardly as if they are in competition will turn -- if we base our assessment solely on the element of optimism -- into a natural prelude for a more comprehensive policy among the five countries of the Arab Maghreb.

#### Details, Future of Treaty

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 337, 27 Aug 84 pp 10-12

[Article by Hasan al-Rashidi]

[Text] Rabat -- King Hassan II of Morocco delivered a 65-minute speech dealing with the historical background of this occasion [not further specified], in addition to the topics of the hour, led by the conclusion by Libya and Morocco of a treaty that provides for the establishment of a union between the two countries -- a treaty signed by King Hassan II and Libyan President Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi on 13 August in the city of Oujda near the Moroccan-Algerian border. The king also reaffirmed that the legislative elections will be held on schedule on 14 September and announced for the first time that those not belonging to political bodies and organizations will be prevented from running as candidates in these elections.

In his speech, King Hassan II did not refer at all to the Sahara issue. However, he revealed the motives leading to this sudden marriage between Morocco and Libya.

King Hassan II revealed that the idea of establishing the so-called Arab African union between Morocco and Libya began on the 13th of July when he received in Casablanca an envoy of the Libyan president who delivered to him a message from Colonel al-Qadhdhafi. The king added that this message was a copy of a message which Colonel al-Qadhdhafi has circulated to all the Arab

kings and presidents containing the objective reasons which motivated al-Qadhdhafi to make sudden visits last year to a number of Arab capitals with which Tripoli's relations were tense and lukewarm. The most significant of those reasons, according to the message, was the desire to rise above the sensitivities and to have Libya contribute to settling the differences and to clearing the Arab atmosphere so that the Arabs may not find themselves forced to accept a dark Arab destiny as a result of the accumulated Arab differences and of the highly charged atmosphere -- all of which caused the Libyan president to experience a severe crisis of remorse toward this situation for which the Libyan message held all the Arab leaders responsible.

The Moroccan monarch went on to reveal further: "After reading the contents of the message of His Excellency the Colonel, I told the Libyan envoy: Tell President Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi that we share his bitterness and disappointment and that in my capacity as chairman of the Islamic Conference Organization, I support the convocation of an urgent Arab summit as soon as possible but that I do not believe that the climate is right."

King Hassan II then quickly proposed the establishment of unity between Libya and Morocco and asked the Libyan envoy to convey the proposal to President Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, who responded 2 days later, welcoming the Moroccan offer. Morocco had four conditions at the time:

1. The need for the emergence of a real and determined will in the two countries for the establishment of unity between them.
2. The need to believe that this will is subject to geographic necessities.
3. Efforts toward a specific objective and not on the basis of hollow slogans.
4. Maintaining the idea -- the plan -- as confidential as possible.

Nearly a month later and after active diplomatic moves along the Rabat-Tripoli axis, an announcement was made on 13 August in the city of Oujda on the conclusion of a treaty between Morocco and Libya to establish a union between the two countries.

#### Federal [ittihadiyah] Court to Settle Disputes

The Moroccan monarch also revealed the contents of the treaty which includes 16 articles and on which a popular referendum will be held on the 31st of August.

The most important contents of the treaty are that the presidency of the Arab African Union is the main agency concerned with making decisions and that the position of the president will be assumed alternately by the heads of the two states. In addition to the presidency, a special secretariat will be established and will be headquartered in Libya. The secretary general will be a Moroccan national. The Arab African Union will also have a political council,

an economic council, a defense council and a scientific and cultural council. The union shall also include a unionist committee which will consist of members from the Moroccan Chamber of Deputies -- the Moroccan parliament -- and members of the Libyan General People's Congress and its task will be to present recommendations to the presidency. The Arab African Union will also include an executive council formed to the cabinets of both governments and its task will be to follow up on and to coordinate the decisions emanating from the other agencies and to hold periodic meetings in each of the two countries alternately. Article 7 of the treaty points out that the Arab African Union will have a federal court that will examine the disputes that may develop and whose decisions will be binding. It is expected that contacts between the two countries will continue on the possibility of taking the dossiers of the disputes to the International Court of Justice in the Hague in case the federal court fails to resolve them. The Arab African Union seeks, according to the text of the treaty, to cement the bonds of fraternity, to contribute to uniting the Arab Maghreb and to achieve the Arab nation's goals and aspirations. The text of the treaty stresses the importance of each of the two country's absolute respect for the sovereignty of the other, for non-intervention in each other's internal affairs and for repelling any aggression aimed against either of the two allied countries. Article 13 points out that other Arab or African countries may join this treaty, provided that the two countries approve such an accession. However, it is certain that Morocco and Libya will now be in the process of putting the house in order while waiting for the Arab or African guests wishing to join the Arab African Union.

#### "Innocent" Treaty

The most important background details raised by the declaration on the establishment of a union between Morocco and Libya have continued to herald the possibility of the Arab Maghreb area embarking on a phase of entrenchment of the policy of axes and of expansion of the disagreements under the cover of building the edifice of the Great Arab Maghreb, especially in the wake of the tripartite treaty concluded in March 1983 between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. Consequently, several questions have been raised regarding the future of the area. Therefore, the Moroccan monarch has had to make it clear that the Arab African Union treaty is innocent and has not been concluded against anybody and rather that it complements the tripartite brotherhood and concord treaty. Now that Morocco has made its official position on the brotherhood and concord treaty clear, it is expected that the countries concerned will respond with their reactions, especially since the initial signals coming from Nouakchott, Algiers and Tunis have not been optimistic about the seriousness of this unionist plan, taking into consideration the outcome of six previous Libyan experiences in this regard. It is worth noting that Morocco has previously rejected Tunisian offers inviting it to join the brotherhood and concord treaty because of Algeria's and Mauritania's continued support for the POLISARIO in the Sahara conflict. As for Libya, its nomination to join the same treaty was confronted with Tunisian pre-conditions. It is evident from examining these given facts that the first background dictated by declaration of the Arab African Union proceeds in the direction



of entrenching the isolation in which Rabat and Tripoli have continued to be since they rejected participation in the brotherhood and concord treaty and, consequently, in the direction of creating a new axis parallel to the Nouakchott-Algiérs-Tunis axis in order to pass new messages and to shuffle all the interlocked cards, beginning with a settling of the Western Sahara conflict and with working to unite the Arab Maghreb area and ending with the search for an effective role in the scenario of Mideast events in the coming phase.

At the bilateral Moroccan-Libyan level, it seems that the most important background of the event will continue to be, until further notice, the enabling of Tripoli to end its Arab and international isolation and to restore it to the forefront through the gate of Rabat which contributes in one way or another to polishing the image of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi in the eyes of its allies, led by the United States.

It also seems that Morocco, which is waging an economic and development battle dictated by the requirements of completing the unity of its soil (territorial unity), is determined to play the card to win all, especially since the ice which continued to dominate its relations with Libya for 9 years has melted, since the level of trade exchange has been revived to the point of prosperity and, finally, since the indications are that the dossiers of the Sahara conflict will be transferred from the OAU to the Arab League. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi underlined such a transference recently when he opened the ministerial Afro-Arab Cooperation Conference in Tripoli, saying: the Sahara conflict is an Arab problem that must be solved within an Arab framework. This new development in Libya's position toward the Sahara issue can be utilized by Morocco according to a joint concept that may be revealed in the future with the aim of avoiding the torpedoing of the OAU which has been threatened with such an explosion because of its inability to end the Western Sahara and Chad problems. To achieve the same objective, Libya will be relied upon to exert its economic weight on a number of friendly African countries, such as Burkina Faso -- Upper Volta formerly -- Ghana and others, to contribute to this rescue.

To sum up, the future of the Arab African Union between Morocco and Libya remains, without any doubt, captive to the idea of imposing the convictions of the two countries on the other countries of the area and on influencing them to draw them into this alliance. This requires the presence of a minimum of understanding on a common ground for building the Great Arab Maghreb.

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SOVIET POLITICAL, MILITARY GAINS IN RELATIONS WITH ARABS REVIEWED

Soviet Political Initiatives

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 237, 25-31 Aug 84 pp 10-12

[Article by Ilyas Harfush]

[Text] In the past weeks, Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East area has been exceptionally active. For the first time since the U. S. withdrawal from Lebanon and the freezing of President's Reagan's initiative, the Soviet Union has played an active and practical role under the slogan of the "Middle East peace plan." Vladimir Polyakov, the head of the Middle East Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has conveyed the peace plan to a number of the area's countries and discussed it with them within the framework of interesting timing.

The Soviet peace initiative was declared in the wake of the successful visit made to Moscow by Shaykh Salim al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti minister of defense, of the talk about bolstering Jordanian-Soviet military cooperation and of the resumption of Egyptian-Soviet diplomatic relations. These moves have caused some to expect the massive return of the Soviets to the Middle East.

But when did the Soviets depart from the area in order that they may return to it?

An official U. S. report issued by the U. S. administration's Disarmament Agency in 1979 estimates the total value of Soviet exports to the Arab countries between 1974-78 at \$11.8 billion, compared to \$12.85 billion representing the value of the U. S. weapons sold in the area in the same period. It is believed that this sum remained the same in the following 5 years of 1978-83.

What, then, are the objectives of the new Soviet movement? What are the details of the Soviet peace initiative? Does the Soviet plan seek to establish peace in the area or to create new markets for the export of weapons?



AL-MAJALLAH recounts here in figures the details of the Soviet Union's relationship with the Arab world's countries.

Western diplomatic circles in the Middle East have followed Polyakov's tour with a great deal of interest and have compared the circumstances accompanying the Soviet Union's announcement of its current plan with the circumstances which accompanied the plan of the late President Leonid Brezhev of 15 September 1982 -- a plan whose details were announced only 2 days after President Reagan's initiative. These circles note the extent of the difference in the situation that has developed in the Arab area and the impact of international relations on this situation in the past 2 years. Even though the Soviet Union has not followed an aggressive policy in the Middle East and in numerous other areas in this period because of its coming under an interim regime which did not last long, namely Yuri Andropov's regime, the developments occurring in the area have contributed greatly to achieving strategic gains for the Soviet Union.

One of the factors which Western diplomacy is viewing at present with big concern is the factor of the indecision and failure that accompanied the announcement of the U. S. initiative (Reagan's initiative) and that have caused this initiative to be practically frozen. This is in addition to the subsequent setbacks suffered by U.S. Diplomacy in Lebanon and in Washington's relations with a number of its friends and allies in the area, especially Jordan. By virtue of the game of balances which imposes itself on the international relations -- this reality inevitable led the Soviet Union to try to take advantage of this situation, which is almost a semi-vacuum, and to try to fill it by political and military means. But the main reason for the failure of U.S. diplomacy -- a reason which Washington tries to evade -- is that the U.S. president has remained captive to political and electoral circumstances that have not permitted him to obtain from Israel the concessions necessary for the acceptance of his initiative. Moreover, the initiative itself lacked courage in connection with facing up to Arab and Palestinian rights and taking a position supporting these rights. This caused many Arabs, especially the Palestinians, to be reluctant to support the initiative. All this has been coupled with a conventional U.S. view of the Middle East conflict as a part of the international struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, even though President Reagan's administrations received direct, numerous and repeated clarifications from a large number of its friends in the area trying to convey the true picture of the conflict as understood by the Arabs, namely that the Israeli and Zionist pattern is more sharp and urgent than the Soviet danger, that the Middle East conflict is a conflict between right and wrong and not between white and black and that the Soviet Union stands with the Arabs in this conflict whereas Israel gets all the military and financial aid it asks for from the United States -- all of which leads to a difficult situation insofar as the state of Arab-U.S. relations is concerned.

The timing of the Soviet initiative is interesting, considering that its announcement came at a time when Egyptian-Soviet relations were restored

at the ambassadorial level, when Shaykh Salim al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti minister of defense, made a visit, described as successful, to Moscow and when Kuwait is awaiting the visit of Andrey Gromyko, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, next September. This is the first visit by such a high Soviet official to a Gulf state. It is well known that Kuwait is the only Gulf Cooperation Council member that has diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union at present. In addition to all this, there is talk about bolstering Jordanian-Soviet military cooperation and about Moscow's readiness to supply the Jordanian armed forces with the missiles which they need and which they have not been able to obtain from the United States.

The diplomatic reports note that the visit of Gen Zayd ibn Shakir, the general commander of the Jordanian armed forces, to Moscow and his talks there with Defense Minister Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov were for the purpose of discussing Jordan's military needs and that they embarked on the details of this cooperation, especially on the possibility of Jordan's purchase of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles. Western observers in the Middle East do not forget to note with interest the position taken by the Soviet Union toward the Iraq-Iran war, the Soviet Union's political and military support for Iraq and its supplying of Iraq with sophisticated types of guns and tanks, not neglecting either the impact of this positive stance on the Arab countries that support Iraq. Despite the political hostility between Syria and Iraq, Soviet support for Baghdad has not affected the quality of Syrian-Soviet relations. Moreover, sensitivities between Syria and the PLO at this time have not affected Moscow's relations with either side. This is why the Soviet Union has enjoyed a good position in its relations with the various Arab sides and why it has relied on a traditional strategy in its diplomatic presence in the area -- a strategy founded on the necessity of disregarding inter-Arab disagreements and of not charting Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East in the light of such disagreements.

#### Right Opportunity

It is within this framework that the Soviet initiative has taken great advantage of the shortcomings in Reagan's initiative and of U.S. diplomatic faltering in the Middle East. One of the most significant things noticed by Western observers in this initiative is that it is a new reading of Brezhnev's initiative and that it reaffirms the points in Brezhnev's initiative, added to which is the fifth article of the Fez Summit resolutions pertaining to the interim period during which it is proposed the West Bank and Gaza Strip are to be put under UN supervision for a period of no more than several months.

The Soviet proposals begin by asserting that experience proves that the attempt to impose partial or bilateral settlements on the Arab countries leads nowhere. The Soviets have in mind, of course, the frozen peace (or cold peace, as the Egyptians call it) between Egypt and Israel and the abolished accord between Lebanon and Israel. This is why the best approach is to have "collective efforts" exerted by all the parties concerned, i.e., the holding of talks at an international conference on the Middle East -- a

conference to be held especially to discuss the arrangements and steps for a settlement.

This conference:

1. Must have the objective of finding solutions to all aspects of the Middle East conflict.
2. Must end with the conclusion of a treaty or a number of treaties that cover all elements of the conflict: withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights, including their right to establish their state, and international guarantees to supervise the adherence to this settlement.
3. The conference must include all the Arab countries that have common borders with Israel, namely Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, in addition to participation by the PLO as an equal member in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Soviet Union and the United States are also to participate, considering that they play, by virtue of the circumstances, a fundamental role in Middle East issues. They must participate as they have participated in the chairmanship of the previous conference on the Middle East (Geneva conference). Other Middle Eastern countries or Arab countries from adjacent areas capable of contributing positively to the conference may also participate, provided that their participation has the approval of all concerned.
4. The conference must be held under the auspices of the United Nations.
5. The conference's fundamental work must be carried out by committees including representatives of the participants to discuss the main issues in the conflict: withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the border issues, the Palestinian issue and the question of Jerusalem, termination of the state of war, the issue of the security of the area's countries that have been involved in the conflict and the international guarantees to supervise implementation of the accords.
6. The countries taking part in the conference must be represented in the first phase of the conference by their ministers of foreign affairs and in the subsequent phases by their representatives, provided that the ministers be prepared to follow up on the progress of the conference's activities.

#### Reactions

Arab reactions to the Soviet plan have been generally positive whereas Israel's reaction has been completely negative. In their comments, Israeli officials have focused on blackmail on the issue of the absence of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv since the June 1967 war. An official comment by Israeli radio said: "It is unrealistic for a country that has no relations with one of the parties to the conflict to play the role of middleman.

Moreover, Israel still believes that it is better for peace to be established through direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict instead of through international meetings." It is the opinion of the Israelis that the main obstacle in the face of the Soviet plan is the issue of the PLO's participation on which this plan insists. "Like Israel, the Americans reject this participation. Even should a U.S.-Soviet agreement be reached on this point, Israel deals with the reality and not with assumptions."

On the other hand, Egypt has welcomed the Soviet initiative at various levels. However, the Egyptians have pointed out indirectly that the proposal of an international conference is not a new one and not a "Soviet invention." A commentary by Egyptian radio said that "even though the Soviet proposals are important under the present circumstances, they have come 7 years late. Many things in the Middle East could have been different had the Soviet proposals been declared at the right time. All know that in the wake of President al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Egypt called for holding an international conference in which all the parties directly or indirectly concerned with the Middle East crisis participate. As a result of the political changes created by that visit in Israel and the United States, these two countries agreed to the convocation of the conference at Mina House in Cairo in the presence of all the parties to which the Soviet plan refers." Despite this observation, Egyptian diplomacy has left the door open for positive results, especially in light of the renewed relations with Moscow. Dr 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid, the minister of foreign affairs, stressed that "Egypt welcomes the international conference, provided that all the parties concerned, especially the United States and Israel, agree to it." The same position was supported by Dr Usamah al-Baz, President Mubarak's political adviser, who said: "Egypt could not be reserved toward the international conference because it was the originator of this proposal as of October 1973." Dr al-Baz noted that the concept of the international conference is compatible with the UN Security Council resolution adopted last December. Egyptian policy supports the joint U.S.-Soviet communique issued in October 1977, calling for the convocation of the international conference in Geneva.

In addition to these comments, the reactions of the other Arab circles to their meetings with Vladimir Polyakov have been positive. But this does not necessarily mean that the chances of the success of the international conference, whether held at a Soviet invitation or at the invitation of UN Secretary General Perez De Cuellar, are good. The conditions prevalent at the time the joint U.S.-Soviet communique was issued in the wake of the summit between Presidents Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev do not exist at present. It is difficult to imagine the convocation of an international conference given the tense relations currently existing between the two superpowers. But the fundamental regional factor in the success of any initiative like the Soviet initiative is tied to the quality of Soviet-Israeli relations on the one hand and to the extent of the ability of the U.S. administration to pressure Israel and to obtain from it the concessions necessary for establishing a real and lasting peace in the Middle East area on the other hand. It remains to be said that the fundamental element in



the success or failure of any initiative is the degree of Arab solidarity vis-a-vis such an initiative and the extent of the ability of the common Arab position to utilize the right international circumstances in the interest of a peace established on Arab justice and rights. In this regard, the Soviet proposals undoubtedly represent a positive and extremely important step which must be utilized. The conditions dictating its time at present must also be exploited.

#### Soviet Mideast Military Presence

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 237, 25-31 Aug 84 pp 12-14

[Text] The Soviet presence in the Arab area is growing to the degree that some observers believe that there are 13,000 Soviet experts in the area. What is the distinguishing characteristic of this presence? Is it the political or ideological feature or is it the military feature? To what degree does the Arab world arm itself from the Soviet Union? Colleague Muhammad 'Ali Qasim answers these questions in the following report.

The primary characteristic distinguishing the Soviet presence in the area since the 1950's is its military presence and its armaments. Whereas Moscow has largely failed to "penetrate" the area ideologically, socially and economically, contrary to the prevalent situation insofar as the U.S. and Western presence in the area generally is concerned, it has succeeded on the other hand in establishing strong relations of military cooperation with a number of Arab countries, with the Soviet Union constituting the main source of armaments for these countries. Even though these arms agreements date back to the mid-1950's, their importance grew considerably in the wake of the June 1967 war. The Arab frontline states confronting Israel, namely Egypt, Syria and Iraq in particular, were able in the 1967-73 period to rebuild and re-equip their armed forces and to modernize these forces in a manner and with a speed that would have been difficult for them to accomplish without the Soviet backing made available to them at the time. Whereas Egypt departed in the mid-1970's from the framework of military cooperation with Moscow, this cooperation continued and grew stronger between Moscow and Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the 1970's witnessed a further cementing of military relations between the Soviets on the one hand and Libya, Algeria and South Yemen on the other. These five countries have become traditionally the biggest recipients of Soviet weapons delivered to the area.

Syria, Iraq and Libya have been somewhat similar in terms of the dimensions of the military support they have received from the Soviet Union in the past 10 years. They are followed at relatively lower levels by Algeria and South Yemen. The said period also witnessed the accession of another Arab country to the list of countries receiving weapons from the Soviet Union. In addition to the Yemen Arab Republic, which has continued to receive Soviet weapons with

almost no interruption, though they are in limited quantity and quality, Jordan and Kuwait have concluded very important weapon deals with the Soviet Union in the past 3 years.

#### Number One Source

In the past decade, the Soviet Union topped the list of suppliers in terms of the quantity and numbers of weapons and military equipment supplied to the Middle East countries by the various international sources, even though the financial value of the Soviet weapon exports remained second to the value of U.S. military exports to the area in the same period.

Before embarking on the details of the arms agreements between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union, it may be beneficial to turn our attention a little to the main features characterizing general Soviet policy at this level. It can be said that Moscow has been following for a long time a constant course in connection with the export of weapons and military equipment to the outside world, whether exported to Third World countries or to Warsaw Pact member states. The mainstays of this course can be summed up in the following two main features:

1. Restraint from exporting certain types and varieties of weapons and equipment and confinement of their use to Soviet forces, to the exclusion of all others, because of various security and strategic reasons. This applies, for example, to strategic and nuclear weapons, such as intercontinental missiles, submarines carrying nuclear missiles and heavy and medium bombers. It also applies to certain types of tactical and non-nuclear weapons, as in the case of certain types of fighter planes, tanks, missiles and munitions that have not been exported to any foreign party.
2. The development of special "export" prototypes (i.e. prototypes designed exclusively for use by foreign countries) of certain weapons operational in the Soviet forces. These export prototypes are usually derived from the original prototypes designed for Soviet use but are different from the originals in several respects, the most important being the electronic and radar equipment, the type of weapons installed and the engines propelling them. In most cases, these are "sensitive" areas which the Soviet try to "protect," not risking their fall into undesirable hands. The outcome of this approach in numerous instances is that the countries receiving the Soviet military aid get simplified weapons that are less effective than the original prototypes from which they are derived. This makes it difficult to evaluate precisely the qualities and the actual practical efficiency of these weapons via-a-vis the Western weapons that are supposed to counter them.

## In 10 Years

The Soviet weapons delivered to the Arab countries during the past 10 years are divided as follows:

Syria was able to make up for all the weapons its forces had lost in the October 1973 war. At the onset of 1979, Syria was able, according to the Israeli sources, to develop its capabilities by 40 percent for its armored forces, by 50 percent for its air defense forces and by 30 percent for its air forces in comparison with the position of these forces on the eve of the said war. The process of building the Syrian forces was still going on when the Lebanon war erupted in June 1982. This war again inflicted on the Syrian forces losses which the Soviet Union quickly compensated, helping Syria to bolster its military capabilities in an unprecedented manner. It may be almost impossible to determine precisely the total volume of the weapons received by Syria from the Soviet Union. However, it may be possible to make a count of the Soviet weapons delivered to Syria in the past 10 years:

Nearly 4,000 tanks, including 1,200 T-74 and T-72 tanks, 2,400 T-62 tanks and the rest consisting of T-55 tanks.

Nearly 600 fighter planes, including 35 Mig-25 interceptors, 150 Mig-23 interceptors (including the improved Mig-23 M F variety), 100 Mig-27 assault fighters, 80 Sukhoi-22 assault fighters and 200 Mig-21 fighters.

A total of 700 self-propelled 122-mm and 152-mm field guns.

A total of 2,000 combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

Nearly 20,000 anti-tank missiles.

Surface-to-surface SS-21 missiles with a range of 120 km and Scud missiles with a range of 300 km.

More than 100 batteries of anti-aircraft missiles, including SAM-6, SAM-8, SAM-9, SAM-11 and SAM-5.

A total of 200 helicopters, including 36 MIL-24 assault helicopters and 4 Kamov-25 anti-submarine helicopters.

Two anti-submarine frigates of the Petya variety.

Twenty Osa-2 assault boats equipped with missiles.

Libya: Among the Arab countries, Libya has been the biggest recipient of Soviet weapons in the past 10 years. According to the figures cited by the U.S. Department of Defense, these weapons have included the following:

Nearly 3,000 tanks, including 500 T-74 and T-72 tanks, 1,000 T-62 tanks and 1,500 T-55 tanks.

Nearly 425 fighters and bombers, including 12 Tupolev-22 planes, 143 Mig-23 planes, 18 Mig-27 planes, 94 Mig-21 planes and 102 Sukhoi-22 planes.

A total of 200 self-propelled 122 mm and 152 mm guns.

A total of 100 batteries of anti-aircraft missiles of the SAM-6, SAM-9 and SAM-2 and 3 types.

SS-12, Scud and Frog-7 surface-to-surface missiles.

Six Foxtrot submarines.

Six missile warships of the Nanuchka type.

Twelve assault boats of the Osa-2 type.

Iraq:

Nearly 1,500 tanks, including nearly 300 T-74 and T-72 tanks. The rest are of the T-62 type.

Nearly 350 fighters and bombers, including 12 Tupolev-22 planes, 24 Mig-25 fighters, 150 Mig-23 and Mig-27 fighters, 80 Mig-21 fighters and 80 Sukhoi-22 fighters.

A total of 200 self-propelled 122-mm and 152-mm guns.

SAM-6, SAM-8 and SAM-9 anti-aircraft missiles.

SS-12, Scud and Frog-7 surface-to-surface missiles.

A total of 150 helicopters, including 60 of the Mil-24 type.

Algeria:

Nearly 500 tanks, including 100 T-72 tanks. The rest are of the T-62 variety.

Nearly 120 fighter planes, including 22 Mig-25, 20 Mig-23, 20 Mig-27, and 32 Sukhoi-20 and 30 Mig-21 aircraft.

A total of 60 self-propelled 122-mm and 152-mm field guns.

A total of 500 armored infantry vehicles of the BMP-1 variety.

SAM-6 and SAM-9 anti-aircraft missiles.

A total of 24 assault helicopters of the Mil-24 variety.

Two Romeo submarines.



Two missile craft of the Koni type.

Four missile warships of the Nanuchka variety.

Eight assault boats of the Osa-2 type.

South Yemen:

A total of 200 tanks of the T-62, T-54 and T-55 types.

A total of 80 fighter planes, including 24 Mig-23, 24 Mig-21 and 30 Sukhoi-22 planes.

Fifteen assault helicopters of the Mil-24 type.

SAM-6, SAM-2 and SAM-3 anti-aircraft missiles.

Frog and Scud surface-to-surface missiles.

Five assault boats of the Osa-2 type.

A logistical support vessel of the Ropuchka type.

Yemen Arab Republic:

A total of 400 T-54 and T-55 tanks.

A total of 300 armored personnel carriers.

SAM-2 and SAM-9 anti-aircraft missiles.

Fifty fighter planes, including 30 Mig-21 and 20 Sukhoi-22 aircraft.

Two assault boats of the Osa type.

Jordan:

Twenty batteries of SAM-8 anti-aircraft missiles.

Sixteen ZSU-23 anti-aircraft guns.

Kuwait:

SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles.

Frog-7 surface-to-surface missiles.

ZSU-23 anti-aircraft guns.

[First Box on Page 13] Number of Soviet Military Experts in Arab Countries

	1978	1980	1983
Syria	2,580	4,150	5,200
Libya	1,750	1,820	2,200
Iraq	1,200	1,065	2,000
Algeria	1,000	1,000	1,250
South Yemen	550	1,100	1,375
Yemen Arab Republic	150	130	500
Morocco	10	10	10
Kuwait	-	5	5
Other Countries	10	20	25
Total	7,250	9,300	12,500

[Second Box on Page 13] Soviet Weapons Existing in Arab World

A total of 8,160 tanks and self-propelled guns.

A total of 9,100 armored personnel carriers and vehicles.

A total of 8,060 towed artillery pieces.

A total of 2,300 supersonic combat aircraft.

A total of 310 subsonic combat aircraft.

A total of 90 other aircraft (transport, training and so forth).

A total of 650 helicopters.

A total of 18,720 anti-aircraft missiles.

A total of 26 major warships.

A total of 26 minor warships.

A total of 54 missile assault boats.

Seven submarines.

[First Box on Page 14] Value of Soviet Weapons Supplied to Arabs in 10 Years.

In the past 10 years (1974-84), the Arab countries acquired Soviet weapons and combat equipment valued at \$30 billion and distributed as follows:

Syria: \$9.6 billion.

Libya: \$8.9 billion.

Iraq: \$7.6 billion.

Algeria: \$2.2 billion.

Egypt: \$1.2 billion (until 1976).  
South Yemen: \$700 million.  
Yemen Arab Republic: \$450 million.  
Kuwait: \$427 million.  
Jordan: \$200 million.

[Second Box on Page 14] Causes of Downing of Mig-23's in Lebanon War

It is well known that Moscow follows a different course in connection with the export of weapons. It develops special "export" prototypes designed for use by foreign countries only and derived from the original prototypes designed for Soviet use but different from these original prototypes in several aspects. The examples of this Soviet approach toward the export of weapons are numerous. The most obvious such example pertains perhaps to the fighter bombers of which simplified types have been exported to the outside world. These types are less efficient than the original Soviet prototypes. This has happened with Syria, for example, whose Mig-23 fighters in the 1982 Lebanon war were much less capable than the "real" Soviet fighter carrying this name. Those Mig-23's were compelled to face the Israeli F-15 Eagle and F-16 Falcon aircraft under circumstances where the latter were fully equipped and armed and similar in principle to the fighters in service in the U.S. Air Force. It suffices to note, for example, that the original Soviet Mig-23 is equipped with a radar having a range of nearly 90 km and with an engine exceeding in power by nearly 20 percent the engine of the Mig-23 designed for export, which is fitted with a radar that has a range of no more than 30 km.

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CSO: 4404/612

TURKEY'S 'ANTI-ARMENIAN POLICIES' IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES CITED

Tehran ALIK in Armenian 27 Aug 84 pp 2,7

[Text] In the first quarter of the year, Turkey's anti-Armenian policies focused on two areas: First, the effort to closely monitor the trials of Armenian fighters in Los Angeles, Paris and Belgrade and, second, the preparation of responses to the outcome of these trials depending on whether they favored Turkey or not.

Human Justice

At the beginning of January, Hampig Sassounian was convicted of committing "first degree murder under special circumstances" and was sentenced to prison for life. According to the verdict of the jury, Sassounian was guilty of being an accessory in the "murder of a Turkish national." The defense committee for Sassounian expressed its disappointment about the verdict in a press statement. When the testimony of the witnesses in the court is recalled, it becomes even more evident that this absurd verdict is the result of Turkish pressures and the deplorable American willingness to appease Turkey.

The outcome of the Levonian and Elpekian trial [in Belgrade] on 9 March was equally unfair and biased. The two young men were sentenced by a Belgrade tribunal to prison terms of 20 years each for assassinating Turkish ambassador Galip Balkar and wounding his chauffeur. Furthermore, two completely groundless and fabricated charges were leveled against the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide: First, that Elpekian killed a Yugoslav student and, second, that Levonian attempted to murder a retired military officer. While the Turkish Foreign Ministry lauded the Belgrade tribunal's verdict and suggested that Yugoslavia should set an example for other countries, the spokesman for the Defense Committee for Armenian Political Prisoners declared in Paris that his organization will protest the verdict at the International Federation of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Commission.

The Exception: France

In Paris, four Armenian young men who had occupied the Turkish embassy in Paris in 1981, were sentenced to prison terms of 7 years each. In the course of the said incident, one person had been killed and two others had been wounded.

Turkey responded with great displeasure to the verdict of the Paris Criminal Court and labeled the Paris trial as "a sham" and "a shameful page in French



judicial history." In a press statement, the Turkish Foreign Ministry expressed regret that the four young Armenians "had not received punishment commensurate with their crime" and insisted that "the international community as well as all those who tolerate and show understanding toward Armenian terrorism will suffer the consequences of that stance."

#### Turkish Anger

This was not the Turkish government's first assault on France in the first quarter of the year. Following French President Mitterrand's important statement to the effect that "France wishes to remember and to remind others of the fact that the Armenian identity was forged by the tragedy of the genocide" and that "the traces of the genocide perpetrated against the Armenian people cannot be erased," the Turkish Foreign Ministry, after an initial moderate response, summoned the French ambassador in Turkey, Fernand (Rouillot), and delivered to him the Turkish government's disapproval of Mitterrand's statement on the "Armenian genocide." Turkish Foreign Minister Halefoglou declared that "charges of Armenian genocide are entirely groundless and constitute historical distortion." Similar declarations were also made during the local elections campaign by political party leaders Yildirim Avci and Erdal Inonu.

Turkey also protested, through its foreign ministry, the release of Kurken Mgrdich Yanikian from prison. As is known, Yanikian was sentenced to prison for life in 1973 for assassinating two Turkish diplomats in Los Angeles. The Turkish authorities declared that "the American justice system made an unwise decision by taking Yanikian's old age (89) and health condition into account," noting that Yanikian was already 78 years old when he killed the two Turkish diplomats.

#### Understandable but Deplorable

Following the airing of Turkish complaints and protests, the Armenian Patriarch in Istanbul, Archbishop Shnork Kalustian, visited Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal not to protest the closure of the middle school of the Immaculate Conception School in Samatia or the poor state of the elementary section of the Esayan School, but to join the government "choir" in condemning the "killing of Turks by Armenian terrorists overseas." The Patriarch concluded his understandable but still deplorable statement by saying: "As loyal children of this homeland, we will not spare our lives to defend the unity of this country."

Before we conclude, let us mention that the Canadian police arrested four Armenians in Toronto in March on charges of being accessories to the assassination attempt against Turkish diplomat Kemalettin Gungor two years ago.

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CSO: 4605/102

PALESTINIAN, EGYPTIAN VIEWS, RELATIONSHIPS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 391, 18 Aug 84 p 25

[Article by Yusuf al-Qa'id: "Palestinian-Egyptian Meeting in Cairo"]

[Text] The Egyptian Foreign Ministry building stands in Tahrir Square in the heart of Cairo, and in front of it on the other hand is the Arab League building; they are divided by only one street. When you go into the Foreign Ministry looking for new things there and asking about the change that took place after the arrival of the new minister, Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, you will be met by quiet smiles and the answer that no radical change has occurred because Egypt's policies are firmly established, and there are many basic things in Egyptian foreign policy that do not change. In spite of these explanations and diplomatic answers, the halls of the Ministry have seen visitors - one cannot say that they are a new sort of visitor, but one must interpret the meaning behind their visits.

The first chargé d'affaires and overseer of interests that Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid received was the overseer of Saudi interests in Cairo.

Next he received the overseer of Lebanese interests. Even while negotiations on the formation of the cabinet were going on, Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid was anxious to go to the Iraqi embassy to congratulate them on the occasion of the Iraqi revolution, though he had not yet been appointed minister.

Whoever roams the halls of the Ministry can be sure that Arab visitors have also been there, but the time for publicizing their visits has not yet come.

Amidst these meetings, one must take notice of Dr 'Ismat-'Abd-al-Majid's meeting with Sa'id Kamal, member of the Palestine National Council, and Hasan 'Abd-al-Rahman, representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Washington, since the meeting is significant in more ways than one. It was the first time that Hasan 'Abd-al-Rahman had come to Cairo since the treaty, and the first meeting since Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid had taken charge of the Ministry.

The meeting took place during the phase following the conference for solidarity with the Palestinian people - and which ended at the time for

Palestinian reasons - but since that time there has been a desire on the part of the Egyptians and Palestinians to continue the dialogue, meetings, and exchange of views. This meeting was the first since the Egyptian elections and the formation of the new cabinet, so what was needed was a search for new methods of rapprochement to limit the quarrels, alienation, and separation prevalent in the Arab nation.

The Palestinian side views the time as appropriate for that because the man responsible for Egyptian foreign policy enjoys the respect of all nations and Arab and world powers without exception as a result of his responsibilities in the United Nations Organization.

As the Egyptian side sees it, the meeting of Arab brothers should not wait for others to arrange their affairs in order for the Arabs to establish their positions. That would be a strategic error which would halt the Arab movement and prevent it from developing its positions and interests, bilaterally and as a nation. Unfortunately, the Israeli elections entered as a factor in Arab plans. That was wrong, and we should never wait for what others plan for us; rather, Arabs should be in the sphere of action, not reaction.

On Palestinian matters, the Egyptian position was extremely clear: The Palestinian people and the Liberation Organization have nothing to do with the parts of Palestinian land which are lost, regardless of the reasons for that. But the possibility should be studied of strengthening the Palestinian presence internationally and of a Palestinian transition to territorial gains. There must be an Egyptian Palestinian struggle to gain international recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self determination, as interpreted in the Security Council itself, which opposes those it opposes, and blesses those it blesses. Egypt has before it the Egyptian-French initiative, and Egypt is not opposed to the Soviet initiative, but it will be necessary to storm the strongholds of the enemy with correct vision, especially since Egypt has shown the whole world - aside from the negotiations - that it believes in a just peace, while the world is convinced that Israel does not want a true, comprehensive and just peace.

The Palestinian side faced obstacles that stood in the way of putting the Palestinian house in order, but the determination of the political leadership was taking firm steps to overcome these obstacles, especially since there are many mines in the Palestinian arena, and there are parties who have an interest in exploding these mines, foremost among them, Israel.

The subject of the Palestinian position in Egypt will be discussed completely and in detail in the Palestine National Council. The Council will adopt a resolution which will reflect the view of the Palestinian people towards Egypt as a strategic weight which the Palestinian movement lost during the period of broken relations following the Camp David accords, especially since Yasir 'Arafat's visit to Cairo and his meeting with President Husni Mubarak for 3 hours were in themselves a symbolic resumption

of Egyptian-Palestinian relations, which the Council must postpone. It must establish firm guidelines which they will not deviate from, and it must leave the matter of establishing executive policies to the new leadership, especially since President Husni Mubarak and his government, on the political front, disregarded many of the stated positions of some other parties. Then after the Palestinian house is put in order, a reasonable and objective discussion must be started on how to move from the area of reaction to that of action in confronting international parties. The Egyptian minister has given assurances that Egypt is for Palestinian legitimacy and for the leadership of Yasir 'Arafat.

Regarding the Egyptian concept of reasonable limits, they are as follows:

It will be necessary to lay the political foundation for the movement of Egypt, Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Syria if it wishes; that to halt the Israeli cancer which persists in building more settlements and judaicizing the land.

At the same time, it will be necessary to gain the support of all Arab parties that are willing for this political foundation, within the limits of their capabilities.

Laying the framework whose implementation is feasible for any effort towards creating a peace settlement. And we must not call upon others to define for us the framework which corresponds with our plans.

Establishing judicious policies towards the powers which have begun to realize the importance of the right of the Palestinian people to self determination within Israeli society.

Minister 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid's words at the end of the meeting were:

"I view the future with cautious optimism. The meetings and contacts among Arab brothers which have taken place bode well. Cairo welcomes a meeting with any Arab official on his terms and at the place he chooses, and opportunity stands before us in the meetings of the General Assembly in New York.

A new Arab era is opening before us, in Egypt.

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'ISMAT 'ABD-AL-MAJID DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES, ISRAEL

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 235, 11-17 Aug 84 pp 20-22

[Interview with 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, Minister of Foreign Affairs by Jamal 'Inayat and 'Abd-al-Latif al-Minyawi: "'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid Tells AL-MAJALLAH That Relations with Arabs are a Priority Matter in Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs; date not specified]

[Text] "We reject Israel's interpretation of the Camp David Accords, and we are hoping for more rapprochement with the Palestinians."

"The resources of the Arab world are tremendous. The starting point is the point at which these resources converge. Let's leave the past alone and look at the future. Let's talk about matters and discuss them; let's not fight and argue. Egypt wants to restore normal relations with its fellow Arabs." These words truthfully express the features of the policy of Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, "the Arab face in Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs," as he is described by Western diplomats.

AL-MAJALLAH interviewed Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, Egypt's minister of foreign affairs, and talked with him about the priorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and about Egypt's Arab and international relations.

It was noon on a Friday when Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid welcomed us into his home on the Nile in Cairo. As soon as we walked in, he looked at his watch to make sure that we had arrived on time. Precision, tranquillity and decisiveness are the marks that Dr Mahmud Fawzi, Egypt's former vice president and minister of foreign affairs had left on all his students in Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dr Fawzi taught an entire generation of Egyptian diplomats, but the features of Dr Fawzi's diplomacy have left their greatest impression on Egypt's current minister of foreign affairs.

We turned on the cassette recorder, and the interview began. Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid talked for a whole hour, pausing only to listen to a question, ask for clarification or answer the telephone.

[Question] When you started working as Egypt's minister of foreign affairs, there were numerous files lying on your desk at the ministry. How did you

reorganize those files according to the priorities for diplomatic action that you think govern the principles for action in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

His response was spontaneous. "Relations between Egypt and the Arab countries are undoubtedly the top priority matter at the ministry. That file is the foremost file on my desk. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs we have always indicated to our fellow Arabs that Egypt with its clout and its resources provides strong support for the Arab nation without pretense or control. We are confident that this attitude is understood by all our fellow Arabs, even those who criticize us and sometimes raise doubts about our positions. Egypt's course has been very clear and unmysterious. As President Mubarak said, there is a clarity of vision in Egyptian policy. We know what we want, and we know where we are going. Egypt wants to restore normal relations with fellow Arabs unconditionally. It is true that there has been a boycott, but the signs indicate that there is an active movement between Egypt and the Arab countries. Let's take air traffic only as an indication of that. Therefore, I am hoping that we will leave the past alone and that we will look at the future and talk about matters and discuss them in a calm, objective manner. Let each party begin thinking about what is expected of it."

[Question] After assuming the duties of your office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first statement you made was that, "We will make considerable progress in moving closer to our fellow Arabs. Steps toward that progress will be bilateral and not unilateral." But before you made that statement there was a statement about the fact that Egypt's return to the Arab League would not add anything to it. The latter statement was made by a ministry official. We are wondering about the significance of that statement and whether or not you agree with it.

He smiled softly as he said, "I read that statement, but I would have preferred to hear exactly what was said. This is not a matter of adding to the Arab League or detracting from it. There is a charter that governs relations between Arab countries. We honor that charter, which was drawn up in Alexandria in 1945, and we consider it the one to be in effect until today. Among the provisions of that charter is one which states that the Arab League is located in Cairo. Therefore, it cannot be located anywhere else. Furthermore, any amendment to the charter has to be done in accordance with legal and constitutional measures. Until that is done our position on that matter is clear and unequivocal."

[Question] One of the principal critical remarks directed against Egypt's foreign policy recently--and the previous question we asked is an indication of that--is the fact that it has numerous spokesmen. Consequently, numerous contradictory statements are made. What is the role of the minister of foreign affairs, and what are the limits placed on the role he plays in devising his country's policy?

[Answer] First of all, there are no contradictions in the statements that come out of Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Regarding the role of the minister of foreign affairs, he is the one who implements the foreign policy that is devised by the president after consultation with his advisers.

[Question] Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, you were Egypt's permanent representative at the United Nations for over 10 years. What do you think is the possibility of Egypt using its presence at the Security Council for the benefit of Arab causes?

[Answer] There is an actual example of what Egypt can do to put its presence at the Security Council to good use. This was Egypt's position when the Gulf countries complained to the Security Council about the attacks that had taken place in those countries. Everyone remembers that Egypt's UN representative played a principal role with a number of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Gulf countries. There was complete coordination between them. I believe that this provides evidence of the fact that Egypt's role has been a positive and a vital one to the questions of the area.

This explains the practical role that Egypt can play through its membership in the council. Our responsibility in the council is diverse. We are a non-aligned Arab, African country, and we have responsibilities within and outside the United Nations. The role that Egypt can play in this context may be discerned from its attitude toward the representatives of the Gulf states who relayed to us their appreciation and their gratitude for the role that Egypt played while the Security Council was debating the problem.

[Question] The enthusiasm and the hope with which you dealt with Egyptian-Arab relations raises in our minds a quick question about the Arab world whose power and unity during the 1973 war had reached a point that has not been reached since. Since then the Arabs have been fragmented and have been fighting among themselves. Has this picture of unity gone forever?

Dr 'Ismat's words conveyed the same hope [that was evident in his earlier remarks]. "This question clarifies a basic point. Sometimes we do not know our own worth. Sometimes we do not know the extent to which we can exercise the power that we have and that we must utilize well. It is true that we can benefit from the lessons of 1973 which provide evidence of the fact that when matters are planned well and preparations are made, success can be guaranteed. The solidarity of the Arab nations shook up the area, and the meaning of Arab power emerged most clearly. This is a latent power that has been in existence and did not emerge from a vacuum. It was only waiting for the spark that would set it off. Even today the Arab world has tremendous resources, and the starting point is that where these resources converge."

He stared into space for a few seconds, and then added with greater enthusiasm, "What I am saying is not unfounded. We were tested before, and we passed the test."

[Question] The relationship between Egypt and the Palestinians is part of Egypt's relations with the Arabs. How far has this relationship gone, particularly since Yasir 'Arafat's recent visit to Cairo did create an upturn in that relationship. Many people expected this upturn to be followed by other steps. A short time ago you made a statement that communications between Egypt and the organization were continuing. What is the nature of these communications?

[Answer] Of course communications are continuing. Our doors are open, and our

communications are underway. Abu 'Ammar's visit to President Mubarak last December did have its good results, and I hope there will be a rapprochement between Egyptians and Palestinians soon.

[Question] Have practical steps been taken to bring about this rapprochement?

[Answer] I cannot think of them right now. But we are always consulting with each other and exchanging opinions with fellow Palestinians on many levels. I believe that this is the result of both parties' wishes for a rapprochement.

#### The Arab Face

Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid's answers were calm, profound and forceful. They raised in our minds a question with which the interview should have started. After he was selected Egypt's minister of foreign affairs, numerous diplomats commented that the appointment was a good move on Egypt's part towards effecting a reconciliation with the Arabs. This comment raises this question. Does Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid manifest the Arab face of Egypt's policy?

[Answer] I do not know how to talk about myself. But I think I did do what was required of me in the past period, over the 11 years I served at the United Nations, from 1972 to 1983. All these years were eventful. I believe, thank God, that I established personal and human relations with many fellow Arabs, and even if there were differences of opinion with some of them, these differences were temporary. I am still affirming what I said after I reached the age of retirement: "I do not regret anything I said or any position I took." This may account for that expression which was mentioned in your question.

[Question] Western diplomats describe Dr 'Abd-al-Majid as a persuasive, patient and calm negotiator. They used to believe that you were the one who would be able to stand up to the Israeli negotiator. We would like to ask you about relations between Egypt and Israel. Some people have gotten into the habit of describing those relations--particularly from the Israeli side--as a cold peace. Do you believe that there is another description for those relations that would be more precise?

[Answer] I believe there are differences in points of view, but we do not have to describe this relationship in terms of a cold or warm peace. We are concerned about these differences in points of view. Such differences could exist between any two countries. If we were to find a willingness on Israel's part to settle this matter, we would welcome it. We would welcome, for example, the withdrawal from Lebanon and action on matters regarding the Palestinian problem and the Taba problem. Israel has to know quite well that the situation there is unacceptable. This means that if there were a positive trend toward a solution and a settlement, we would be willing to go along with that.

[Question] Israel has been complaining of two matters since 1982. First, it has been complaining of the fact that measures to normalize relations between it and Egypt have been frozen. Second, it has been complaining of the fact that Egypt has not returned its ambassador to Tel Aviv. What do you see are the possibilities for negative or positive developments in this situation?



[Answer] We are watching the situation, and we are hoping for a positive development. Egypt thinks that the problem of Lebanon, the Palestinian problem and the Taba problem are principal problems. If the Israeli side thinks that movement towards peace is in its interests, we will be ready to go along. As I said before, we know what we want; our policy is clear, and we have no problems in that area.

[Question] Don't you think that the purposes of the Camp David Accords have been exhausted?

[Answer] I am a jurist, and the shortcomings of agreements constitute a large item in international law. Therefore, I do not favor a discussion of these matters in non-legal terms.

[Question] But haven't the purposes of the agreement been exhausted?

[Answer] If we were to speak from that perspective, [I would say] there are many theories of international law, and there are different interpretations. However, if I were to deal today with an agreement that is in effect and if I were to describe it in terms that I regard as non-legal and unconsidered, I would be violating somewhat my international obligations even as I state that I am adhering to them and that I remain committed to implementing the agreement. However, if the second party violates the agreement, then I have the right to take measures of my own in accordance with the law. We have our own interpretation of this agreement, and our interpretation insists on the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own destiny. The Israeli side has another interpretation that we reject. This is part of the difference that has caused the suspension of the autonomy talks.

An International Conference or a Unilateral Solution?

The telephone that connects the minister's home directly to the ministry rang. The minister asked that the call be forwarded to another telephone. Then the minister asked his son, Fahmi, who is an engineer, whether he was using the blue telephone or the red one. Dr 'Ismat left the room to speak on the telephone. While he was gone everything in the house was still, but that stillness was not motionless. During that time the cassette recorder was stopped; it was turned back on when Dr 'Ismat returned to the room. We asked him about statements made by the U.S. undersecretary of state about Reagan's initiative, about the need to push for that initiative and about the notion that holding an international conference could complicate the situation further. Then we asked him, "Does this demonstrate that the U.S. administration wants to have a unilateral solution in the Middle East?"

Dr 'Ismat, who had spent over 10 years in the United States as Egypt's representative at the United Nations said, "The United States has a responsibility and a role to play in the area that we do not deny. If working with the United States will lead to a solution because the United States can influence Israel, then let's try to pursue that course since it would not be wise to rule it out."

[Question] This, of course, is in addition to pursuing other courses, is it not?

[Answer] Exactly. There has never been a magic wand that can be used with such matters. Progress in such matters is slow.

If the question is which of the initiatives would be more applicable, the answer to that question requires a precursory dialogue. As Arabs, let us sit together to talk about this matter; let's discuss it rationally without arguments and fights. First, we must get together, and then we can discuss the Fes initiative or the Reagan initiative or other initiatives that have been proposed. The Arabs have tremendous and great resources, and the Arab world is rich in its human, material, intellectual and cultural resources.

I say this because I was moved by a statement made by Mr 'Imad al-Din Adib, the editor-in-chief of AL-MAJALLAH, in the column "Shujun 'Arabiyah" [Arab Anxieties] in AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT. Mr Adib expressed my feelings precisely. This is not a matter of emotions. I am known for not becoming emotional, but what is certain is the fact that a large number of fellow Arabs and colleagues have the same feelings.

#### The Cards in the Game

[Question] It is only normal that our next question to you would be this: Can we conclude from this that the solution lies in the hands of the Arabs themselves?

[Answer] Of course. This is indisputable.

[Question] Wouldn't there be any other international parties involved?

With a smile, Dr 'Isamat asked us to hold back our question and said, "One cannot clap with one hand! It is true that the Arabs are holding all the cards, but we do not live in isolation from the world. It is best for us to be realistic. We are part of an integrated world, and there are points about which we are in agreement with many countries. The European community, for example, has interests that do not conflict with ours. It is here that the role of the Arab countries' and the non-aligned countries' foreign policy emerges. Ultimately, it is the Arab world that has what it takes to set the question in motion and to find a just solution to it.

#### Russia, Egypt and the United States

[Question] "The Arabs are holding the cards." We reiterated these words slowly to be sure that their meaning sank in. Afterwards we asked Egypt's minister of foreign affairs, "You have always said that Egyptian-U.S. relations were special relations. What is the meaning of the word, "special?"

[Answer] They are special relations that have to do with commitments and interests in the sense that there are no conflicts between U.S. interests and Egyptian interests. The United States is a superpower that has interests in the area. I do not believe that there is a conflict between those interests and maintaining stability in the area and helping developing countries make progress in their development efforts. Therefore I feel that the two peoples have common interests and that their friendship is based on mutual understanding.

Egypt wants friendship with everybody. This does not rule out the fact that Egypt would have stronger relations with one of the other countries.

[Question] The discussion about special relations with the United States has raised in our minds the question about the ambassador exchange between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Do you believe that the restoration of these ambassadors could have side effects?

[Answer] It will have no side effects, not even with the United States. The return of the two countries' ambassadors to their posts is tantamount to a return to normalcy, and there is complete understanding of this situation. Egypt and the Soviet Union did have diplomatic relations, but the level of diplomatic representation was that of a charge d'affaires. Then representation was upgraded to the ambassadorial level.

[Question] Then what is meant here is the restoration of relations on the ambassadorial level only?

[Answer] Yes. I am not establishing new relations; I am merely upgrading the level of representation.

Beware the Wrath of the Mild-Tempered!

[Question] Some people have described you as a person who exemplifies the school of the straight and narrow path in Egyptian politics. They say you are a disciple of Dr Mahmud Fawzi's school of foreign politics. Would you clarify for us the features of that school?

[Answer] Dr Mahmud Fawzi taught a generation of diplomats. I have of course worked with him since 1950. His style is a quiet one that is based on an in-depth probe of problems. His style is scientific and earnest and at the same time decisive. To a large extent this is consistent with my own personal character because I am inclined to pursue a quiet style that is based on scrutiny and deliberation. However, let me remind you of the proverb which advises people to beware the wrath of the mild-tempered!

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CSO: 4504/406

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MODERNIZATION OF ARMED FORCES VIEWED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 235, 11-17 Aug 84 pp 28-31

[Article by Muhammad 'Ali Qasim: "A Question Raised by the Israeli Elections: Egypt Changes the Military Map of the Middle East!"]

[Text] Israel has launched a new campaign to press the government of West Germany to stop the cooperation program between Germany and Egypt to produce and develop a new model of tanks in Egypt. For the first time since the Camp David Agreement was signed, Israel is showing its opposition to the weapons deals that Egypt is making with the West.

AL-MAJALLAH received a report affirming that there was a major shift in Israel's attitude toward Egypt's weapons deals. At the same time the report stated that Israel's military was beginning to place Egypt's armed forces in a different position on the military map of the Middle East. Some reports even affirmed that there were Israeli ideas about the possibility of facing hostilities on two military fronts: one in the north and one in the south.

In the area of weapons and military aid, it was officially announced that the United States had allocated 1.1 billion dollars this year for military aid to Egypt. This aid will be in the form of grants. At the same time the Soviet Union has agreed to provide Egypt with some spare parts--this is after the restoration of Egyptian-Soviet relations--to maintain Soviet weapons that are still being used by some Egyptian units. Egyptian forces have recently succeeded in reaching an agreement with some western firms to modify Soviet equipment and weapons. Covered under these agreements will be an effort to furnish Soviet T-62 and T-55 tanks with British engines and 105 millimeter guns. French and British firms are also providing Egypt with modern electronic systems for the MIG-21 and Sukhoi-7 fighters. Soviet torpedo boats will also be modified so they can be used as used as missile attack craft.

It is this development and this diversity in the processes of arming the Egyptian armed forces, along with efforts to shore up the local weapons industry, with the United States offering Egypt the largest amount of military grants after Israel, that lie behind Israel's anxiety. Features of this anxiety, which became evident during Israel's elections campaign, are revealed in this special report which presents for the first time an integrated picture of the position held by the Egyptian forces on the military map of the Middle East.



Many observers and analysts in the world agree that the strategic shift which was begun when Soviet experts left Egypt was one of the most important happenings in contemporary international politics, not only in the Middle East, but also throughout the world. The effects of this shift and its political, military and economic consequences--even its ideological and cultural consequences--are still being played out today. Briefly stated, the consequences of that shift, involved a gradual movement by Egypt away from its alliance with the Soviet Union and a shift instead to an effort to forge a new alliance with the West in general and with the United States in particular. This strategic shift in Egypt's foreign policy was of such magnitude and vitality that it was difficult, if not almost impossible, to predict during its early days the magnitude and the scope of the changes that could come about in the political and military picture of the Middle East as a result of that shift. Egypt has been and still is the principal and foremost power in the Middle East. It has been and still is the country through which regional and international balances of power that are prevalent in that area of the world can be determined. Therefore, it was not curious that the Soviet Union's departure from the Middle East was considered the greatest setback for the Soviets in the Third World since World War II. On the other side of the coin, the United States' return to Egypt constituted the most significant success of its kind which U.S. policy was able to achieve in more than one area. In fact, concurring with an opinion expressed by several U.S. political circles on more than one occasion may not be an exaggeration. According to that opinion, the United States' success in gaining Egypt's friendship in the seventies was to a large extent enough to make up to for the major loss that Washington had suffered in Vietnam. Gaining that friendship helped considerably in revitalizing U.S. foreign policy in the world.

Egypt's shift away from Moscow did not come about as a surprise, nor was it done in one step. It came about in stages and in numerous forms, each of which had its own implications and consequences. This was not merely a matter of replacing one superpower as an ally with another. This was a matter that involved numerous changes, perhaps the most important of which, and absolutely the most serious, was that gradual change in Egypt's position on the scene of the central conflict in the area, that is, Israel. Egypt had fought the 1973 October War without the Soviet experts; it had, however, fought that war with Soviet weapons. Actually, weapons deals between Cairo and Moscow were never completely suspended except in 1976 when the Soviets finally stopped supplying Egyptian forces with the weapons and spare parts they needed. Meanwhile, relations between Egypt and the United States were continuing to grow, and tensions on the Egyptian-Israeli front were declining noticeably. The first and second disengagement agreements in Sinai were signed, and this was followed by President al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977. This trend later culminated in the signing of the Camp David Accords which included a pledge by Egypt to normalize relations with Israel. But that did not take place for reasons that have become evident to everyone.

#### A New Israeli Plan

Subsequent developments added new dimensions to the situation. These developments were not restricted to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Cairo and Moscow after a break in those relations that lasted about 3 years. They were not restricted to recent news about the Soviets agreeing to resume



shipping "limited quantities" of spare parts that were necessary for the maintenance of Soviet weapons that were still being used by Egypt's armed forces; nor were they restricted to the Soviets' sending a group of experts to Egypt to help repair a number of factories that Moscow had built during the years of cooperation between the two countries. The question also pertains not only to recurrent statements that officials in Israel seem anxious to make about "the death of Camp David" and "the impasse that has been reached in the peace process with Egypt," etc. The principal and the most important part of this question has to do with current, ongoing changes. These are to a large extent partial changes inasmuch as they are directly related to the future of Egypt on the scene of the Israeli-Arab conflict. This idea is beginning to worry the Israelis to the point that some of their military planners have begun making plans and developing possible scenarios for a war that Israel may have to fight in the future on two fronts: with Syria in the north, and with Egypt in the south. Such statements are being made publicly in Israel for the first time since the Camp David Accords were signed.

Even if these statements overstated the case--and that was evident during the Israeli elections--this does not mean that such a view is totally inconceivable. Perhaps the most salient indication of a shift in Israel's attitude toward Egypt is that which has to do with the hidden aspects of the forementioned attitude toward Egypt's efforts to arm itself. AL-MAJALLAH has learned recently that Israel is applying pressure on West Germany to force it not to go ahead with a program that includes helping Egyptian industries modify and produce a new model of tanks that would be put to use among the ranks of the Egyptian army as of the mid eighties. What is significant in this regard is that this is the first time since Camp David that Israel is expressing its opposition to an arms deal in which Egyptian forces are a party. This is in keeping with Israel's protests which are usually made when Arab countries, like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and others enter into arms agreements with western parties in the United States and in Europe.

As long as the matter rests ultimately on the military position, most of the questions that were raised in past years about Egypt's policy and its regional and international directions must revolve principally on that specific preoccupation with Egypt's military power and what has happened to that power during that period of successive events and developments.

What may be said in this regard is that Egypt's military forces are presently going through an important period of transition that is characterized basically by a rapid effort to implement a number of programs aimed at strengthening the armed forces, modernizing their weapons and furnishing their different branches with advanced and integrated equipment. Despite numerous financial, technical and operational difficulties that are still facing the programs for building Egypt's defenses, efforts to complete those programs are being made at an ever faster pace. This has been particularly true since the early eighties when these programs became more serious and more comprehensive, compared with preceding programs that were in effect during the period that immediately followed the 1973 October War. The Egyptian command is hoping that by 1985-1986 it will have completed the greater part of its current armaments programs. If these programs are completed successfully, that will constitute an extremely vital positive step towards strengthening Egypt's defense capabilities and firmly establishing its role as a principal and effective regional power.

## Difficulties and Accomplishments

Egyptian forces experienced many difficulties after Soviet support to them was cut off in the mid seventies. This does not mean, however, that these forces are now in a precarious position as far as their weapons or operations are concerned. Despite numerous problems which the forementioned forces faced during past years, particularly with regard to the maintenance of Soviet-made weapons and equipment in their arsenal, on the one hand, and incorporating and operating the American and European weapons they were receiving, on the other hand, the Egyptian army is definitely at the present time stronger than it has ever been at any time in the past. In fact, most western and Israeli defense sources are convinced that Egypt is still the foremost Arab country militarily. They also believe that Egyptian forces still constitute, besides Syrian forces, the most serious military threat to Israel. Available information indicates that Egyptian forces were recently able to absorb most of the negative effects of the technical and operational blow they had received as a result of the suspension of Soviet military and weapons support. This support was suspended in the aftermath of deteriorating relations between the two countries. Efforts made by the Egyptian command to arm Egyptian forces and build Egypt's defense capabilities were also characterized by considerable earnestness. This is contrary to what is generally prevalent. Evidence of this earnestness may be noted in the quantities and kinds of weapons that Egypt tried to acquire from different sources over the past years. In addition, significant attempts were made to expand and develop the base of local military production. Concern with certain kinds of Soviet equipment and with improvements to it has also grown. Efforts are being made to upgrade the performance of this equipment for the purpose of continuing to operate it and to benefit from its capabilities.

The Egyptian command is planning to develop the local capabilities of military production so that these capabilities would include in the near future the production of a new model of principal combat tanks and fighter airplanes. The Egyptian command is hoping to obtain a license from France or the United States to manufacture these tanks and fighters. At the same time work is underway to implement several cooperative programs with western European firms. The aim of these programs is to modify a number of Soviet-made weapons that the command feels should continue to be used. These programs will modify these weapons or manufacture versions of them locally. It may be sufficient to cite as evidence of this capability which Egypt has acquired in this regard the fact that the Egyptian army is no longer monopolizing the local military industry. For some time Egyptian military products have been exported, and they are being purchased by a number of Arab and African armies. Western sources estimate that in 1983 Egypt exported 1 billion dollars worth of military equipment. This figure is also likely to grow in light of efforts that are currently being made to expand and develop in more than one area the foundation of military production.

## Cairo Is Dissatisfied

The principal features that characterize defense building efforts at the present time may be summarized as follows:

1. U.S military support is being relied upon in a principal way, and attempts are being made to upgrade cooperation between both sides to higher and more

credible levels. This is being done by getting the United States to agree to supply Egypt with advanced weapons and equipment in sufficient quantities, or by securing more financial U.S. aid, which would be necessary to finance weapons and local military production programs. It is interesting to note in this regard that Egyptian government sources are always stating that they are satisfied with U.S. aid. They are always comparing the cooperative relations between Egypt and the United States with those between Washington and Tel Aviv, demonstrating thereby their feelings that the U.S. view toward Egypt should be as credible as that which has traditionally governed relations between Israel and the United States, particularly in the military, strategic area.

Egyptian official authorities have actually expressed their dissatisfaction on more than one occasion with the levels of financial and weapons support from the United States, and they have asked the United States to improve and increase that support. For example, Egypt's minister of defense, Field Marshal 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah was unequivocal in his comments about that matter. Before his visit to Washington in 1983 Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah stated that his government was convinced that the United States had to take into account the financial and military aid it allocates to Israel as a standard in any attempt aimed at upgrading the level of support that Washington has to offer Egypt. On another occasion Abu Ghazalah defined Egypt's position when he said, "The United States' responsiveness to Egypt's military requirements has so far been slower than it should. We are nevertheless convinced that the United States is truly determined to meet our defense needs.... We consider ourselves to be true friends of the United States. Consequently, the United States has to strive to support us militarily just as it does with Israel."

At any rate, among the results of the numerous visits that Abu Ghazalah made to Washington over the past 3 years and the successive negotiations that took place during those visits is the fact that the U.S. administration has approved most Egyptian requests. Thus, the amount of financial and military aid allocated to Egypt was increased, and the United States promised to help Egypt implement a comprehensive program devised by the Egyptian command as the foundation for its defense efforts during the first half of the eighties. It is worth noting that Egypt is now receiving a total of 1.3 billion dollars in U.S. military aid and loans. Thus, it is the second largest recipient of such U.S aid after Israel.

#### Action and Self-Reliance

2. Egypt's freedom of action regarding weapons is being maintained by devoting attention to the establishment of close relations with other principal weapons-producing countries in the world such as Britain, France, China and Italy. In addition, there are other secondary countries that manufacture weapons like Spain, Brazil and Yugoslavia. Egypt tries to acquire from these countries a rather considerable portion of the weapons it currently needs for its armed forces. Actually, existing defense cooperation between Egypt and the forementioned countries is not less significant than that which exists between Cairo and Washington. In fact, it may even be more vital and more beneficial over the long term. This situation is underscored, for example, when one notes the joint cooperation programs in weapons and weapons production that are presently being implemented between Egypt and France, Britain and China. These programs include



the manufacture of airplanes, tanks, missiles, naval vessels, guns and different kinds of ammunition.

3. Increased emphasis is being placed on the importance of local military industries. So much so that conditions are being set for foreign arms suppliers to allow Egypt to manufacture the weapons it purchases or at least assemble them locally. Besides, Egypt stipulates that the spare parts and ammunition required for the weapons it purchases be produced locally. On this basis Egyptian industry is now manufacturing airplanes for training as well as the tactical support airplanes, Alpha-Jet. Egypt is also manufacturing Gazelle helicopters under license from France. Egyptian industry is also planning to assemble advanced Mirage 2000 fighters which Egypt's air force will begin to acquire at a later date this year. Working with the Chinese, Egyptians are also assembling the (Shenyang) F-7, the Chinese version of the MIG-21; and the (Shenyang) F-6, a version of the MIG-19. The Egyptians have recently acquired from the United States the right to manufacture an armored personnel carrier, the M-13. Meanwhile, production of the British anti-tank Swingfire missiles is continuing; an official permit was obtained several years ago from Britain. Perhaps the most important step in this regard that Egypt intends to carry out at the present time with the cooperation of West Germany is that of manufacturing a new Egyptian tank by using the advanced technology of the Leopard-2 tank. This is the program that was supposed to begin soon. In addition, Egypt has entered into an agreement with Brazil to manufacture 80 new training airplanes--the T-27 (Tucano). These airplanes will be manufactured in Egypt starting late this year.

One of the most important interim objectives of Egypt's current defense building program becomes evident in Egypt's basic emphasis on a number of aspects, the most salient of which is its rush to acquire those U.S. weapons that the United States agreed to provide to it. In addition, Egypt will try to get the United States to approve its urgent requests for new arms deals that Cairo feels it has to have to face the future combat and operational requirements of its forces. Egyptian objectives also include the acquisition of appropriate weapons that have been selected from other foreign sources. These objectives include making attempts to solve the difficulties that still plague the problem of incorporating new weapons and introducing them into full active service.

Regarding the Soviet weapons that Egyptian forces still have, the highest priority at the present time is, on the one hand, to discard those that are old and ineffective and replace them with western, modern weapons, and, on the other hand, modernize and develop other Soviet models that proved to be effective and efficient during the long years of use. This applies specifically to MIG-21 interceptor fighters; Sukhoi-20 and Sukhoi-7 combat fighters; T-62 and T-55 main battle tanks; 122 and 130 millimeter field artillery guns; 23 millimeter anti-aircraft guns; and SAM-2, SAM-3 and SAM-6 air defense systems. The Egyptian command is relying on a number of measures to prolong the life and operations of these weapons. That includes manufacturing necessary spare parts; carrying out the necessary maintenance; and manufacturing the necessary ammunition locally. It includes entering into agreements of cooperation with foreign parties to improve these weapons and introduce modifications into them. In this regard an agreement has been reached with Britain to replace the engines of the T-62 and T-55 Soviet tanks with British made engines. At the present time the 100 millimeter guns on these tanks are being replaced with 105 millimeter

British guns. Meanwhile, work is underway to produce a version of the T-62 tank gun, which is a 115 millimeter gun, with the cooperation of the British Vickers Corporation. Also MIG-21 and Sukhoi-7 fighters are being equipped with new British and French electronic systems. In addition the MIG-21's are being armed with U.S.-made air to air Sidewinder.

The Egyptian navy had made a significant achievement a few years ago when it was able to convert a number of Soviet torpedo boats that it had to offensive launch boats that it called October. These vessels were furnished with Automat anti-ship missiles, which are jointly produced by France and Italy. This program was implemented in the context of an Egyptian-British cooperation program. Egyptian industries are also trying to manufacture versions of a number of Soviet weapons that include 122 millimeter field artillery guns; 122 millimeter anti-missile devices; and 23 millimeter anti-aircraft guns. Meanwhile, Egypt is cooperating with the West to improve the efficiency of these guns by converting them into automatic guns that would be carried on British and American made armored vehicles.

In general, it is difficult to define in precise terms how efficient and effective Egypt's military power is at the present time. It has been established, however, that this power has recently been able to overcome the obstacles that it faced as a result of different financial, military and political circumstances that have beset Egyptian policy during the past decade. Egypt's armed forces have also been able to bring about significant changes in quantity and quality in a variety of weapons and technical and operational areas.

If current Egyptian plans include considering 1985 an important turning point in the future of Egypt's military power, it may not be an exaggeration to link such a shift with a radical change that is highly significant to the regional balances of power. This shift will undoubtedly come about in a manner that will alter the overall outlook on future political and strategic conditions in the Middle East.

8592  
CSO: 4504/405



NEW POLICY ON OIL EXPLORATION DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 15 Aug 84 p 9

[Article by 'Adil Ibrahim: "Egypt Enters New Phase in Oil Exploration"]

[Text] Egypt is entering the third phase of oil exploration. It features, as announced by 'Abd-al-Hadi Qandil, minister of petroleum, granting new help and assistance to the companies that are bearing 85 percent of the expenses for oil exploration operations. This is in order to encourage them to operate in Egyptian territorial waters in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. The question submitted is, what are the results of this new policy?

Has Egyptian policy succeeded in the past in attracting international companies to join in the exploration operations according to the present, conventional system with production distribution so that domestic capital does not have to bear the consequences of risk while maintaining Egyptian control over petroleum resources. What has happened throughout the past 10 years is the signing of 89 oil exploration agreements, covering 712,000 km, with 40 companies from 18 nationalities, obligating these companies to spend 1,813,650,000. Also, the granting of registrations amounted to about 170 million which are not returnable.

These agreements led to an increase in the rate of exploratory drilling in both sea and land areas, and 168 exploratory and production wells were drilled last year, compared with 46 exploratory and production wells in 1974. The number of feet drilled for finding and producing oil on land and sea came to 1,346,000 feet last year, compared with 323,000 [in 1974].

For the past 10 years, Egyptian oil policy has induced the foreign oil companies to work in Egypt, according to geologist Ibrahim Radwan, director general of petroleum agreements in the petroleum agency. He adds that these agreements cover the rights of the foreign companies to recover exploration expenses over 5 years instead of 10 upon making a commercial find. Each agreement stipulates a time period for the exploration that varies between 2 and 8 years, as well as a time period for production of from 20 to 30 years. In the agreement they set percentages during the period of exploration, which is divided into three time periods. A quarter of the area is relinquished following each period in order for the companies

not to hold the ground, unnecessarily, forever. When a petroleum discovery becomes commercial, a percentage is allotted for recovering expenses. This varies between 20 and 30 percent of the value of the petroleum discovered. The percentage of the production value remaining is divided, and this varies between 60 and 80 percent, depending on conditions and between the agency and the company, with percentages varying from one agreement to another, depending on the probability of oil in each area. When the likelihood of petroleum is high, the agency's share increases. In general, this varies between 80 and 88 percent.

Also, agreements with foreign companies in Egypt require 12 steps before approval and before implementation can begin.

Dr Husayn Kamel, president of the General Petroleum Organization, said that exploration operations in Egypt have experienced development in the use of advanced technological procedures and methods since the domestic sector began exploration work in 1957 and in the participation of foreign companies within the framework of production agreements in 1964. This has brought about an increase in oil exploration agreements from \$5 million in 1952 to about \$700 million in 1983, which is a 120-fold increase. The chances for finding oil have increased, since the ratio of successful exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Suez basin from 1908 to 1957 was 5 percent while conventional technology was used. This has gone to 17 percent since the beginning of the 1960's.

Concerning the results of exploratory drilling, geologist Shawqi 'Abidin, director general of exploration in the Gulf of Suez Oil Company, says that the exploratory wells that have been drilled for oil since 1968 total 884. These led to finding 108 petroleum fields. Of these, 91 are oil fields and 17 are natural gas fields. The exploration efforts at the present stage, since 1973, surpass the previous efforts, since 124 wells have been drilled, leading to 79 discoveries, of which 65 were oil and 14 were natural gas, and 18 oil discoveries have been turned into producing fields, while 47 oil finds and 14 natural gas finds are still being assessed.

12496

CSO: 4504/400

# CAUSES OF DECLINE IN BANK PROFITS EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 12 Aug 84 p 9

[Article: "Indication of a Decrease in Bank Profits--Why?"]

[Text] What is the mystery behind the decrease in bank profits last year? Is it the lack of demand for commercial credit as a result of the interest rate going up to a 16 percent minimum? Or is the reason sound unsound conditions in credit, aside from the large number of banks in Egypt? Or have all these reasons combined led to the decrease in bank profits? Any attempt to increase commercial bank profits requires taking all these factors into consideration.

Dr 'Ali Lutfi, professor of economics and former minister of finance, says that it is obvious, on the basis of reports put out by the banks in 1983, that there is an inconsistency between the profits of some banks and their profits of previous years. This inconsistency is attributable to a number of reasons, which are:

-The credit policy established by the Ministry of Economy and the Central Bank, by its nature leads to a decrease in the profits of these banks. This policy is intended to focus on providing incentives to agriculture and industry, that is, the production of commodities, and a tightening up of trade. Therefore, the Central Bank decided that the interest rate for agricultural and industrial projects would be a 13 percent maximum while the interest rate for trade would be a 16 percent minimum. No doubt this naturally leads to a reduction in demand for commercial credit.

-The credit policy established by the Central Bank forces the banks not to increase commercial credit except within very narrow limits. Therefore, we find that the volume of commercial credit has shrunk and commercial credit, as is well known, is the credit that yields large profits to the banks. And in my view that is the primary reason for the lack of growth in profits in some banks and for the inconsistency in profits in some banks during 1983 compared with previous years. This does not mean that the credit policy is wrong because the incentive for agriculture and industry is necessary. But my comment here is whether it was necessary to the extent of limiting trade and raising the interest rate on commercial credit to 16 percent.

The distinction between types of commodities imported is concerned with the importation of consumer goods. Specifically, if they are not indispensable, the interest rate can be 16 percent or more, but in importing manufactured goods, raw materials and brokered goods I believe the interest rate must, however, be less than 16 percent.

-The general climate that prevailed in some banks regarding the granting of credit in recent years led to the appearance of some unsound credit situations and make the banks check very carefully when granting credit and encouraged them not to extend credit unless there was very good collateral.

-The great number of banks operating in Egypt is also behind the decrease in bank profits. Under the open-door policy a very large number of banks and branches of foreign banks were established. The number of banks in Egypt has now reached about 99. This includes the four domestic banks: Bank al-Qawmi, Misr Bank, Bank of Alexandria and Cairo Bank. This is in addition to the specialized banks: the Industrial Development Bank, Agricultural Credit Bank and the real estate banks. Then there are the joint banks that were established under the investment law. And there are branches of foreign banks and investment and operations banks. I believe that we have enough banks here and there is no need for establishing a surplus of banks and possibly leading to a kind of competition between banks. They have distinctive features, but the harm that has taken place is that the spreading of the activity among a large number of banks has led to a reduction in the profits of each bank separately. The truth is that there has been an increase in the volume of economic activity in general, but the increase in the number of banks was more rapid than the rate of increase in the volume of this activity. So the banks have begun drawing customers from one another and competing with one another, and this is what has affected their profits. Because the interest rate on savings varies between 12 and 13 percent and the result of the competition cuts about 10 percent, this means that there is a loss on the loan resulting from sharp competition between the banks, so this has had a third effect on bank profits. Now there is a decision to halt the establishment of new banks, so if we take into consideration the growth in economic activity, this means the banks will be able to handle this activity. I expect that bank profits in 1984 will increase.

With regard to financing trade, it is necessary to make a distinction between the various types of commodities. Restricting imports of consumer goods, especially (luxury) consumer goods, is necessary, but it is not necessary for us to restrict imports of manufactured goods, raw materials and brokered goods because they are necessary for production. Indeed, if the objective is to increase the production of commodities, whether agricultural, industrial, or in the form of requirements for this commodity production imported from abroad, then we must not put restrictions on them. Hence commercial credit for importing manufactured goods, brokered goods and raw materials must be increased and profits restored to the banks. Since this increase will promote production, it is necessary to

lower the interest rate on commercial credit, which will increase demand for it.

The former finance minister says the interest rate for savings is quite suitable because it has reached 13.25 percent and is the highest rate of interest permitted by investment certificates. The interest rate is a double-edged sword because increasing it is an incentive to save, but has a disadvantage of when the rate is raised it is very detrimental to investment because when the investor borrows, it raises his interest rate, for instance, from 12 to 13 percent or more and decreases investment. Therefore, when the Central Bank sets the interest rate, it must establish a kind of balance between savings and investment, because if the interest rate is raised sharply, savings will increase considerably but will remain idle at the banks, which will not be able to invest them because the interest rate is too high. Conversely, if we lower the interest rate, there will be no interest in saving but a strong demand for investment capital at the banks.

12496

CSO: 4504/400



NEW MONETARY POLICY GUIDELINES DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 12 Aug 84 p 9

[Article: "Comments on Monetary Policies and Change in Credit: Bringing Inflation under Control Still a Hard-to-reach Objective"]

[Text] Economic policies aimed, through several monetary decisions, at reducing instruments of payment, controlling inflation and inducing production activity.

These policies have produced some results, which were announced by Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id at his recent meeting with leading bankers. The most important of these is a reduction of the number of means of payment from 44 to 22 percent. But this has not achieved all the objectives hoped for, the most important of which are a lowering of the inflation rate and an increase in the exchange rate.

These policies brought other actions, the first of which was announced by the minister of economy. What it amounts to is that the credit limits at the banks have retreated from the percentage set by the Ministry of Economy in November 1981, which was 65 percent, and have dropped at some banks to 55 or 56 percent.

If we consider the regulation issued by the Ministry of Economy with regard to not allowing trade activity more than 1 percent of the amount of credit at the banks per month, this means also raising the rate of the liquidity of the commercial and general speciality banks because these are the banks that, with the huge deposits they have, influence the overall rate for deposits and loans.

This also means not channeling the rest of the credit available at the banks intensively and enthusiastically into industrial, agricultural and service production activity, certainly unless the aforementioned monetary policy is aimed at this.

If we go past this fact, which pertains to increased liquidity in the general banks, we find that the reverse is true with regard to the small private banks that maintain their credit limits with difficulty.

However, on another level there has been some overstepping of the proclaimed interest rates, that is, until it dawns on the customer later that it is difficult to obtain the bank deposits in accordance with government regulations!

In connection with that, these banks now have sinking liquidity rates and therefore do not have recourse to long-term or even medium-term industrial or agricultural loans but, in all their operations, rely on commercial activity or short-term activity that guarantees quick-turnabout profits.

If we look at these regulations and at the reality of the consumer market at the level of the ordinary citizen, we find that inflation levels are still rising despite a reduction of the quantity of means of payment!

And despite the banks' retention of liquidity and despite the curtailing of trade activity and the instigating of interest rates favoring production...

The Ministry of Economy, in the policies it has been issuing, has been endeavoring to deal with these matters, although the conditions of the Egyptian market require special discussion, then these regulations have pulled the rug out from under all the importers, including those who import raw materials for manufacturing, tools and materials that go into manufacturing. This has a reverse, negative effect on the small producers who put these raw materials into their products. Not only this, but withdrawal of some credit assistance from some led to a withdrawal of this assistance in the payments they had been making to their producers among the small manufacturers and the owners of craft shops, workshops and small plants...

This in turn has kept most of these workshops and plants from producing at high rates, and the recent monetary policies are, most certainly, not aimed at this. On examination of these policies we find they began to stimulate interest rates several years ago in favor of industry, agriculture and services by reducing the rates for these activities and raising them, with no maximum, for trade activity. The ministry of economy brought about this regulation in November 1981, especially in credit at 65 percent of total individual deposits. This means, in other words, banning loans from bank deposits.

Following the setting of the percentage of loans for trade activity so that it does not exceed 1 percent per month, all these regulations ensued with the objective of cutting back the quantity of means of payment, supporting production activity and reducing the rapid increase in trade activity, all for the purpose of reducing inflation rates.

However, the facts are: rising liquidity of the large banks and decreasing liquidity in the small private banks, stagnation in the small industries' market and continuation of the rates as they are, if not higher than before. All of this, when considering the recent monetary policy, causes a lot of question marks.

## EGYPT

### PROBLEMS BETWEEN SAUDIA, EGYPT AIR OUTLINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 812, 6 Aug 84 pp 24-25

[Article by Ni'man al-Zayyati: "War of Seats Between Egypt Air and Saudia "]

[Text] A war of seats has broken out between Egypt Air and Saudia. The victims are hundreds of thousands of passengers who have missed out on their business affairs or vacations waiting for a declaration of a truce between the two companies.

It is said that the Egyptian civil aviation authorities have sacrificed Egypt Air. The full story is in the following report.

#### Strange Support!

Saudia has pursued a monopolistic policy since 1980 with a view to monopolizing traffic aboard its aircraft to the exclusion of effective participation by other companies, Egypt Air in particular. This policy has led to monopolization by Saudia of 75 percent of the traffic, leaving 25 percent to Egypt Air. The result has been financial losses for Egypt Air amounting to about \$100 million in 1982 and more than \$31 million in 1983. This in addition to the support by Egyptian civil aviation authorities to Saudia by authorizing its operating schedules at the end of the summer of 1984 without coordinating with Egypt Air, disrupting the balance by violating the provisions of the bilateral treaty concluded between the two countries.

What about the damage caused to Egypt Air? And how can this monopoly which Saudia has followed be addressed under existing treaties between the two countries?. Egypt Air Director of International Affairs 'Abd al-Rahman Banajah said, "The total traffic actually carried aboard Egypt Air and Saudia's regular Cairo-Jiddah, Cairo-Riyadh, and Cairo-Dhahran routes from November to October during the year (summer and winter) is about a million passengers annually in both directions. Summer traffic represents 65 percent of the total annual traffic. The weekly average in one direction for both companies is 10,400 passengers in the summer and 8,227 passengers in the winter. Egypt Air's share was no more than 25 percent of the total traffic while Saudia's percentage reached 75 percent for the following reasons.

- Saudia pursues a monopolistic policy with the backing of

agencies in the Saudi state.

- A decision was made to have Saudi state employees traveling at state expense make their trips aboard Saudia flights. This does not constitute a problem since this is a very small proportion of the traffic between Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

- The monopoly later extended to include contractors with state agencies. This is what really opened up passenger orders and this constitutes a large proportion of the traffic.

- Saudia did not stop here; its monopolistic policy has been covering the Saudi private sector for two years during which contractors were denied entry visas unless the trip was made aboard Saudia. It reached the point where travel bureaus in the interior cities were threatened with not being given reservations for private sectors unless the trip abroad was made aboard Saudia aircraft.

#### Recovering Lost Rights

'Abd al-Rahman Banajah says that, since it appears that from the statistics, the average number of passengers actually transported weekly in one direction by both companies is 10,400 passengers in the summer and 8,227 passengers during the winter, then the total seats which have to be offered through the two companies weekly in one direction, on the basis of the principle of a minimum seat occupancy breakeven point of 65 percent, must not exceed 16,000 seats per week in the summer and 12,657 per week in the winter.

The support given by Saudi authorities to their companies has resulted in Saudia's offering 11,000 seats a week in one direction in the summer and winter between Cairo and Jiddah and and between Cairo and Riyadh. Egypt Air has no choice but to offer the rest, 4,200 seats, or 75 percent for Saudia and 25 percent for Egypt Air.

Consequently, Egypt Air has begun to demand recovery of its rights under provisions of the bilateral treaty concluded between the two countries and Egyptian civil aviation authorities demanded in May 1982 half of the total number of seats which must be offered between the two companies at the rate of 7,600 seats a week for each company during the year until Egypt Air was able to regain 3,400 seats a week from Saudia to get its full share, especially since the return for this share was about 60 million dollars annually.

'Abd al-Rahman Banaja adds that the fifty-fifty arrangement went into effect on June 1982 and consequently the return ensured preservation of the company's general capital. Unfortunately, this fifty-fifty sharing arrangement lasted no more than two weeks; Saudia reverted to its former practice. This required intervention by prime minister, in order to preserve the company's general capital, by issuing decision number 2896, which



stipulated that the rights of Egypt Air must be preserved, At the same time a suitable schedule had to be chosen and negotiations had to continue until this was achieved.

Under the prime minister's decision, agreement was reached between Egypt Air and Saudia to divide traffic on a fifty-fifty basis with effect from April 1983. Saudia then asked to add supplementary flights to the regular route to accommodate fifty thousand passengers in both directions. Egypt Air agreed to this and continued to operate special pilgrimage flights exclusively in exchange for Saudia's continuing to operate special teachers' flights exclusively.

As a result of this agreement, traffic carried aboard Egypt Air during the summer of 1983 increased over that carried during the summer of 1982 by 62 percent and income amounted to approximately 19.5 million dollars.

An Egypt Air official believes that it was lack of coordination between the Egyptian civil aviation authorities and Egypt Air which led to the successive losses of Egypt Air. Support by Egyptian civil aviation authorities for Saudia by sanctioning the latter's operating schedules at the end of the summer of 1983 without the needed coordination with Egypt Air upset the necessary balance. This was in violation of the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 8 of the bilateral treaty signed by the two countries. It stipulates:

"The organizations under the control of the two parties shall have fair and equal opportunities to operate agreed-upon air routes in designated corridors between their regions."

Furthermore, Egyptian aviation authorities, without consulting Egypt Air, granted Saudia's request to operate supplementary flights. The result was that Saudia carried more than 64,000 passengers aboard its supplementary flights, not to mention the effect this had on Egypt Air's route. Approximately 79,000 seats were cancelled following this authorization. Despite these cancellations, the seat occupancy rate did not reach the recognized breakeven point of 65 percent; in fact, it reached 47 percent in contrast to Saudia's 89 percent. Consequently, Saudia obtained, as a result of the authorization by the Egyptian authorities, approximately 12.5 million dollars. We therefore find that if the approval had not been given for extra operations for Saudia, Egypt Air would have been able to continue to offer its full share on the regular route without any cancellations and in turn the income obtained by Saudia would have gone to Egypt Air, for an increase of about 31 million dollars.

"Egyptian Aviation Authorities Sacrifice Egypt Air"

Following several lengthy meetings between the Egyptian side and

the Saudi side to give fair treatment to Egypt Air, Egyptian officials were surprised at the additional authorizations and advantages to Saudia. The result of this was that Saudia obtained requests for increases over 1984.

It seems that Saudia had set aside part of the Jiddah-Riyadh traffic in the summer of 1983, but did not do so in the summer of 1984. This will lead to an increase of seats offered from Cairo and Jidda and will inflict damage on Egypt Air's operation which basically depends on the Jiddah-Cairo traffic, to which the Cairo-Riyadh-Cairo and Cairo-Dhahran-Cairo traffic does not compare. This is in addition to the additional capacity agreed upon in the summer of 1984 between Cairo and Medina amounting to 816 seats per week in one direction vice 450 seats in the summer of 1983. This also indicates the the interests of Egypt Air in traffic between Cairo and Jiddah, whose revenues amount to more than 33 million dollars.

#### How Can We Return Nationalism to Egypt Air?

'Abd al-Rahman Banajah believes that, in order for us to preserve the company's general capital and in order to recover from Saudia, it is necessary to immediately review the operating schedules of Saudia for the summer of 1984 authorized by Egyptian civil aviation officials and reduce them as was the case last summer and winter. The extra flights of peak season tourist traffic should be shared by the two companies on a fifty-fifty basis, according to the market requirements. This is our basic demand, and there should also be support for the Egypt Air organization in operating its flights to Riyadh, just as there is for the European and other Arab companies.

Egypt Air also demands that it be compensated for the lost capital of approximately 33 million dollars from the improvement and development fund for civil aviation services. Even if this is done, the answer about the reasons for Egypt Air's carrying such a sum for Saudia is not understood.

Egypt Air believes that there should be a stop to Saudia's operating any supplementary flights, especially after the increase it was authorized by the Civil Aviation Board. Egypt Air should operate the supplementary flights exclusively whether Cairo-Jiddah-Cairo, Cairo-Riyadh-Cairo or Cairo-Dhahran-Cairo, since that represents 42 percent of the extra seats authorized for Saudia in its schedules the revenues for which reached more than 19 million dollars.

6945

CSO: 4504/409

ROLE OF LOCAL, FOREIGN BANKS IN DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 813, 13 Aug 84 pp 13-15

[Article: "Mistaken Liberality in the Banks of the Economic Open-Door Policy"]

[Text] The recent measures taken by Minister of the Economy Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id, for the purpose of regulating business dealings in foreign currency and to achieve discipline in credit, were tantamount to an electric shock to the open-door banks.

The banking sector in Egypt numbers 100 public and investment sector banks and the open-door banks enjoy many privileges. Perhaps they have become intoxicated with those privileges and have forgotten that there are economic authorities, a central bank, a development plan and projects in which they ought to be participating. In this connection, Law No 120 of 1975, concerning the Central Bank and the banking system, says that they should operate in accordance with development plans and policies of support to the national economy.

After this corrective movement in the banking street, and free from all those policies that had isolated it, the question is: How can the banking sector participate in development?

Banks Carry Out Their Role

Sami al-Hulwani, the director general of planning in the Egyptian National Bank, defines the basic role of the banking apparatus as revolving around development progress in the community, through the funding it provides to existing economic projects or funding the establishment of new projects or the renewal of production components and their stimulation in existing projects, in addition to funding the cycles of production activity and covering the liquidity shortfall during the projects' times of need while awaiting the resources to pay off the advanced funding.

He also added that during the past few years, the banks have been searching for a basic role in establishing new projects, through participation in their capitalization. Undoubtedly, helping to create these projects covers the development plans that are aimed at a definite role for the

private sector, including the establishment of projects under the auspices of the investment law or law no 157. The banks should also participate in the management of these projects, through their representation on their boards of directors. This would provide the management of these companies with banking expertise, which would help to spur these projects down a dound road and would always work to correct their course, so as to achieve the desired goals.

#### The State is the Reason

Isma'il Siyam, the director of the Office of Planning in the National Bank for Development, agrees with the view offered above. He added that the banks that were established in accordance with law no 43 of 1974, or private banks whose establishment was within the bounds of published official statements, or within the parameters permitted by the banking and credit laws in Egypt, cannot exceed these parameters in deciding on granting loans in the commercial sector. With the exception of this, these banks carry out their roles as should be done in the rest of the sectors.

Policies submitted in the government, and the words are still those of the director of planning in the National Bank for Development, shook the confidence in individual activity. "I believe that what is necessary is to free confidence in their activities, because ultimately that will serve the cause of increased production, since production -- increased production -- is the sole and pressing solution and the absolute master for solving the economic problem in Egypt. However, we recognize that the private producer-- whoever it may be--tries to make the activity more profitable from his point of view, and the achievement of greater profits will ultimately serve growth. Profits translate into taxes, which help to achieve social justice.

#### Export or Consumption

That slogan was offered by Dr Hazim al-Bablawi, president of the Egyptian Bank for Export Development, who thinks that Egypt faces a challenge in the next 10 years, represented by the difficulty in the pressure of total imports, since they are basic imports. Accordingly, an effective policy must be established to increase industrial and agricultural exports, because that would mean that the Egyptian economy would be dependent on Egyptian labor. This is an absolute value that could introduce us into the arena of true international competition on the one hand, and on the other hand, and this is the most important, the growth of exports would work to create parity in our balance of payments.

Dr al-Bablawi offered his practical concept for advancing the wheel of development. He said that "introducing an insurance system for exporters against commercial and non-commercial dangers, which would be introduced in Egypt for the first time, would greatly encourage exports. Our concern with exporting goes back to the fact that it is the most



important component of the growth process. In this regard, I would point out that the World Bank agreed to give Egypt funding for exporting projects, in the amount of \$125 million. Participating in these operations are the Bank for Export Development, Misr Bank, the National Development Bank and the Industrial Bank.

Don't Blame Us!

'Aziz Mahmud Ibrahim, director general of the National Bank of Oman Ltd, began his conversation by remarking: "Do not put the blame on the foreign banks for not participating in the country's development plan because we neglected to regulate this matter. The responsible agencies, such as the Central Bank of Egypt, must issue decrees to control this matter. Have each bank operating in Egypt allocate a specific percentage of its deposits, let it be 5 percent, for participation in development projects. This participation must appear in the bank's budget under the item 'obligatory midterm loans.' Some of the developing nations, such as Morocco, have done this, arranging it so that the Central Bank of Morocco issued several decrees, regulating the participation of banks in growth projects. These decrees also imposed penalties and fines on banks on whose budget sheets this percentage was not shown. Undoubtedly, the object of law no 43 of 1974, which licensed banks and investment firms operating in Egypt, was only basically for liberalizing production investment and not to develop consumer liberality."

The director of the Bank of Oman Ltd adds that evaluating the experience of banks operating in Egypt was done for the first time in 1978, when the first investment conference was held. One of the recommendations of this conference was for the state to draw up a plan on a country-wide level, enumerating the vital projects needed for the country for growth purposes, so that the banks and the various investment firms would be able to study the projects and their requirements, and the possibilities of participating in them. Unfortunately, this investment chart has not yet been drawn up.

Obstacles in the Path of Participation!

The consensus is that there are many difficulties in the way of banks fulfilling their roles in the development field. The first of these difficulties was brought up by Isma'il Siyam, when he said that some of the requirements of the banking and credit law were necessarily regulatory, in order to maintain the general balance. However, these requirements on standards should not be increased more than is necessary. For example, determining the size of credit with respect to deposits could determine the possibility of expansion in economic activity to the sovereign advantage of the state, which means that we make sacrifices on behalf of increasing production, with an increase--non-accountable--in services.

Dr Hazim al-Bablawi submits what he views as one of the obstacles, when he mentions:

1. The problem of obtaining appropriate expertise in a field in which human expertise is represented by true capital.
2. Problems pertaining to complicated measures that exporters face in terms of deficient information, funding and facilities.
3. The need to change some economic policies.
4. Slow reaction of the government apparatus in certain matters which disrupt the market.

'Aziz Mahmud Ibrahim looks at another side of this matter, which does not represent obstacles for banks so much as obstacles for the growth process as a whole. He said: "We lack awareness in the investment field, especially since we know that there are 22 million Egyptian pounds still frozen in the form of bank deposits in the names of individuals and organizations. There is no doubt that most of these deposits represent the savings of these individuals and organizations. These huge funds could be utilized in the investment plan and growth projects. We should also reconsider the obligations and duties of banks operating in Egypt, especially foreign banks, so that many of these banks could undertake short-term funding for quick return projects. I believe that this is not the object of inviting these banks to operate in Egypt, and this is not a development job."

#### Where is the Social Side?

Despite the fact that this gap with respect to the growth process comes--in the considerations of producers--in second place, it must be closed, especially since it is an aspect measured in quantity, despite which might occur to some minds that it is a qualitative process that is done automatically as a result of the success of any economic project. The individual aspects of this quantity are many, not the first of which is the guarantee of housing and food for every individual of the populace, and not the last of which is the guarantee of employment for all hands capable of working in society. These are individual aspects that deal with the slogan of just distribution, but what is the picture in the banking system?

Isma'il Siyam, director of the Office of Planning in the National Bank for Development, says: "The private producer is engaged in those sectors in which he considers himself to be expert and skilled especially in their management. Therefore, the private sector tasks him with a role that is not the role of the public sector. On the contrary, the purpose of regulating profit in the private sector is what makes it necessary for the public sector to take on sectors and projects in which individuals cannot engage. The blend between the policy of production and distribution should not mean that the state must endorse a liberal policy in production and a socialist policy in distribution."

Sami al-Hulwani of the Egyptian National Bank says: "The law of supply and demand is what must govern the development process. This means that

one must clearly distinguish within the framework of the group that is working and must be rewarded for efficiency and good work. In this way, we serve the social aspect in the growth process and we achieve it. I would like to emphasize that no producer enters into a project without wanting to earn a quick economic profit."

#### Why Did Foreign Banks Come to Egypt?

This section comes from two bank workers. One works in a bank in the public sector, and the other works for a bank established in accordance with law no 43 of 1974. What do they say?

Mr Abu-al-Layl, director general of the Office of Research and Marketing in the Bank of Egypt, says: "One can highlight the most important of the observations and indications of the extent of participation of banks stemming from the provisions of law no 43 of 1974, as first: Banks of the economic open-door policy did not use a portion of the local deposits inside Egypt and, consequently, did not invest these funds to serve the national economy. That is, to put it more clearly, they withdrew the deposits of Egyptians to use them abroad. We must consider the seriousness of this for the Egyptian economy, as well as noting that the commodity sectors did not benefit from investment funds inside Egypt. That was due to the insignificant volume of loans granted by these banks to the commodity sectors, whose growth is considered one of the fundamental conditions for economic development in Egypt."

Mr Muhammad Fahmi al-Sayyid of the National Bank of Development talks about the same point:

"The establishment of these banks outstripped the actual need for them, which led to competition among these banks with regard to attracting customers, both depositors and borrowers. This reached the point of illegal competition. In the area of competition for deposits, several of these banks resorted to raising interest rates on these deposits violating certain of their conditions, granting overt and covert privileges, and creating a new class of deposit brokers and establishing commissions for them, which constituted a fraudulent tariff on banking services. That had an effect on the net operating revenues in the banks, as a result of the rise in their sources of funds. Due to this, there was the fear that if this situation continued, these banks would be unable to cover their obligations.

"In addition, there was the foreign banks granting loans without consideration for the assets or capabilities of the borrowers, and without regard for the needs of the national economy, which caused inflationary gaps. This also formed an obstacle to the retrieval of these funds. The two cases of the al-Ahram Bank and the Jamal Tarsat Bank are fresh in our minds. There was also the participation of many of these banks in the phenomenon of encouraging the black market with regard to foreign currency, as an inevitable result of liberalizing imports without the need to remit currency. Moreover, there was poor control over the banks' foreign

Assets and Debits of Financial Centers of the Various Groups of Banks Operating Within the Banking Sector  
(Estimates in Millions of Pounds)

	The Four Public Sector Banks	Commercial Banks Est. in Accordance with the Investment Law	Investment and Business Banks, Incl. branches of foreign banks
Assets:			
Cash	262.8	50.0	28.5
Financial and investment paper	790.1	75.5	178.5
Owed to the banks	5,386.8	3,454.2	2,413.0
Loans and credit easements	6,928.6	2,622.9	1,821.0
Ministry of Finance funding accounts	541.0	---	---
[Category not provided]	648.8	585.9	405.4
[Total]	14,558.1	6,788.5	4,846.4
Debits:			
Property rights	366.3	348.5	345.0
Allocations	629.4	177.0	87.0
Long-term Loans	126.7	---	4.3
Owed to banks	2,389.9	990.5	2,315.8
Deposits	9,537.3	4,448.5	1,458.3
Other debits	1,508.5	824.0	636.0



transactions. This caused the implementation of foreign transfers damaging to the national economy, especially after it was recently rumored that the Socialist Prosecutor's Office had effected the return of \$17 million to the country, which one of the banks had remitted abroad. In addition, there was \$8 million in taxes due on this remitted amount.

7005

CSO: 4504/413

## SUDAN

### MINISTER OF FINANCE DISCUSSES ECONOMIC SITUATION

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 335, 13 Aug 84 p 32

[Article adapted from AL-HADAF, a publication of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party of Sudan: "Facts about the Economic Situation in Statements Made by the Minister of Finance"]

[Text] In his address to the National People's Assembly Ibrahim Mun'im, minister of finance and economic planning, revealed the facts about the economic situation in the country in 1984-1985. He mentioned that the total deficit in foreign trade in 1984 will amount to 1.582 billion dollars. Details of that deficit are as follows:

There is a deficit of 1.25 billion dollars in the balance of payments. This represents the inability to meet the country's needs of essential imports such as wheat, flour, petroleum, drugs, spare parts, fertilizers, chemicals, etc. A deficit of 332 million dollars was incurred to cover requirements for development projects. Thus, the sum total of the deficit that is to be covered is 1.582 billion dollars.

The minister added that the IMF and the Paris Club had agreed at their last meeting to provide 807 million dollars of Sudan's needs for 1984. The details are as follows: 332 million dollars for the program on development and foreign aid; and 475 million dollars to subsidize the balance of payments. Thus, the total appropriations that the Paris Club had promised to make available to Sudan in 1984 amount to 807 million dollars.

The minister revealed that Sudan still had a deficit of 775 million dollars; these are debts that will become due next year. The minister said that Sudan would get these funds after the Paris Club and commercial banks agree to re-schedule the debts and postpone payments. The countries with which Sudan will enter into agreements for the re-scheduling of debts and the deferment of payments on these debts are Germany, the Netherlands, the United States of America, Great Britain, Switzerland, France, Saudi Arabia, etc.

The minister indicated that the recent Paris Club meeting, which was held in December 1983, had approved Sudan's fiscal and economic policies as well as the 3-year investment plan for 1983-1986. The Paris Club meeting had approved a

definition of Sudan's needs in the areas of energy and training. It approved the government's domestic measures for removing subsidies for petroleum, flour, wheat and sugar. The Paris Club meeting also approved the government's measures for raising prices for railroad and electricity services, and it approved the government's measures for reducing government spending, etc.

The minister added, "It would have been inconceivable for us to request a subsidy of over 1.5 billion dollars from the Paris Club if it were not convinced that our financial and economic policies [were sound] and if it did not approve of those policies."

The minister of finance and economic planning affirmed the following in the Economic Supplement to the newspaper, AL-SAHFAH, [The Press] which came out on 28 February 1984:

The minister emphasized his agreement with the Paris Club to set up a special fund to finance the importation of oil products into the country. [He emphasized that] the ministry had submitted a proposal to the Development Bank for setting up a workshop that would look into the means for developing resources and revenues for modern Islamic countries. The governors of the bank will consider this matter at their meeting, which is to be held in Jeddah on 1 March 1984.

The minister added that the aim of the visit which the president of the IBRD had paid to Sudan was to strengthen relations between the two parties. The president of the bank wanted to understand the problems that Sudan's economy was facing; he wanted to come up with appropriate solutions to these problems and to discuss appropriate projects for this stage. It is known that the bank contributes more than 560 million dollars to finance several projects, particularly the al-Jazirah Reconstruction Project and other irrigated farming projects. The bank also contributes funds to the process of upgrading economic and infrastructure establishments, such as energy.

Emphasis will be placed during this visit on appealing to the bank to expand and increase the subsidy offered to the public sector for farming, industry and services. The minister is hoping that the bank will adopt a plan for the private sector that will fit in the national plan. The minister is hoping that the foreign private sector will participate in this plan with the local private sector. This plan will cause many private and public sector firms in countries that are members in the bank--the minister is referring to advanced capitalist countries--to participate in subsidizing local private sector projects. These firms will then implement projects that cannot be implemented by utilizing the resources of the local private sector or the government's public sector.

What do these facts reveal about the gist of the economic situation?

It may be summarized as follows:

The total deficit in foreign trade that is expected in 1984 will amount to 1.582 million dollars. Last year the minister of finance had estimated that the deficit would be 700 million [dollars] only. What matters here is not only the problem of covering this year's expected deficit, but it is also basically one

of stopping the decline and checking the deficit in the balance of payments which is growing year after year because of financial, commercial and economic policies. These policies have been accompanied by a decline in production, devaluation of the currency, a rise in the cost of living and a shortage of staples. Every day citizens pay dearly for these conditions in the cruel treatment they receive and in the depressed conditions under which they live.

The minister is focusing his attention on acquiring funds from the Paris Club to cover the deficit in the balance of payments. At the same time he is ignoring altogether the task of dealing with the deteriorating structures of the national economy and the shortage in production requirements. The minister is admitting his inability to provide even the basic requirements for life such as wheat, flour, petroleum, drugs, fertilizers, spare parts, etc. To solve this problem, he is forced to pay a high price. For example, he had to remove the subsidy for staples such as wheat, sugar and petroleum, and he had to turn over management of the national economy to the IMF and the IBRD, who are backed by the Paris Club. It is known that it is the IBRD that directs the minister of finance and sets fiscal and economic policies for him. The IBRD also sets the general directions for the development of the economy. This is evident from the minister's forementioned statements [about] setting fiscal and economic policies and pursuing the implementation of these policies. It is evident in the removal of government subsidies for flour, wheat, sugar, petroleum, railroad services and electricity; in the suspension of development since 1978 under the pretext of reducing government spending; and in the break up of the public sector. It is evident in the fact that the local and foreign private sectors, which are subsidized by the IBRD, are given a free hand in the areas of farming, industry and services; and it is evident in the devaluation of the national currency.

It is becoming evident that the deficit in the state's budget--the domestic deficit--is also growing because of lavish and non-productive government spending, which is also growing. As usual, government can do nothing but impose more fees and taxes. What is new here is that religion is being exploited to impose new burdens on the people--the bonds for the holy war--and to create new sources of revenue.

This is a summary of the general economic situation as it is set forth in statements made by the minister of finance, and these are the remedies he offers. Nevertheless, the economic crisis is getting worse, and the budget deficit is growing. There is a foreign trade deficit; the structures of the national economy are declining; the cost of living is rising; and all this is affecting citizens' lives. This situation is creating bitter strife and depressed living conditions daily. It is making the simplest necessities of life scarce despite assistance and relief from the IMF, the IBRD and the Paris Club. [These hardships exist] despite the Paris Club and despite the Islamic course that is being pursued; the hardships exist despite support from the banks.



## SUDAN

### CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, CORRUPTION DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 334, 6 Aug 84 pp 21-22

[Interview with Wali-al-Din al-Mahdi by Jamal Isma'il: "Islamic Law Would Forbid Muslims from Pledging Their Allegiance to Numayri"]

[Text] On the 10th of last June, Sudan's president, Ja'far Numayri sent the People's Assembly a proposal--his third since coming to power--for broad amendments to the constitution. The president's proposal would amend 123 articles of the constitution's 225 articles.

Anyone who takes a close look at the "proposed" amendments will easily discover without any trouble that their aim was to give the president more power and authority so he can control deteriorating conditions in Sudan on all levels.

The proposed amendment to Article 80 of the constitution makes that evident. The amendment would replace the original text with one that would call upon the president to become "the leader of the faithful and the protector of the Sudanese nation." The proposed text would have the president become the head of state as well as its imam. He would assume the executive authority; he would take part in the legislative authority; and he would function in that position in accordance with a legal pledge of allegiance.

President Numayri proposed these amendments almost 1 month after declaring a state of emergency in Sudan. While numerous senior clergymen, professional associations and Sudan's political forces inside the country and abroad were speaking their minds on the emergency law that was imposed on the country, and while they were expressing their thoughts about the new laws, the constitutional amendments and their pledge of allegiance to Numayri, leaders of al-Ansar--the followers of Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi--were preparing to issue a statement defining their position and their rejection of the notion of paying homage to Numayri. Leaders of al-Ansar have been calling on the public in Sudan to refrain from paying Numayri such homage because it may be legally impermissible.

This is what Mr Wali-al-Din al-Hadi al-Mahdi, the oldest son of Imam al-Hadi, leader of al-Ansar, stated in an interview with AL-DUSTUR about developments in the situation in Sudan. This is the interview that touched upon a variety of subjects and brought that situation into sharp focus.

At the outset Mr Wali al-Din affirmed that Numayri's attempt to set himself up

as imam and request that the public pay him homage was legally impermissible.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because most al-Ansar [followers] are committed to pay their homage to an imam whose fate is still unknown to us. So far we have no material evidence about the destiny of Imam al-Hadi who entered the system when he became involved in a conflict with it. Events succeeded each other rapidly. We consider the imam to be absent from our midst until matters become clear. For these reasons the statement that we will be issuing will call upon supporters of the imam to observe caution and to refrain from paying their homage to Numayri in accordance with the law. For one may not pay homage to two imams simultaneously, particularly since the regime did drag its feet in providing evidence about the fate of the imam when we asked for that evidence. It was this foot dragging that increased our suspicions.

It is my opinion that Numayri's request that people pay him homage is no more than a political game. It is not a serious matter. If it were a serious matter, the matter of Imam al-Hadi would have been settled first. Then another such plan would be entertained. But now, let me say once again that paying homage to Numayri would be legally impermissible.

[Question] President Numayri proposed his amendments to the constitution while the Emergency Law was in effect. He said that the laws he had proclaimed were laws that would apply Islamic law. First, what do you think about the reasons that impelled him to declare a state of emergency? Second, what do you think about the matter of applying Islamic law as that was declared?

[Answer] According to information that is available to us, a state of emergency was declared last April by the regime following the air raid on Omdurman. However, we think it was the situation that was emerging in south Sudan that was fundamentally behind the declaration of the state of emergency. This situation has almost brought the regime to a dangerous stage which it is unable to confront. In addition, the popular opposition movement led by the Sudanese People's Grouping has grown. The regime is disturbed by that and has overreacted to it by resorting to more suppression and terror. The state of emergency was declared to give the regime's agencies the right to enter people's homes and search them even though that practice is inconsistent with the traditions of Islam and Islamic law, which forbid people from entering the homes of others without their permission. [Government officials are entering and searching people's homes] despite the fact that the regime is well aware of the nature of the Sudanese people in the north: in all the actions they took to express opposition to the regime, they acted publicly and openly and not surreptitiously. The regime is well aware of this. But the matter of terrorizing people, searching their homes and arresting, mistreating and imprisoning innocent people without charges or trials are practices that have continued since the term of the May [Revolution] began and since it came into power.

Furthermore, the regime is applying Islamic law in a manner that is turning people away from Islam, particularly in light of the very poor economic situation in the country, high prices and the shortage in staples. People's freedom of expression is being suppressed, and weapons are being used to subdue them and

drive them out of their homes. All this is intolerable: this regime must either retire or resign. It must give others who can carry out reforms the opportunity to do what its officials were unable to do in the country throughout the 15 years they spent in office. These 15 years have been years of pain and sorrow for the people of Sudan.

The Islamic tendency implies mercy and compassion, but it seems that the regime is deliberately pursuing the opposite of that, inflicting more pain and suffering on people. We know that the people have done their best, but the will of God did not determine success for them. Even efforts for reconciliation and reform that were made were aborted by the regime. It is for this reason that we've assumed our present posture in the opposition, and we've stayed away from this matter, condemning any reconciliation with the regime and its aides as well as with the political tendencies of its members and its entourage. We are holding all those people equally responsible for what is happening to the Sudanese people now. If people's rejection of the regime has inspired the regime with terror, that means that confidence between the regime and the people has been lost. Therefore, the regime is always ready to strike the people and to oppress them. It would thus be normal for the regime to resort to declaring a state of emergency in that regrettable and disturbing manner that we are seeing now.

[Question] Would you comment on the existing contradiction between the regime's application of Islamic law in the manner this application was proclaimed and what we know about the prevalence of corruption, illegal gain and injustice?

[Answer] We have to begin first with the historical background to this matter. When the May coup took place, there was an agreement among the major constitutional parties, chief among which was al-Ummah Party, the faction of Imam al-Hadi, and the Democratic Union Party. These parties were in agreement over the ratification of an Islamic constitution in the country. But that was delayed for numerous reasons until the events of May occurred and Numayri came to power. Numayri undermined the permanent constitution, calling it a yellow paper. He proclaimed a secular tendency, and he rejected Islam. Furthermore, he dealt blows to Muslims and particularly to al-Ansar [the followers] in Aba Island and elsewhere, killing thousands of them. He drove many Muslims out of their homes, and he tortured and imprisoned them. After that he tried many systems from the far left to the far right. When he failed to manage and reform the affairs of the country, he resorted--as he is now--to Islamic laws as the ultimate solution or the ultimate means for prolonging the life of the regime by attempting to influence the emotions of the Sudanese people.

It is our opinion that this is the principal reason why these laws were proclaimed. These laws are nothing more than an expression of the regime's hostility to Islam, not its support for it. Let me repeat that the economic situation, unemployment and the food shortage preclude the application of set Islamic penalties even if a person were to steal. This is because the established penalty for theft would apply to those who steal even though they do not need to steal [to survive]. But it seems that the regime is applying the law to the hungry and the poor and is leaving those who caused the existing corruption and embezzlements to get away with impunity. Such injustice is inconsistent with

Islam, which urges justice and equality. We heard that the new constitutional amendments would make the president unimpeachable even though the principle in Islam is that when a ruler does something right, his action is to be publicized but when he errs, he is to be disciplined. But how can the president be disciplined when the proposed Shura [Advisory] Council is to be chaired by the president and is to include the same entourage and aides who entertain no opinions of their own? Those people agree with the ruler when he is right and also when he is wrong! Is this Islam? It most certainly is not the Islam we know, and it has absolutely nothing to do with Islam.

[Question] In view of all these prevailing conditions, what in your opinion are those forces upon which the regime is relying so it can stay in power?

[Answer] At first the regime relied on a group of officers in Sudan's armed forces who were absolutely loyal to Numayri. Also after the Addis Ababa Agreement some people from south Sudan stood by the regime; they joined it wholeheartedly and assumed the responsibility of protecting it in the north. Third--and this is not less important--there is a mutual defense agreement between Egypt and Sudan. Numayri depends on this agreement for his protection in a fundamental way. In this regard we believe that this protection constitutes a kind of suppression of the Sudanese people. We believe that future relations between Egypt and Sudan would be enhanced and would become more fair if Egypt were to abandon Numayri. This is because while Numayri's regime is not permanent, the matter of good neighborliness and fraternity between Egypt and Sudan is both inevitable and permanent. We are calling upon the government in Egypt to stop protecting this tool of repression which manifests itself in Numayri. We are confident that the people of Sudan will appreciate that posture. On the other hand, Egypt's continued protection of the regime will create ill feelings among the Sudanese people who are suffering from its repression.

In the outside world the United States is backing the regime with funds and equipment. We do not exaggerate when we state that U.S. intelligence does have a material presence in Sudan.

[Question] In accordance with that, who are the active forces that are mobilizing people in Sudan?

[Answer] The people of Sudan took action more than once. Their basic motivation has always been their dissatisfaction with the economic and political decline in the country and their suffering from it. The people have exhausted all the peaceful ways of expressing their opinions. All their methods were countered by oppression and more oppression. The Sudanese People's Grouping is the effective and basic force that constitutes the opposition to the regime. Political demonstrations and popular uprisings have been the most successful peaceful methods for expressing that opposition. However, everyone who has expressed his opinion in the ways that are available has been taken into custody and tortured. The prisons are now bearing witness to that.

The interview had almost come to an end, and I asked Mr Wali-al-Din al-Hadi al-Mahdi to use AL-DUSTUR as a vehicle to address the people of Sudan. After a brief period of silence he said:

"We believe that the only thing people can do at the present time is refrain



from getting involved in the regime's policies, particularly after "Islamic laws" have been put into effect. The aim of these laws is to call for promises and pledges of loyalty that would be imposed on people by force in a non-Islamic manner. The solution to this situation lies in having the people join the Sudanese People's Grouping. The people of Sudan have suffered much from repression and oppression, and civility and courtesy in this context are pointless. Al-Ansar [the followers] are committed to their allegiance to Imam al-Hadi whom we consider to be absent. In Islam a pledge of allegiance is not to be coerced. Islam says there is to be no coercion in religion. "Call men to the path of your Lord with wisdom and kindly exhortation" [al-Nahl: 125]. This means that oppression and coercion are alien to Islam and only serve to turn people away from it. They are heresies that no one ought to abide by. This is what people must do inside the country. We cannot ask them to do anything more after all the sacrifices they have made and are making."

#### Numayri and the Gulf War

Mr Wali-al-Din al-Hadi al-Mahdi had taken part in the business of the Baghdad Conference for peace in the Gulf; he had participated in that conference as the representative of al-Ansar. When AL-DUSTUR asked him to comment on the events of the conference, he affirmed that the basic activity [for peace] must begin after the conference is adjourned and the international delegations return to their countries and organizations to carry out the work that has to be done to affirm the justice of Iraq's position in contrast with the intransigence of Iran, which is rejecting peace.

He added, "Iraq's position is one that calls upon all the Arab masses, and that includes the people of Sudan, to volunteer on the side of Iraq. This is a matter that Arab governments are bound by."

Regarding the government of Sudan Mr Wali-al-Din revealed that President Ja'far Numayri had recalled the symbolic unit he had sent to Iraq after the resolutions of the Fes Summit Conference. He said that that step which Numayri had taken was inconsistent with the wishes of the vast majority of the people of Sudan. Mr Wali al-Din also expressed his belief that Numayri had sent this unit at first in an effort to realize a personal interest. He recalled the unit when what he had sought to accomplish was not accomplished.

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CSO: 4504/403



OPPOSITION PARTIES ASKED ABOUT IRANIAN DEMANDS TO END WAR

Nicosia AL-NASHRAH in Arabic 19 Dec 83, 9 Jan 84

/Article: "A Referendum: The Iraqi Opposition Responds"/

/No 7, 19 Dec 83 pp 22-24/

/Text/ By October 1983, the number of victims in the Iraqi-Iranian war came to 173,000 killed and 600,000 wounded--civilians and military personnel--if we ignore the other estimates, the lowest of which is greater than these figures.

This "forgotten" war, which has entered its fourth year, still is far from being subjected to a final formula or solution, at least as it seems now. Conversely, it is being subjected to various explanations, interpretations and positions, which prompted AL-NASHRAH to address itself to Iraqi opposition forces, so that it could see, through these forces' answers to two specific questions, their evaluation and notions about this war and about its effects in the domestic setting.

AL-NASHRAH defined its two questions in the following terms:

How do you evaluate the situation the Iraqi-Iranian war has reached? What is your position on the subject of bringing down the regime, which the Iranian leadership has propounded as a basic condition for ending the fighting?

Here we will pause to consider the answers of some Iraqi opposition forces, publishing the other answers in a coming issue. These answers comprise the following forces:

The Kurdistan Socialist Part (secretary of its central committee, Salih al-Kusufi).

The Kurdistan Democratic Federation (its secretary general, 'Ali al-Sanjari).

The Iraqi Marxist-Leninist Organization (member of its leadership committee: Sa'id Jawad).

The Socialist Party (its secretary general, Mubarrir al-Ways).

The Kurdistan National Federation (its secretary general, Jalal Talabani).

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (its chairman, Mas'ud al-Barzani).

The Socialist Party

From the day in which (president) Saddam (Husayn) declared his war on the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 22 September 1980, we have declared, in the central socialist newspaper, that this war was launched by carefully arranged prior planning with international imperialism, especially the United States of America, and Arab reaction in the area, with the objective of smashing the Iranian revolution, which eliminated the regime of the interred Shah and represented the colonial base to which the pursuit of the role of policeman in the region, protecting the imperialist interests of the United States of America and international Zionism, had been assigned, especially since this revolution, from the day it took place, declared that it stood alongside Arab rights to Palestine, participation in the liberation of Jerusalem and its enmity toward imperialism, Zionism and reaction in the region. This position, in itself, is a great victory in supporting the Arab nation and the demand for its rights. This war, which is entering its fourth year, has led to the destruction of both countries' economy and the destruction of the Iraqi and Iranian people, since this war, which is still taking place, has ruined the lives of hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded from both countries and tens of thousands of prisoners. Its obvious effect is apparent on the Iraqi side, on account of the population. This is what international imperialism and Zionism are seeking, in order to prepare suitable circumstances by which the Zionist entity may annex the Syrian Arab Golan area, which it occupied in 1967, destroy the Iraqi army and keep it occupied in an unjustifiable war with Iran, evict the Palestinian resistance and annex southern Lebanon. That is what Zionism has been aiming at for a long time, in its colonial scheme to establish a greater Israel from the Euphrates to the Nile. The war has placed Iraq totally in the strategy of the West as one of the reactionary regimes in the area, one to which the execution of imperialist plans has been assigned, since this regime has called for the return of the Egyptian regime to Arab ranks, violating the boycott resolutions the Baghdad Arab summit took in the wake of the treasonous agreements this regime made in Camp David with the Zionist enemy, agreements which isolated the Egyptian regime from the front of the struggle with the Zionist enemy and ignored the Arab right to Palestine. The Iraqi regime called for recognition of Israel in the well-known words of its president to the American senator /sic/ Solarz on 25 August 1982, which the Iraqi newspaper AL-THAWRATH published, when the president pointed out that the Arabs had to accept security guarantees for Israel, stated that his policy and the policy of a number of Arab countries was founded on the basis of acceptance of Israel, and stated "The military operations the Palestinian organizations carry out inside and outside Palestine, which include Israeli civilian targets, are to be considered terrorist operations." He also stated that it was in the power of the United States to

resolve the Palestinian cause in accordance with another agreement similar to Camp David, because the name of Camp David is loathsome to the Arabs, and that most Arab leaders would accept the new agreement, and stressed that his regime would seek to establish strong economic relations with the United States.

We, in the Socialist Party, which is pursuing and embracing a nationalist progressive unionist course, believe that the task of bringing down the existing Iraqi regime is the task of the Iraqi people alone, the people who have absolute sovereignty over its territory, and we also believe that the only way to bring this regime down is to establish a comprehensive Iraqi national front which includes the national forces, with all their orientations and political and religious ideologies, in order to establish a democratic alternative to the existing regime, which will achieve democracy for Iraq, real autonomy for our brothers the Kurds and rights for the Turkomans and the other minorities.

We, the community of unificationists, reject the establishment of any ready-made alternative regime to the government of Iraq, whatever might be its form or coloring through imposition, which we basically reject, unless we give ourselves the right to establish the regime which we consider appropriate in accordance with our nationalist unificationist socialist political platform, a goal which we are fighting to achieve, and unless that is through free democratic elections in which our people as a whole take part in order to establish the type of power governing it, whether that is a political or religious power. This is the principle which has been accepted and agreed to unanimously by our people.

#### The Kurdistan National Federation

The Iraqi-Iranian war has reached a dead end, having exhausted the powers of the people of Iraq and Iran, destroyed their economic resources and brought them tragedies, and it is continuing to do so.

The only beneficiaries of this war are the imperialist monopoly companies which are awaiting bids to "redevelop" the two countries after the war is stopped, in order to reacquire petrodollars and consequently to plunder the oil wealth of Iraq and Iran.

The Iraqi people, represented by their national forces, will be the ones to establish the democratic alternative regime, through their will alone, without intervention or the imposition of formulas by any other body, whatever it might be.

#### The Kurdistan Democratic Party

As is well known, the war against the Islamic Republic of Iran which imperialism had devised has entered its fourth year. This war to a large degree has weakened the economy and resources of the two countries; in addition, there is the volume of the tremendous human sacrifices on both sides. Thus

the Iraqi regime has offered a great service to imperialism, which has realized its basic demand, aimed at weakening Iran and Iraq, making it easy for imperialism to push through its liquidationist schemes and capitulationist plans. This has also encouraged the Zionist entity, with the support of American imperialism, to invade Lebanon in order to liquidate the Palestinian resistance, cause Syria to bow down and reduce the magnitude of its role in influencing events on behalf of the seminal causes of the Arab nation and the liberation movement in the area.

The direct, flagrant intervention by America which the region is witnessing now through its forces, which it has sent to Lebanon under the guise of "keeping the peace," alongside the forces of its allies, and the bombing by its airplanes of Syrian positions and positions of the Lebanese forces in order to extend its hegemony over the region, threaten Syria within its own territory and escalate the aggression against it. It is one of the effects and results of the change in the military equation in the war in Iran's favor. America has not stopped at this point, but has started to threaten the Gulf as well in order to defend its interests. Through this activity imperialism, under the leadership of America, wishes to preserve the regime of (President) Saddam (Husayn) on the one hand and create a kind of balance in the event the regime in Baghdad falls on the other. Therefore, from now on, America will be trying directly and through its allies in the region to strike out at the Syrian resistance and even bring down its progressive regime, because, in the event the Iraqi regime falls and Iraq goes back to its normal place, it, with Syria, Iran and the other countries that are standing against American and Zionist interests, will constitute a serious threat to their strategic interests and the spearhead which executes aggressive plans, as embodied in the Zionist entity.

Regarding the issue of bringing down the regime in Baghdad, our party has raised the slogan of bringing down the authorities since 1976, and we believe that the sole means for stopping the war and bringing about a just peace between the Islamic Republic in Iran and Iraq lies in the downfall of the regime, since experience has proved that the regime is unable to achieve peace, as it is rejected by all the masses and the parties to the Iraqi national movement, as well as having without justification launched the aggressive war against the Islamic republic in Iran, in which the Iraqi people have no interests.

It remains for us to say that the regime of (President) Saddam (Husayn) bears the responsibility for this destruction, which has afflicted all aspects of life, and is responsible for all these terrible consequences.

#### The Kurdistan Socialist Party

There is no doubt that the Iraqi war, which has entered its fourth year, has brought and still is bringing serious effects on the Iraqi and Iranian people and the national liberation movement in the region overall. In the course of the past 3 years it has caused great human and material losses to occur. In Iraq, more than a quarter of a million victims have fallen in the form of



killed, wounded and disabled and a large portion of the tens of thousands of people who have fled military service are suffering from the fear of confrontation with Iraqi persecution teams formed from the special forces, which have been delegated to shoot without restriction or condition. The war has also affected the important economic installations to the quick, since the Iraqi economy is now suffering from a real crisis which is threatening the survival of the regime. This war has also offered the greatest service to American imperialism (which was behind the outbreak of the war by encouraging the Iraqi authorities and implicating them in it by false premises), and has made it easy for it and for Israel to push through its expansionist schemes. In another area, the recent months have experienced developments in the fighting on the fronts, since that has extended to encompass the region of Kurdistan in Iraq, and its effects on this creative stage have reflected a difficult, complex situation. He (President Saddam Husayn) has agreed, without embarrassment, to the introduction of the Turkish army into the hinterland of Iraqi territory, from the area of Zakhu, in order to strike out at the growing Kurdistan liberation movement in Turkey and Iraq and prepare for the subsequent occupation of parts of Kurdistan and Iraq, if the war goes through a development suitable for carrying that out.

On the downfall of the regime, which Iran sets forth as a condition for ending the war, we believe, regardless of the details, that we are not a party concerned with the realization of the regime's desire to end the war with Iran. It would be more appropriate for this question to be directed to the numerous mediating parties and not to an Iraqi party which is fighting to bring down the regime. We have also embarked on an armed struggle, alongside other nationalist parties and forces, are working to bring down the regime, which is the basic goal now, and are fighting to establish an alternative national regime which is able to resolve the basic problems, foremost among them the realization of democracy and autonomy for Kurdistan. Of course this regime will do everything to end the war with Iran directly after the downfall of the regime of (President) Saddam, on the basis of a just peace which will realize the interests and independence of the two countries in accordance with fraternal dialogue and mutual respect.

#### The Kurdistan Democratic Federation

It is clear that it is the regime in Baghdad which launched the war of aggression against the Iranian revolution and its neighboring Moslem people, that is, the people of Iran, with the support and encouragement of American imperialism and the other colonialists in the West. This is obvious and it is necessary to enter much into the details of it. As regards the course of the war, that has become a terrible holocaust in terms of the destruction of the human capabilities of the Iraqi and Iranian people and the economy of the two countries both. This is what the evil force which has ignited the fuse of the war wanted, and wants.

The war has gradually moved over to the area of Kurdistan in Iran and Iraq at the same time. The active front in the war is now stretching from the area of the Kurdish province of Ilam in Kurdistan in Iran and is being matched on

the Iraqi side by Zarbatiyah, Mandali and Khanaqin and most Iraqi Kurdish inhabitants up to Hajji 'Umran. The fighting is taking place on both sides of the border in Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish areas. The Kurdish people are paying the price for a criminal war in which there is absolutely nothing to be gained, same as the other members of the Iraqi and Iranian people are.

The shift of the war to Kurdistan in Iraq and the occupation of Hajji 'Umran, Banjawayn and other areas of Kurdistan by Iranian forces is extremely grave and imposes important, historic responsibilities on all Iraqi national forces in general and Kurdish ones in particular. As far as Iran goes, the war knows no limits and barriers, and the victors are pursuing the vanquished into the privacy of their own homes in order to oppress them. However, the situation is totally different as far as the Iraqi national forces which are fighting against the regime in Iraq are concerned, since one assumes they are struggling to bring down the regime as a basic goal, and are not ignoring the Iraqi people's rights to sovereignty, independence and freedom.

The Iraqi national forces, with all their tendencies and orientations, are responsible, before the Iraqi people, Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans and minorities, for the need to unify their ranks, forces, and resources within a broad comprehensive front in order to end the regime in Iraq with all possible speed and prevent Iran from continuing to move on Baghdad in order to carry out this task, which is the task of sincere Iraqis. Conversely, the war will continue, the Iranian forces will advance within Iraq and the Iraqi opposition parties will continue in their profound lethargy and will preoccupy themselves with side disputes and futile "chicken before egg, or egg before chicken" debates.

As regards the conditions of the Islamic revolution in Iran for ending the war, foremost among them the elimination of (President) Saddam Husayn in person and the termination of the regime along with him, we believe that Iran is totally right in linking the issue of the downfall of the regime to the termination of the war, since if the fighting ends, but Husayn and his regime still dominate Iraq, what guarantees will keep (President) Saddam (Husayn) from repeating the aggression against Iran in the future? As for people's belief that the regime will fall at some stage after the war is stopped, that is foolish, because the nature of the existing regime is not like that of regimes which are concerned about the people and their public opinion, which plays an influential role in the election of the regime and the legislative authority so that the ruler can be held accountable to the opinion of the people. Therefore, Iran has the right to offer legitimate conditions. However, there is the problem of material compensation after the regime is removed. That is something which is not in the power of the Iraqi people to bear, and they are not responsible for the war and its results.

#### The Iraqi Marxist-Leninist Organization

On 22 September, President Saddam Husayn launched a war of aggression against the Iranian regime, by proxy for imperialism and reaction and spontaneously,

on part of his regime. The common goals are to bring down or cause the Iranian revolution to collapse, install forces opposed to it and transcend domestic crises.

The Iranian revolution replied with a defensive national war, supported by the people of Iran, with the backing and power of our people and their national democratic forces which enjoy the support of the peoples of the world.

After the battles of Khorramshahr (al-Muhammarah), the initiative shifted to the Iranian command, and the battles then took place within Iraqi territory for the most part. In spite of that, the nature of the war might have continued to be aggressive on the part of Saddam Husayn's regime, and it might have remained national and defensive with respect to Iran, if changes had not occurred in the structure of the Iranian authorities, their program and their policy toward the future of our people and our nation, because the role of the Iranian revolution in smashing part of the machinery of the war and repressing a regime which is hostile to our people and the people of Iran coincided with the struggle of our people and their national democratic forces to bring down the dictatorship, installing a democratic alternative and serve the interests of the peoples of Iraq in ridding themselves of an aggressive dictatorship which is in alliance with its enemies and has worked to bring down their democratic revolution.

The slogan of bringing down the regime, on Iran's part, as a condition for ending the war must be put in motion, in accordance with the changes which are taking place in the interland of the Iranian and Iraqi fronts.

The nature of the war is continuing to be aggressive on the part of President Saddam Husayn's regime, but the shift of the war to our country's hinterland has given it another face as far as our people and their nationalist forces go, while it has assumed a dual character as far as Iran goes. When President Saddam Husayn continues the war within Iraqi territory in defense of his regime, for the same goals for which he launched the war, on behalf of the same forces, this is the aggressive face of the war. However, the Iraqi national movement and its armed forces, and the masses of our people in general, while fighting to bring down the "dictatorship," oppose the entry of the Iranian forces onto Iraqi territory and forcefully adhere to their absolute right to establish a national coalition alternative.

The Iranian leadership, by continuing the war and penetrating Iraqi territory and the liberated national areas of Kurdistan, is defending the interests of the conservative bourgeois forces and their power, and not the people of Iran and their interests, which are no longer threatened by a war which is not confined to Iraqi territory.

The only way to bring down President Saddam Husayn's regime and end the war lies in the support of our people and their national forces, with all their elements and currents in the form of allies and friends, who have an interest

in bringing down the regime (which is the right of the peoples of Iran, against whom aggression has been committed). This is what makes it necessary that the Iranian leadership abandon plans to designate an alternative for our people themselves and respect their absolute right to establish the alternative they want. At that point it will be possible to establish a democratic peace without annexation or subordination.

/No 8, 9 Jan 84 pp 22-23/

/Text/ In the past issue, we published the positions of a number of Iraqi opposition forces on the issue of the Iraqi-Iranian war and the issue of bringing down the Iraqi regime in the course of it.

Here we are finishing publishing the answers by other forces on this subject, which has had its effects not only on the Iraqi stage but also on the overall Arab stage, and the details of political and economic life in the overall region in general.

AL-NASHRAH defined its question in the following terms:

How do you evaluate the situation the Iraqi-Iranian war has reached?

What is your position on the subject of bringing down the regime, which the Iranian leadership has propounded as a basic condition for ending the fighting?

Here are the answers we have received from:

The Arab Socialist Movement (its secretary general, Jawad Dush).

The Kurdistan Democratic People's Party (its secretary general, Sami 'Abd-al-Rahman).

The Federation of Iraqi Democrats (one of its leading figures, Ahmad Salim).

The Democratic Vanguard Movement.

The Arab Socialist Movement

The Iraqi regime launched this war against the Iranian revolution in order to change the course of the major struggle between the forces and movements of Arab liberation and the hostile forces of imperialism, Zionism and reaction, and to push through imperialist conspiracies for grinding down the Palestinian revolution, causing all the Arab forces of liberation and progress, regimes and parties to submit, and moving the Arab nation, with all its countries, into the sphere of influence of American imperialism.

The flames of this war (which is now in its fourth year) are still burning the masses of the Iraqi and Iranian people, destroying the spirits of hundreds of thousands of citizens and turning Iraq and Iran into fertile terrain for pillage by the giant multinational monopoly companies.



Our Arab Socialist Movement has condemned this war since its flames broke out, has held the Iraqi regime responsible for all the consequences that have arisen from it, and has demanded that it be stopped, that the border problems be resolved by peaceful means on the basis of respect for the principles of the national and domestic sovereignty of the two friendly peoples, and that their joint struggle against hostile forces be consolidated. Our movement has called on the forces of liberation and progress in our area and the whole world to support the struggle of our Iraqi people and their national movement, which is aimed at bringing down the regime and establishing a national coalition government which will bring about democracy for the people and autonomy for Kurdistan and will bring our country back to the cavalcade of the Arab national liberation movement. Our movement has raised the slogan of bringing down the regime since the 17 July 1968 revolution, has offered grave sacrifices, along with all the national forces of our people, Arabs, Kurds and Turkomans, and has considered the downfall of the regime a central, pressing task and national goal which cannot be relinquished under any circumstances.

Whether this war continues or ends, we will continue to bear arms until the regime is brought down and a national coalition regime is established in Iraq. However, our movement, and most national domestic progressive forces along with it, stringently rejects having any foreign regime take the place of the Iraqi people or act in proxy for it, whatever its objectives and motives might be, in raising the banner of bringing down the Iraqi regime and in permitting itself to occupy Iraqi territory under this cover, exposing our beloved country to the danger of partition and the establishment of ridiculous loathesome racist factional statelets.

Our movement has condemned foreign military penetration of Iraqi territory and has considered the occupation of territory of our nation by Turkish forces, in collusion with the regime, to be an American Atlantic conspiracy to eliminate the unified entity known as Iraq.

Bringing down the regime is a central, pressing Iraq's mission which concerns our Iraqi people and our national movement alone. Our movement has requested all Iraqi progressive forces emphasizing national independence to consummate a comprehensive national alliance and lead the struggle to bring down the regime and repel the imminent dangers that are now threatening national sovereignty.

#### The Kurdistan Democratic People's Party

The Iraqi-Iranian war has been condemned by us since it first broke out, and those who ignited it have been condemned.

The commodity which is being consumed by this war is the Iraqi and Iranian people; we cannot recall a war in history of such scope where the person who ignited it and caused it has remained in the seat of power.

The slogan of bringing down Saddam Husayn's regime has been raised by us since 1974, when we raised it after the 1974 fighting; we sustained it after

the 1975 setback, proceeding through the revolution of 26 May 1976, and progressive elements in the Kurdistan Democratic /Party/, of which we are a part, raised it.

When our party was established in July 1981, the issue of the downfall of Saddam's regime was one of the main ideas presented at the conference. Our evaluation of the regime was that it had lost all justification for its existence and survival in the national and domestic contexts and the context of the people. This was published in our political report, titled "The Revolutionary Alternative for the Kurdish Liberation Movement." We now believe that the crisis of Saddam's regime has become exacerbated and its bloody fascist platform has struck deep roots, and therefore we have not changed our opinion and position on it. The Iraqi-Iranian war is proof of that, since it has come about in order to gain time, first of all. This war has increased our belief in our conviction and our position on bringing Saddam down, a position which has appeared in a carefully studied principled form and does not depend on the position of other people relative to it, whether that is asked for or not. Our opinion on this matter is firm and is not affected by any foreign influence.

#### The Federation of Iraqi Democrats

The Iraqi-Iranian war broke out as a result of the deranged ambitions and illusions of the tyrant Saddam Husayn, who had the ambition of being the strong man of the region after the fall of the interred Shah of Iran and also dreamed that he could bring down the Iranian revolution and be spared of its influence to Iraq, exploiting the unsettled conditions in Iran's disfavor. Thus he ordered his army to make the offensive into Iranian territory, later defeated arriving at the outskirts of the important city of Abadan.

However, the Iranian people, who believe in their revolution, managed to persevere, absorb the attack and start the counterattack. They managed to regain all the land Saddam's army had occupied, inflict grievous losses on its ranks and occupy some segments of Iraqi territory. It put Saddam Husayn's regime in a real quandary which prompted it to beg for an end to the fighting and also to ask for financial and military aid from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. It resorted to selling Iraqi women's jewelry and public sector organizations in order to pay the expenses of its war of aggression.

The course and goals of the war, as well as the two countries' international alliances, have certainly changed greatly from the way they were the first year it broke out. In addition, international intervention has increased and will increase further in the foreseeable period. As regards the matter of bringing down Saddam Husayn's regime, which Iran has posited as a condition for stopping the war, we are on the side of all the forces of the Iraqi national movement and fully believe in the validity of the slogan of bringing down the bloody fascist power which holds sway over our people, and we consider this as well as the establishment of the desired alternative regime, a purely Iraqi task.

Any proper foreign aid which is intended for our Iraqi people and their national forces which are fighting to achieve this aspiration will assuredly meet with the utmost gratitude and appreciation.

#### The Democratic Vanguard Movement

It is now clear that the war has taken a new course, now that Saddam's forces of aggression have been forced to withdraw to international borders, taking these as new defense positions in the southern and central sector. In the light of this, the Iranian forces have managed to open a gap for themselves in the northern sector, in order to shift the weight of military operations to this area.

The penetration by Iranian forces of some of our territory has created a disruption in the Iraqi and international equation. We have condemned the Saddamist aggression against the Iranian revolution, and have continued to condemn it, on grounds that it has served, and still is serving, the imperialist and Zionist schemes and has paralyzed the powers of the Iraqi and Iranian people. We are against any occupation of other persons' territory as a firm matter of principle.

Concomitant with the added tension in the atmosphere which the Gulf war has created, Saudi Arabia has worked to exploit its results in order to carry out its overall suspect policies by pursuing a group of measures, including increased oil production at a high rate and security agreements directed against the Arab liberation movements and progressive countries.

We are in agreement with the slogan of bringing down the Iraqi authorities which Iran has raised, on grounds that it is a proper slogan which expresses the aspirations of the masses of our people and their nationalist parties. However, the attainment of this goal is a purely domestic Iraqi task whose burden is to be borne by all Iraqi national movements, relying on and derived from the powers of our Iraqi people, with the support and backing of brothers and friends.

The Iranian brothers must be aware of this fact if they seek the mutual friendship of our people, relying on the bonds of friendship and good neighborliness and the spiritual tie which joins us as Moslems.

However, the fragmentation and rifts in our Iraqi national movement on the one hand, and foreign intervention on the other, which to some degree have suborned the independence of Iraqi national decisionmaking, have all helped extend the life of the regime, in spite of the aggravation of its military, political and economic crises.

In order to accelerate the process of bringing down the regime, as a factor helping to support our struggle, it is necessary to coordinate the common fighting positions with our brothers. In view of the exceptional importance

Iran enjoys, we have extended our hand to cooperate in order to put a limit to the tragedies and destruction the war has caused our two friendly neighboring peoples.

Therefore, the establishment of a democratic coalition regime is the proper formula and the alternative which will make it possible to build the bases of a just permanent peace with the Iranian neighbor and therefore strengthen fighting relations on the basis of the fight against colonialism, reaction and Zionism and the liberation of Palestine.

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CSO: 4404/646



SOVIETS REPORTEDLY MASSACRE CIVILIANS IN MASHWANI

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 8 Sep 84 p 4

[Text]

ISLAMABAD (UPI) — Islamic Afghan guerrillas said Wednesday Soviet troops have conducted a large-scale operation against civilians in Afghanistan, resulting in a heavy loss of life.

The Afghan Islamic Press news agency said the opera-

tions began July 21 and culminated last Wednesday with a massacre in which at least 85 people were killed in the area of Mashwani, 25 miles (40 km) from the Pakistani border.

There was no confirmation of the report by AIP which has its offices in the Pakistani city of Peshawar near the Afghan border.

The agency said that Soviet soldiers in Mashwani arrived in a total of 10 vehicles, including tanks, and conducted house-to-house searches.

In some instances, the troops dragged civilians out of their homes and shot them in cold blood, the agency

said, while in others they shelled residences.

The agency said 35 bodies were later recovered, but added that it was feared the number of dead may exceed 130.

The agency said similar operations were carried out by Soviet occupation forces in the Jalalabad area, where the number of fatalities was estimated to be 200.

On Aug. 16, the agency said, 60 villagers were killed in the village of Humber.

Since invading Afghanistan in December 1978 and putting President Babrak Karmal in power, the Soviets have encountered extensive resistance.

CSO: 4600/761

# IRRIGATION MINISTER WRITES IN SOVIET PAPER

Moscow SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN' in Russian 29 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Akhmed Shah Sorkhabi, the Minister of Irrigation of the DRA, entitled, "The Deeds and Plans of Irrigation Specialists "]

[Text] Afghanistan is a country four-fifths of whose territory is occupied by mountain ranges and plateaus. This circumstance and also the presence of a large quantity of stony desert and arid steppes sharply limits the possibilities of development of agricultural production. More than once this region has suffered drought as a result of which crops perished and the number of cattle decreased.

In the country there are approximately 17 million hectares of land suitable for agricultural use. In fact crops and gardens occupy roughly 4.5 million hectares, of which less than half consists of irrigated lands.

Agriculture suffers in the first place from a lack of water. Meanwhile Afghanistan possesses rich water resources. They are the powerful system of the rivers Amu Darya, Kabul, Murghab, Farakhrud, Hilmand and others. However, until the April revolution of 1978 not a single project for the creation of modern irrigation systems and the mastery of water use was realized in practice. The only exception consists of the Jalalabad irrigation complex, built with the economic and technical assistance of the Soviet Union.

Today irrigation in Afghanistan is being given serious attention. If in 1983 around 375 million were allotted to the development of the irrigation system, then in the current year more than 600 million afghanis were appropriated for the necessities of the development of irrigation. According to the plan of the Ministry of Irrigation, the DRA envisages the completion of the construction of 27 irrigation canals and other hydrotechnical objects that offer the possibility of irrigating tens of thousands of hectares of dry and virgin soil. It is planned to lay new canals in the provinces of Badakhshan, Kunduz, Parvan, Nimruz and others. The construction of small capacity dams will be continued on a series of rivers.

On the river Hilmand work is continuing on the construction of the largest hydroelectric complex in the western part of the republic. A large-scale project for a similar complex is being implemented on the banks of the river Farakhrud. Its entry into service will permit a three-fold increase of the irrigated area of the province of Farakh. Eighteen thousand hectares of land will receive water after a 54-kilometer main-line irrigation canal is constructed in Tsardar.

By the end of the year it is planned to complete the construction of the second phase of an irrigation complex in the province of Parvan that will make it possible to bring water to more than 24 thousand hectares. Water has begun to come to the peasant fields through an irrigation network built with dikes in Sardar (Gazni province).

Since time long past in Afghanistan water has been valued no less than the land. From time immemorial Afghani peasants have dug by hand Kahrizes - underground tunnels for the collection of water. They built canals for irrigating the fields, using only the spade and primitive devices. Today old irrigation systems are being replaced by modern irrigation complexes, the construction of which utilizes modern technology - tractors, bulldozers, excavators, applying the latest achievements of science and technology.

CSO: 1807/307

PAPER COMMENTS ON MUBARAK'S SIX-POINT PEACE PLAN

GF131022 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 27 Aug 84 p 24

[Unattributed commentary: "About Mubarak's Peace Plan"]

[Text] The nature of the six-point plan by Mubarak to end the imposed war, the text of which was published in KEYHAN yesterday, and the propaganda dimensions surrounding it during recent months are worthy of analysis. In a primary analysis yesterday, we stated that Egypt cannot be the designer and instigator of a peace plan for the Iran-Iraq war for two major reasons. First of all, the Cairo regime has played an active role in all the open and clandestine plans and plots against the Islamic Republic of Iran and has been part of the alliance for the implementation of the plots of the superpowers in order to deal blows and suffocate the Islamic republic and the Islamic revolution. In other words Cairo, since the victory of the revolution, has been an active participant in a secret war against Iran and has openly played this role in the past 2 years. The only difference between Egypt and Iraq is that the former has no common border with Iran.

The second reason is that in the clear issue of the war, Cairo is one participant and Cairo's military experts and its forces, arms and information supply, and all-out support for the regime of Baghdad in various aspects of the war have also been a deciding factor in continuation of this war. The context of the proposed plan remains within this same framework. The articles of the proposal are more or less the same things Iraq has been uttering for some time, such as a ceasefire, implementation of the 1975 agreement...

The first article by Mubarak talks about the sovereignty of the two nations. The Islamic Republic of Iran has no need of suggestions when it comes to establishing its sovereignty over its own soil. The sole source of opposition to the establishment of such sovereignty in the southern and western border regions has been the repeated plots of the big powers, regional reaction, and the military presence of Iraq. The Islamic Republic of Iran establishes its sovereignty with might and eradicates all obstacles one after the other. It will not enter into any deals over this "sovereignty" for which much blood has been spilled. In general, the sovereignty of the Islamic republic is not subject to discussions, arguments, or deals with this or that government. The establishment of sovereignty in Iraq depends



on the demands of the people of that country. If establishment of national sovereignty means this, then we welcome it since we have been the champion of this from the start. However, it is clear from this article that it does not mean to establish the government desired by the people of Iraq. On the contrary it seems that its aim is the continuation of the barbaric Ba'thist regime and Saddam in Iraq.

The Egyptian designers of the proposal, who are completely aware of the internal situation in Iraq and the hatred of the people for the Ba'thist rulers, have attempted to ensure this regime in their article four by proposing the stationing of foreign forces on Iraqi borders. This sovereignty is not national sovereignty but is an international one and hence it is rejected by us and the people of Iraq.

The second article deals with the return of forces from both sides to borders defined in the 1975 Algerian agreement. The imposed war started when Saddam Husayn in a large official gathering in Baghdad tore up the 1975 agreement and declared it valueless. The filmed report on this event was broadcast around the world the very same day. Saddam's claims on Iranian soil also made the headlines in the world media and the media of the region. It was Iraq's armored, mechanized, and infantry armies that crossed the borders following the denunciation of the 1975 agreement and destroyed our towns and villages, and it was Iraqi bombers that attacked our vital centers.

So now, if this agreement is supposed to be respected again and the war is to be ended on its basis, the minimum expectation would be to recognize the violator of the agreement as the aggressor and punish him for his crimes and destruction.

The third article stresses a planned ceasefire. We ask: What sort of plan? Everyone is aware that the question of a ceasefire is not its timing, its place, or method of implementation. A ceasefire in a war that, according to many figures, international circles, and the mass media, is the biggest war since World War II, needs preparations the boundaries of which far exceed, time, date, and method. For a variety of reasons, Iranian officials have announced that Iran will not accept the type of ceasefire that has been declared following each attack and aggression by Israel against the Arabs. The destiny of nations which have become weak and dispirited and hence have accepted conditions without obtaining the necessary guarantees for the removal of the occupiers and reparation, is a bitter lesson which is not easily forgotten by free nations. In order to end the present situation we want the aggressor to be identified and punished. The main axis and the backbone of the plan is in its article four which deals with the stationing of international forces at the borders of the two countries.

The revolution in Iran and the imposition of a war on us has its roots in opposition and disagreement with the big powers. We paid a heavy price for expelling the forces of international oppression from our homeland and the idea of the reappearance of such forces is unimaginable for us. At present, we consider the presence of the naval forces of big powers around our maritime borders a serious danger and are preparing to face this danger.

Contrary to the governments for which this presence is a heart tonic and which guarantees their continuation, we do not look at foreign forces as angels, but consider them as symbols and defenders of international oppression and symbols of the murder and plunder of innocent people. If the imposed war is solved in a fundamental manner and with a healthy attitude, then there is no need for the presence of multinational forces. The presence of these forces for the imposition of a peace will not be effective. The Lebanon experience attests to this.

The fifth article deals with payment of reparation to both sides. The Iraqi regime, which started the war, entered Iranian soil, bloodied defenseless people, and used dynamite to destroy towns and villages, is at the end judged to be worthy of receiving reparations! Logic suggests, and international law agrees, that reparation is for the wronged.

We ask whether the Iraqi regime has been so wronged that it should receive reparations? In fact, why should the Baghdad regime receive reparations since it has been the Iraqi nation that has suffered damages at the hands of the regime of Baghdad and not the Islamic Republic of Iran. We have, of course, no objection to any payment of reparation to Iraq by an international fund considering its small amount. However, we object to the source receiving this payment. We say the Iraqi nation should receive the reparation and not the regime of Iraq, because for the latter it would not be reparation but a "prize for aggression." It would have been better had the Egyptian regime proposed another plan, at the start of which those who create fires and those governments which fan the flames of war by squandering the wealth of their people would be criticized.

CSO: 4640/413

OPPOSITION PAPER ON MUBARAK'S IRAN-IRAQ PEACE PLAN

GF141102 London KEYHAN in Persian 6 Sep 84 p 1

[Excerpts] The Islamic Republic is gradually preparing public opinion for the start of negotiations for a ceasefire in the war with Iraq. In his 9 August speech, Ayatollah Khomeyni said: "Even Saddam, no matter what he is, prays!" At the same time, the officials of the republic are sending up a trial balloon to test public opinion with respect to the six-point Egyptian plan for peace between Iran and Iraq. The leaders of the republic have not completely rejected the Mubarak plan the way they have rejected many other proposals during the past 4 years. On the contrary, they are indicating that they may accept the proposal with minor modifications. These changes are noted in a Tehran KEYHAN article published on 27 August. The article bears no signature but there is reason to believe that it has been prepared with the consent of the strongman of the regime, Ayatollah Khomeyni.

The article discusses the various points of the Mubarak proposal. With respect to the first article concerning sovereignty rights for both countries, KEYHAN writes: "The establishment of national sovereignty in Iraq is dependent on the national desire. If this means the establishment of national sovereignty then we welcome it."

In other words, minor modifications to the paragraph will make the first article of the proposal acceptable. The second article deals with the return of the forces of both sides to the borders agreed upon in the 1975 agreement. This agreement was declared null and void by the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Husayn, who again called it legal and binding after the defeat in Khorramshahr. KEYHAN published in Tehran writes: "If this agreement is supposed to be respected again and the war is to be ended on its basis, the minimum expectation would be to recognize the violator of the agreement who should be punished for his crimes and destruction." What they are saying is that they do not completely reject the resurrection of the 1975 agreement and are prepared to negotiate the issue. The third article deals with the establishment of a ceasefire. KEYHAN writes: "The establishment of a ceasefire, in a war that according to world figures, circles, and media is the biggest war since World War II, needs preparations the boundaries of which far exceed time, place, and method." Thus, they are saying that given the right preparations, a ceasefire is acceptable. [passage omitted quoting articles four and five, as outlined in referent item, without comment]

The article does not say anything about the sixth point of the proposal which is the establishment of peace between the two sides. However, it asks Egypt to make its proposal "more acceptable!" It says: "It would have been better had Egypt proposed another plan, at the start of which those who fan the fire in the region at the cost of squandering the wealth of their nations would be criticized." In other words, the matter could be closed with some "criticism" of governments which are left unidentified. Thus, in the opinion of diplomatic observers, the ayatollah is trying to prepare the scene for a half-baked peace. [passage omitted on previous Iranian conditions for ending the war]

Experts say that the position of the republic has changed 180 degrees and that the formula offered by Egypt in consultation with Yugoslavia and India can be the basis for the start of discussions. If it were otherwise, the ayatollah easily could have announced that he has torn up Egypt's proposal and thrown it out.

CSO: 4640/424

OPPOSITION PAPER ON EFFORTS TO REDUCE KHOMEYNI'S ROLE

GF171720 London KEYHAN in Persian 13 Sep 84 p 1

[Article by Mansur Yahyavi: "Move Over and Let in Some Light!"]

[Text] Tehran--"Sticking photographs of the Imam on all the windows of a building is not only illogical and unacceptable, but in fact stops any light from entering the building." Should we see any meaning in this remark made by Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani during the 7 September Friday sermon other than its face value?

In the opinion of some informed sources even if this statement by the Majlis speaker was made solely for domestic consumption in order to reduce public anger over the chaotic situation in the country, we can still assume that the move to remove signs of Khomeyni's presence before his death has started. In his Friday sermon the Majlis speaker severely criticized "those who call themselves hezbollahi and who use a dirty and disshelved appearance to pretend that the more dirty the individual, the more hezbollahi and revolutionary he is." Thus he has indirectly, and possibly in order to achieve popularity, raised one of the topics of Khomeyni's 8-point decree which some 2 years ago created a false sense of public excitement. He said: "The prophet of Islam was the cleanest and best-dressed person in any group. Anytime he passed through an area, people would know afterward because of the smell of his perfume. On many occasions his hair was long and over his shoulders but he always had a comb with him and used to comb his hair. Now people who call themselves his followers have created a situation whereby people with an unkempt appearance, unshaven faces and dirty clothes are thought to be being hezbollahi."

By making such remarks, Hashemi-Rafsanjani is negating the most important actions of the regime in the past 5 years to change the face of the nation from a well-off one to an oppressed one. At the same time he also criticizes the transformation of Ayatollah Khomeyni into an idol when he says "they stick dozens of the Imam's photographs on a wall in a small room. A couple of pictures would not matter but so many is not correct or logical and is harmful to the revolution."

The Majlis speaker then invites the prayer participants, who form the core of support for the regime, to be moderate and says: "Our society should move toward some degree of moderation." Is this some form of apology to the people



and is it taking a position against the rightist Islamists considering the benefits that the extreme rightist groups such as the Hojjatiyeh and Qa'emiyun have gained from the actions of the regime in the course of the dress code demonstrations? If this is true, then should we wait for the regime to ease restrictions on daily life in response to popular demand?

The truth is that the Islamic republican regime, during its 5 years of existence, has constantly assumed an attitude of confrontation with the public based on its successes and failures of foreign policy. When in the foreign front--the largest aspect of this for the past 4 years has been the war--the regime has obtained success, its reflection domestically has been harsh actions and severe measures. In other words every time the regime has managed to deal a blow against its foreign enemies, it has extended its arm to deal a blow against the "nation" which in a sense is the most ardent enemy of the regime.

On the contrary, each time the regime has been defeated in the foreign front, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have suddenly remembered the nation and have again extended their arms to ask the people for help. If the understanding of some of the experts is correct that Hashemi-Rafsanjani remarks are more than just skin-deep, then we can conclude that a gradual removal of Ayatollah Khomeyni from the indirect control of events and a trend to establish more moderate policies have started.

About a month ago Ayatollah Bigdeli, who is known as Azari-Qomi, indirectly accused Ayatollah Khomeyni of making mistakes in a Majlis speech and openly said that if the Vali-ye Faqih approves of someone or orders something done, it does not mean that everyone must follow his will. After him, Khalkhali rejected the point of view of the Islamic republican leader concerning the need to remove the control of the government from foreign trade and the Majlis speaker, in addition to stating that it is impossible to change the nationalization of foreign trade which is an article of the constitution, in his Friday sermon clearly showed that Jamaran is no longer the center where all decisions are taken and that the photographs of the leader of the revolution can be stuck on walls and windows as long as it does not stop the light!

CSO: 4640/423

EMIGRE PAPER COMMENTS ON OPPOSITION'S CRITICISM OF MUSAVI

GF161700 London KEYHAN in Persian 6 Sep 84 p 15

[Article by Firuz 'Azizi: "Musavi: the Majlis Sneer and Khomeyni's Half Smile"]

[Text] The bloody welcome the internal opposition offered to the first minister of information and security of the Islamic Republic, the sound of which engulfed the world, no doubt cost the regime much more than a blind act of terrorism would have. Three weeks after Musavi's cabinet passed through the Majlis' abattoir--having lost five ministers in the process, with votes that on occasion did not exceed one-third of the parliamentarians and with a 2-month time limit to introduce two new ministers--it seems that the recently united internal opposition to the regime has found nobody better than Musavi as the target of its criticism.

To date Musavi has withstood the sneers of the Majlis because of Khomeyni's half-hearted smile. The fact that Vali-ye Faqih announced that Musavi is trusted by him, both before and after his introduction of the cabinet, has, to some extent, boosted the resistance of the premiership against its opposition, the majority of whom are also faqihs and some of whom may claim to be Vali-ye Faqih in not a too distant future. However, as the leader of the unofficial opposition faction in the Majlis, Ayatollah Azari-Qomi, stated, Khomeyni had also approved of individuals such as Bazarga, Yazdi, Qotbzadeh, and most important of all, Bani-Sadr in the same manner in the past. The approval of Ayatollah Khomeyni for various individuals never goes outside the framework of necessity and expediency. He clearly has shown that humane feelings have no role in his running of the country. Even his grandson, Hoseyn Khomeyni, has not been spared in this respect. Therefore, if the incapacibilities of the government of Musavi create even the slightest danger of an upheaval for the ayatollah in the coming days, no matter how mild, he will not hesitate to drop him.

On the other hand, the attacks and counterattacks of the Majlis representatives and cabinet members has so increased the burden of the government with respect to embezzlements, misuse of power, weak management, gross errors, and even treachery on the part of cabinet members that it has forced the government to become more cautious. Such caution cannot be beneficial for the government given the current confusing situation, the war, and the international isolation of the regime. The current caution is reflected in at least two ministries.

Mohammad Gharazi, the oil minister of the regime, will no doubt not have the past freedom of action due to all the mismanagement and losses in his ministry which directly results from his inabilities. Behzad Nabavi, who was also severely criticized for the purchase of tractors and assembly plants, has started the policy dictated by the Majlis--to reduce the importance of the assembly industry--by reducing imports from the British company Talbot.

Likewise, conditions in the ministries of health, light industry, commerce, agriculture, and finance will not fare any better. The Defense Ministry which is chiefly responsible for the reconstruction of war equipment and supplies to the fronts and rear areas will be unable to do anything new without a change in the position of the regime in the international arms market resulting in freedom of action for purchasing the right kind of arms from the correct suppliers.

CSO: 4640/421

DOMESTIC RESISTANCE TO REGIME REPORTED

GF171932 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 17 Aug 84

[Text] A young Iranian girl came out in the street bareheaded and wearing non-Islamic dress in Mohseni Square on Mirdamad Avenue. She was immediately arrested by a patrol unit of the guards for non-Islamic dress code and was taken into a vehicle to be transported to prison.

Moments later the explosion of a grenade which was hidden in the purse of the young girl set the vehicle on fire and killed all the guards as well as the young girl. Nationalist sources informed us this morning that the young girl's motive was revenge because the regime had executed her brother and father. The noble death of this oppressed and suffering Iranian girl which had widespread effects among the people of Iran again showed the extent of public hate for the criminal Khomeyni regime.

The armed agents of the Islamic regime barbarically disrupted the wedding party of a family in Karaj and, using arms and force, arrested the guests, forced them into their vehicles and delivered them to the city's Islamic Revolution Committee. During the barbaric event, a doctor who was among the guests and who had objected to the armed attack was beaten up and had to be taken to the hospital.

CSG: 4640/417

CLASHES REPORTED BETWEEN PEOPLE AND GUARDS

GF171936 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 17 Sep 84

[Text] People in Langrud and Quchan who have had all they can take, clashed in the streets with the guards and security forces of the regime. As a result of the clashes a large group of our compatriots in these brave and resistant cities lost their lives in the liberation of dear Iran. According to reports by nationalist sources, in Quchan alone, 20 of our compatriots watered the plant of Iran's coming liberation by spilling their blood and with their brave demonstrations showed their depth of hatred and disgust for a regime which has plundered their very being. Nationalist sources say that during the demonstrations, many of the guards did not act against their compatriots and very bravely defended the just rights of their people.

Another report notes that people of Bandar-e Gaz held some scattered demonstrations recently as a result of very lengthy power and water cuts and due to shortages of food and health care. Their demonstrations lasted around a week and was a means to raise objections against the ineffective government of Khomeyni and his cronies. They then attempted to occupy the office of the district governor. A number of mercenary guards of the regime opened fire on them and murdered six. During this barbaric attack, a number of citizens were also severely wounded.

CSO: 4640/418



ATTEMPTS BY PRESIDENT'S BROTHER TO FORM NEW PARTY

GF172020 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 17 Sep 84

[Text] Seyyed Mohammad Khamene'i, the brother of the Islamic Republic president and a Majlis deputy, has started efforts to form a new party and has begun discussions with a group of his allies. Our report adds that Mohammad Khamene'i has also invited some individuals to help him in forming a new party. Khamene'i has stressed in his preliminary discussions that the single-party system can be highly dangerous for the Islamic Republic and that should the war over succession intensify further, the only faction which can usurp power would be the monopolistic Islamic Republican Party.

Informed sources state that the new actions by Mohammad Khamene'i, of which the Islamic Republic regime is also aware of, should not be seen as opposition to his brother who is the secretary general of the Islamic Republican Party. The possibility exists that the formation of a second party is an idea sponsored by the Islamic Republican Party. Those opposing the president of Khomeyni's republic 'ali Khamene'i, have noted that he is currently trying to establish a moderate faction for a future coalition in order to strengthen his position in the current power struggle.

We would like to also note that the president of Khomeyni's republic has recently started extensive efforts to seize more power, some of which were defeated. During his recent trip to Syria, Libya and Algeria, the only countries which agreed to receive him, Khamene'i was unable to gain any success. In Damascus Hafiz al-Asad not only disapproved of the policies of the regime but asked for fundamental changes to it. In Libya, al-Qadhdhafi also broke the country's official tradition and sent Colonel Jallud to the airport in his place. In Algeria, the military band played the Iranian imperial anthem instead of that of the Islamic Republic and by this action, severely insulted Khamene'i.

CSO: 4640/419

## MONTAZERI, LAJVARDI DIFFER ON PRISON OPERATIONS

GF170741 (Clandestine) Radio Nejat-e Iran in Persian 1630 GMT 16 Sep 84

[Text] Majvardi has expelled Montazeri's representative from the Evin Prison. The Radio Nejat-e Iran correspondent reports that there were severe clashes between the various factions of the mullahs of the Tehran regime, including a clash between Majvardi, the Evin Prison director, and the central prosecutor and Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri, the potential successor of Ruhollah Khomeyni. As a result, Masha'allah Harati, Montazeri's representative in Evin Prison, was expelled. Montazeri, who recently through his speeches and messages has been criticizing the strictness and torture against prisoners, dispatched a three-member commission in the middle of the month of Tir [first 10 days of July]--on his own behalf to inquire about the conditions in the various prisons of the regime. Over a 45-day period this commission prepared hundreds of complaints and reports on cases of torture and maltreatment of prisoners in more than 80 prisons in Tehran and the districts.

According to the testimony of some guards who were eyewitnesses, a large number of the accused succumbed to torture even before interrogation or trial. For example, two prisoners were held under water until they were completely fatigued. One case occurred in the guards' prison and the other in the 'Adelabad prison in Shiraz. Montazeri frequently issued orders to prison officials but they remained indifferent. Eventually, Lajvardi expelled Masha'allah Harati, Montazeri's representative in this prison.

CSO: 4640/422

EMIGRE PAPER DISCUSSES PROBLEMS FACING ISLAMIC REGIME

GF151722 London KEYHAN in Persian 6 Sep 84 p 10

[Article by Hushang Vaziri: "The Clever Tactics of the Opposition in Dealing Blows Against the Islamic Government"]

[Excerpts] The powerful bomb that exploded near the railway station square in Tehran left over 30 dead and hundreds wounded. The Majlis speaker, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who is also Tehran's acting Friday Imam, used the event to feed his propaganda machinery. During the Friday prayers' sermon he attributed the terrorist action to hypocrites, monarchists, liberals, nationalists and other anti-Islamic groups and international oppression and at the same time he threatened France as the country which has given asylum to them.

To hear such remarks from the Friday Imam was not novel. What was novel was his love-struck blink for Saudi Arabia when he said in relation to the march by Iranian pilgrims in Mecca: "The Government of Saudi Arabia has finally surrendered to the truth and has realized that the demonstration of our Muslim people in Mecca is not against its interests." The following day the Saudi Consulate in Beirut was attacked and Fahd's pictures were torn and replaced with Khomeyni's photographs, all in order to create an obstruction to the new turn the Islamic Republic has taken toward the West. However, the Islamic Republic has definitely turned several more degrees toward the West. It is not in foreign policy that this right turn is most apparent. In domestic policy the bazaaris have used economic measures to reshuffle political weights.

The Council of Guardians has been able to stop a leftist tendency and this is where we see the increasing influence of the bazaaris. The bill for the nationalization of foreign trade was designed by the government of Musavi to take economic activities out of the hands of this powerful group and bring it under the control of the government. This move was faced with obstacles and finally after 3 years Khomeyni dealt it the coup de grace. In an audience with the president, prime minister, and the cabinet, Khomeyni clearly told them not to interfere with the import activities of merchants and even to encourage them. Later the same day, Musavi issued a circular ordering the relevant ministries and organizations not to lose a second in implementing "Imam's guidance." Those who had expected a gradual loss of power by the private sector following the departure of the popular son of the bazaar, Habibollah 'Asgarowladi, have now learned a new lesson.

Naturally, Khomeyni prefers the achievement of more power by the private sector, irrespective of the additional tilt toward Western values, to a leftist regime since the former will not endanger the foundations of his power in the short term while the leftist regime would destroy the private sector at the start and would then transfer power from the mosques and pulpits to party clubs or organizations.

It is very difficult to doubt that the target of the attack of the "black political-economic gangs" is the government of Mir Hoseyn Musavi. Even though this government has the second longest service life since 1941--the first being the government of Amir 'Abbas Hoveyda--it has been the focus of struggles which have diminished but not finished and are now growing.

This government came to power when Dr Velayati, the present foreign minister, was unable to obtain Majlis approval as the prime minister proposed by Hashemi-Rafsanjani. It is said that Mir Hoseyn Musavi is supported by Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i and there are even rumors concerning their close family ties. As a result the relationship between the cabinet, whose chief minister is Khamene'i's protege, and the Majlis, whose speaker is Hashemi-Rafsanjani, had been an odd political marriage. However, due to obvious reasons, Khomeyni is not prepared to change the cabinet and continues to support it. As a result Hashemi-Rafsanjani has maintained a cautious attitude and even though he voted in favor of the government during the vote of confidence, he has left all subsequent choices open. His support for the government was more a conditional support than the true meaning of the word. Those within the regime who oppose the government deal indirect blows against the government--that is supported by Ayatollah Khomeyni--in order not to attract his wrath or directly confront him. Mir Hoseyn Musavi has not yet been released from a domestic political war between the various factions of the regime and is facing new fronts.

CSO: 4640/420

NVOI CARRIES TUDEH PARTY STATEMENT ON EHSAN TABARI

TA141922 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 14 Sep 84

[Text] Dear compatriots: The Islamic leadership has opened a new magic show. In connection with the Islamic leadership's new show, the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran has published a statement entitled "The Reactionary Government's New Magic Show," the text of which we now bring to the attention of the dear compatriots.

The statement says: The Islamic Republic's reactionary rulers are continuing with their magic shows and crimes. One of the latest measures of this regime is a new television show that began last week. One of the victims of the Islamic government, namely Comrade Ehsan Tabari, was coerced into participating in this show. As you are aware, Ehsan Tabari has been languishing in prison for more than a year, and has been subjected to various physical and mental pressure, torture and harassment. So far Comrade Ehsan Tabari has suffered several heart attacks as well as a cerebral hemorrhage, and pictures of him published in the newspapers very clearly show his abnormal condition. Now that leaders of the Islamic Republic are again displaying Ehsan Tabari, this noble and tormented scholar, on the television screen, we once more raise our voices of protest against Iran's treacherous rulers and stamp the stain of shame on their foreheads.

The statement by the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran points out: For more than 40 years Comrade Ehsan Tabari has expressed his views on Marxism-Leninism and on Iran's political and social problems. What the rulers of Tehran are attributing to him today are not and cannot be his own views. What they are placing before him today are the intentions of wolves in sheep clothing who for more than a year have subjected him to dreadful tortures and have led him to the brink of death. The Islamic regime's criminals should know that they cannot distort the facts with these magic shows. They can no longer deceive the people. These measures are daily increasing their isolation as well as disgrace and hatred in Iranian and world public opinion. We strongly condemn this new round of conspiracy against the Tudeh Party of Iran and its members, and ask for the help of all humanitarian, progressive and (?peace-loving) peoples in Iran and the world.



The statement by the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran says:  
We call on the country's national and progressive forces and on the world's democratic organization and figures to raise their voices of protest against the offenses and crimes of Iran's reactionary rulers, and to prevent the continuation of atrocities of the reactionaries ruling over Iran by sending their representatives, particularly doctors, to Tehran to study the physical and mental situation of political prisoners. The world should not and cannot remain silent in the face of indignity to the character of human beings. We are confident that should the voices of all humanitarian and progressive people in Iran and the world be coordinated, one can put an end to the atrocities of the Islamic Republic's reactionary rulers.

Signed: Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran, 11 September 1984.

CSO: 4640/425

IRAN

FOILED HIJACK ATTEMPT SAID TO BE 'FUNNY PLAY' OF REGIME

GF140642 (Clandestine) Radio Nejat-e Iran in Persian 1630 GMT 13 Aug 84

[Text] According to our correspondent in Tehran, the voice of the so-called Islamic Republic carried a false report about the foiling of a hijacking attempt by four individuals during a domestic flight yesterday. This was broadcast in order to scare the Iranian strugglers and put them off future attempts.

Our correspondent writes: The security agents of the regime in Tehran put on a show on an aircraft en route from Tehran to Shiraz as a propaganda maneuver in order to create a false report which they then carried on radio and television. This is an attempt to create a new uproar. Quoting a technician from Iran national airlines who was on the flight, our correspondent notes that the security agents of the regime carried out a funny play inside the aircraft using dummy ammunition and scared the innocent passengers who were unaware of the show. The direct flight was then ordered to stop in Esfahan in order to drop off the guards who were playing hijackers.

CSO: 4640/426

RAFSANJANI COMMENTS ON CENSUS AS 'A FUNDAMENTAL NECESSITY'

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Sep 84 p 26

[Text] In a meeting with census and planning officials, Hojjat ol-Eslam Rafsanjani said: The wealthy people do not wish anyone to know the amount of their income and wealth, and they do not wish the problems of the country to be resolved. Of course, the case of a few wealthy people who do not want justice is different from others [as published].

He emphasized: The rich must be assured that information gathering is separate from social decision making. If they provide false information and are afraid that it will cause problems, they impede the advancement of affairs. The statistics and data officials must gain the trust of such individuals and make them understand that the course of the statistics and data officials is different from other courses.

The census and planning officials, along with the dean of the college of statistics and data of martyr Beheshti university, met with Hojjat ol-Eslam yesterday.

In this meeting, Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani, pointing out that the lack of a statistics and data system is severely felt in Iran, emphasized the establishment of a statistics and data system which is in keeping with the growth of the society in various industrial, social, cultural, and economic dimensions. He said: This task must be reported to the people and the officials in some manner so that everyone will be able to carry out planning in his own work and advance the society. In the past, due to the treason of the leaders and their lack of competence and compassion, this task did not materialize. Among the many treasonous acts perpetrated on this country by the previous leaders was the lack of attention to the question of statistics and data. However, for the officials of the Islamic Republic, this shortcoming cannot be justified. Of course, there have been no delays in this task. Since the very beginning of

the victory of the revolution, the Reconstruction Crusade began the creation of a statistics system as a progressive task. Unfortunately, the value of statistics and data is not very clear to our people. A large segment of our society consists of illiterate people who carry out ordinary work with the little information they gain and are satisfied with that minute amount of information. But those who engage in complex tasks in the society are expected to plan based on precise statistics and data. They must clarify the value of statistics and data in the culture and make the people understand that the issue of statistics and data is vital to the continued progress of a society.

Continuing his statements, the speaker of the Majlis pointed to the existing shortages in the society and how they are attributed to the government and said: On the basis of precise statistics and data, the government must anticipate shortages and eliminate them.

#### Informing

He also stressed that officials should inform the people in this regard and said: You must gain the trust of the people through truthfulness and sincerity. If you give people correct data, for instance, in regards to wheat harvests, rice production, the number of industrial workshops, income levels, and so on, the people will trust your truthfulness.

He added: In the past, whenever a census taker went to people's homes, the people thought there was trickery involved. Naturally, when a tyrant rules, the people do not consider it in their interests to reveal their secrets. But when the relationship between the government and the people is correct and the people know that the government requests statistics and data to improve their conditions, they will cooperate. Of course, this trust of the people in the high level government officials exists, but the elementary officials, from the governors general to the education, health and welfare and other officials, must be trusted by the people and the people should provide them with the necessary information without undue concern.

Pointing out the necessity of employing the statistics and information resources, Hojjat ol-Eslam Rafsanjani said: Any information deficiency can harm the system, from the elementary schools to other large social sectors. Everyone must have sufficient information relating to his own activities in order to plan accordingly. Our planning now does not conform to the realities of the society. Some of the programs are based on guesses and some on calculations. Such programs, unfortunately, prove to be wrong in mid stream and do not yield desired results.

Then, referring to the lack of cooperation and trust on the part of the rich in providing data and statistics, he said: They do not wish anyone to know the amount of their income and wealth. Of course, the case of a few rich people who do not want justice and do not want the problems of the country to be resolved aside, other wealthy people must be assured that census taking is different from social decision making. If they give false information and are afraid that it will cause problems, this will impede the progress of affairs. The statistics and information officials must try to gain the trust of such individuals and make them understand that the course of the census and information officials is different from other courses. The people must be assured that the statistics and data concerning them will remain personal and confidential and will not be published in the press, but will be employed in the construction of the country.

Pointing out that we must have precise information concerning all the resources of the country, such as the amount of water and energy available, the number of pastures, the number of mines, the amount of arable lands, the potential forces, and many other issues, he said: All the information must be categorized and placed at the disposal of the managers, the Plan and Budget Organization, the Majlis, the directors of divisions, and other officials. Every sector must receive the necessary information appropriate to its work. It must be noted that today's world operates on the basis of precise statistics and data and the advanced countries have made great gains in this area. In many instances, they have identified the forces and have even determined the level of admission of students, art students, professors, and so on, on the basis of the needs of the society and the people. If this task is carried out, after a period of 10 years, the results of another census will be studied by statistics experts and the results will be explained to the people.

Then he emphasized the efforts to inform the people of the value of statistics and data and of keeping confidential information secret, gaining their trust and providing the officials with statistics and data and said: The proposed 20-year plans, which were offered to the Majlis as a series of 5-year plans, had a very serious weakness, which we faced in the committees. This weak point still prevents the Majlis from reaching a decisive conclusion because of the unreliable data used in decision making and budget allocation.

Referring to the probable disruptions of counterrevolutionary elements in the matter of statistics and data, he said: The enemy might have plans to divert our work, because we want to carry out a fundamental task.



In the past, in regards to censuses and planning, either the foreigners would interfere directly or individuals under their influence would manage affairs. We must be aware that the enemy will not be able to influence these affairs. Having correct data and presenting it truthfully to the people and the officials can neutralize the insinuations of the enemies. For instance, our opponents might insinuate that Iranian soil is not appropriate for the cultivation of corn, rice, and so on, or they might do the same in cultural areas, saying that Iranians are poetic and unable to do scientific and technical work. In that case, only statistics and figures will be able to neutralize their conspiracies and expose their lies. We must note that our global enemies and their domestic agents, despite assuming a composed and humanitarian posture, are in reality like wounded snakes who would resort to anything.

In conclusion, he referred to the issue of air piracy and said: When a few people brought an airplane to Iran, the mass media of global oppression engaged in vast propaganda. But despite the fact that they know that the security of the airways is a necessity for all countries, still they engage in such actions. Obviously, it is very easy to endanger the lives of dozens of passengers by threatening the pilot and taking an airplane somewhere else. They are not worried at all about the anxiety that they cause for the passengers, although they claim to be humanitarians. In this connection, thus far, the hands of the two governments of Bahrain and Egypt, as the agents of oppression, have been revealed when they have participated in an aggressive action and have acted in coordination with the domestic agents of oppression.

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CSO: 4640/412

## IRAN

### ARMS SALES TO IRAN EXAMINED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 228, 23-29 Jun 84 pp 8-12

[Article by AL-MAJALLAH's military editor: "Iranian Arms from the Shah to Khomeyni: AL-MAJALLAH Names 15 Nations Selling Arms to Iran"]

[Text] Foreword

"Tell me to whom you sell arms, and I can determine what politics you pursue" (philosophy of a well-known arms dealer).

Because AL-MAJALLAH believes in this practical philosophy, we have tried to plunge into the world of the international arms market in order to determine precisely who is selling arms to Iran, how they are sold, why, what types, at what prices and for what ends.

In this detailed report, AL-MAJALLAH stands alone in publishing the details of the lists of arms that have arrived in Iran in the past 3 years, along with giving the complete background of the story of arms purchases on the international market, starting from the sixties in the shah's era up to the past month.

AL-MAJALLAH is ringing the warning bell and notes that Islamic nations and a nation "friendly" to the Arab world are selling these weapons, while at the same time they announce officially and through the media that they adhere to a neutral stance in this conflict.

These nations, whose names we are publishing, raise up the banner of "self-control," but we ask, is it possible to achieve self-control by inundating the region with vast quantities of arms?

This report deserves an unhurried reading to determine the policy these "friends" follow toward the Arab region.

## Arms Exporters Start with Switzerland and End with Israel

For about 10 years during the last decade, Iran under the shah held uncontested first place as the most lavish spender among all nations of the Arab region and the Middle East in matters of armaments and of military build-ups. The size of Iranian expenditures shortly before the shah's fall at the end of the seventies reached the point where it compared with the size of the sums which the great nations of the world normally earmark for defense. In 1978, for example, the Iranian arms budget amounted to about \$10 billion, which placed Iran in sixth place in the world on the list of nations spending the most on military affairs, right behind the Soviet Union, the United States, China, West Germany, France and Britain.

When the era of the shah neared its end in the latter seventies, Iranian armament efforts had reached their peak. It might be provocative to mention in this vein that the new Iranian government, immediately after taking power in Tehran, proceeded to cancel arms deals made during the era of the shah, which had a value of about \$15 billion. The canceled weapons included 16 F-16 Falcon fighters, 7 AWAC surveillance and early warning aircraft, 2 missile destroyers, 400 Phoenix air-to-air missiles, 200 Harpoon antiship missiles, 900 Mark-46 antiship torpedoes and 1,000 Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, in addition to 1000 Shir Iran tanks from Britain and numerous other smaller deals which were made with Britain, France, West Germany and Italy. Among these was a deal with West Germany that included the purchase of six attack submarines of the Type-209 class.

Though the government of al-Imam al-Khomeyni decided, after reaching power, to cancel the aforementioned arms deals and reduce Iran's military expenditures by more than two-thirds (from \$10 billion in 1979 to about \$3 billion in 1980), the current Iranian command must have felt a deep regret over taking this step, aside from the fact that the canceled weapons are an extension of what Iran currently needs in order to wage its war with Iraq (here are cited especially the F-16 fighters, AWAC's, missiles, antiship torpedoes, Shir Iran tanks and Type-209 submarines--collectively, they are the equipment similar to which the Iranian forces at present seriously lack, especially since the big problem that the new Iranian regime has faced since coming to power, and actually since the Gulf war flared up, was how to maintain the country's military capabilities and to try to strengthen them so as to meet the needs of the ongoing war.

Iran's armament problem during the last 3 to 4 years can be summarized in the following two main points:

1. An attempt to preserve as much as possible Iran's vast arsenal of advanced American and Western weapons in a usable operational condition after Iran was cut off from the possibility of Western military and technical support, especially as a result of the American Embassy hostage crisis during 1979 and 1980. Following the fall of the shah, the Iranian forces were lacking many specialized personnel and crews qualified to operate the aforementioned weapons, especially pilots, maintenance

technicians, armored vehicle and tank drivers and missile system operators, some of whom decided to leave Iran immediately after the success of the revolution, or were discharged from service, or were brought to trial on the charge of loyalty to the previous regime. On another level, severing military relations with Iran's traditional weapons suppliers, such as the United States and Britain, brought out a severe deficiency among the Iranian forces in the areas of maintenance, spare parts and other material necessary for operation of the weapons in their possession. All of this made compensating for this deficiency an urgent priority.

2. Attempts to find new alternate sources of armaments that would ensure replacement of the traditional sources of armaments on which Iran has depended in the past, not only for the sake of obtaining through them the expertise, assistance and parts to guarantee operation of Iran's military arsenal but also with the aim of being supplied with new weapons from them to replace the old weapons and equipment which would become unusable.

#### Arms Black Market

Since the outbreak of the Gulf war, the Iranians have exerted mighty efforts in their attempts to find a satisfactory solution to their armaments problems. By the nature of the situation these efforts included all types of overt and secret methods, and sometimes they even included methods which reached the level of desperation from the standpoint of urgency. A prominent example of this urgency might be the fact that Iran occasionally agreed to spend enormous sums to obtain weapons and equipment from the European arms black market at rates that reached three times the authorized world prices on the official international market.

It was clear that the return of Iranian concentration on matters of armaments at any price would lead to a huge new increase in the size of Iranian military expenditures, to an extent that had never existed even during the most extravagant periods of defense spending during the shah's reign.

The greater part of Iranian military expenditures is aimed primarily at purchasing weapons and ammunition. This poses the question which has confused international military observers for the past 4 years: If, from the beginning of the eighties, Iran was undergoing an arms embargo imposed by the United States and the West European nations, how, then, is it possible to explain the ability of the Iranian forces to mount a hard battle and intense ground, aerial and naval operations? In other words, the main question focuses on where Iran is getting its combat requirements at the present time.

#### From Where, and at What Price

Actually, information has recently been gathered by Western military circles, in light of which it has become possible to shed light on much of the obscurity regarding armaments and assistance relations in diverse military and technical fields between Iran and its new suppliers of weapons and various combat materiel. It can even be said that this information is a

great help in explaining what Iran's ambassador to the United Nations stated several months ago in his reply to a question submitted by an American journalist, who asked him how Iran continued to obtain the weapons it needed in spite of the international embargo. The Iranian ambassador, Sa'id Raja'i Khorasani, answered: "Whoever has enough determination and money can buy anything he wants in this world."

In fact, the words of Ambassador Khorasani are a very accurate assertion about the truth of the current Iranian armaments situation, where Iran's sources of weapons and military equipment have come to include hostile nations and parties who would not logically come together if they had actually come together in the real world. Perhaps a simple look at the list of nations which, according to various international sources, have certainly provided the Iranian forces with various types of military aid, whether official or covert, will explain the contradiction.

### The Deals in Detail

The details of the relationships, the deals and the military cooperation which have linked Iran and these nations during the past 4 years can be determined on the basis of information brought out during recent months and weeks by a number of specialized official and semi-official sources in the United States and Europe, information that is almost certain, as follows:

North Korea: At present North Korea is one of the most important sources of Iranian arms. Information drawn from American Department of Defense sources estimates that in 1982 Tehran imported, from this nation alone, weapons and equipment valued at about \$1 billion, that is, the equivalent of approximately 40 percent of all Iranian weapons imported that year. This information also alludes to an agreement signed between Tehran and North Korea which provides for the latter getting 250,000 tons of Iranian crude oil in exchange for weapons and combat equipment valued at about \$1 billion. The weapons for which Iran is rumored to have made a contract with North Korea include equipment of Soviet and Chinese manufacture, in addition to equipment produced in North Korea. This includes about 250 T-54/55 and T-59 tanks (the latter is a Chinese copy of the Soviet T-54), about 400 122- and 130-mm field guns and howitzers, about 1,000 mortars, 600 anti-aircraft guns and 12,000 machineguns and rifles, in addition to about 100 MiG-19 fighters and its Chinese copy known as the F-6.

South Korea: In spite of continuous denials by South Korean authorities that they supply weapons to Iran, information brought out by a number of American and British defense sources indicates the opposite in practice. These sources report that South Korea actually participated in arming the Iranian forces throughout the past few years, including supplying them with quantities of spare parts for American-made F-4 Phantom and F-5 Tiger fighters (aircraft



which operate in both the South Korean and Iranian Air Forces). This played a part in enabling Iran to continue to operate and prolong the life of some of these models. Other unconfirmed information reports that South Korea supplied Iran during the 1982-83 period with many American Hawk anti-aircraft missiles after a shipment of these missiles was sent to Iran instead of the original destination, that is, units of the South Korean Army itself.

People's Republic of China: The Chinese authorities in turn vehemently deny reports of their selling weapons to Iran (in fact, at the present time China is considered one of Iraq's most important sources of arms). However, information available through American, British and West German defense circles confirms, on the contrary, the fact that China supplies the Iranian forces with not inconsiderable quantities of weapons. Chinese weapons are normally sold to Tehran via North Korea. This includes, it appears, F-6 (Mig-19) fighters and possibly F-7 fighters (a Chinese copy of the Soviet MiG-21 fighter) and T-59 tanks (copies of the T-54), besides field artillery, mortars and various other weapons and ammunition.

Taiwan's role in supporting Iran's armament efforts is similar to the one played for some time by South Korea, in that it focuses on supplying the Iranian forces the spare parts they need to operate the F-5 Tiger fighters and the other weapons and equipment of American origin in their hands. Also currently working among them, according to British information, are advisers and technicians from Taiwan whom the Iranian government has employed on contract to maintain and repair the working weapons they have. The contracts were made with them on a commercial and individual basis and not as part of an official deal between the authorities of the two parties, as is the custom in such cases.

Pakistan: Several weeks ago a specialized British publication brought out information alleging that Pakistan played a vital role as an "intermediary" in a number of deals concluded by Iran on the international arms market. This was one of the methods Iran followed to get around the weapons and combat materiel export laws in many of the European nations that imposed an embargo on the sale of such equipment to Iran. According to this information, which was also confirmed by a similar American publication, Pakistan made these deals and then sent the subject equipment to Iran in return for specific monetary commissions. In addition, Pakistan played a part in supplying Iran with spare parts and ammunition for the Western weapons and equipment that are being operated by the Iranian forces. Iran also contracted with many Pakistani advisers and technicians to work for them.

India: Current Indian-Iranian military cooperation is considered limited in comparison with others. As far as is known, it has been restricted to one deal made in 1981, valued at \$17.2 million. This deal included supplying Iran with about 4,000 jeeps, several hundred trucks and about 10,000 tents, in addition to various other logistical materiel.

**Brazil:** Brazil is associated with a number of Arab nations by close armament cooperation relationships, especially Iraq, which obtained from it armored vehicles, armored personnel carriers, rocket launchers and various other weapons. However, it would appear that this does not prevent Brazil from associating with Iran in return for important trade relations, which most Western sources consider very likely to have included sales of specific military materiel to the Iranian forces. These sources point to an agreement made between Brazil and Iran in 1983 which provided that Brazil obtain 45,000 barrels of Iranian oil per day over a period of 2 years, an agreement which is renewable. The amount of bilateral trade between the two countries in 1984 reached \$800 million, while information published in America indicated the likelihood that Iran will be buying a quantity of armored vehicles from Brazil which the latter is now producing, including 100 to 200 Cascavel armored vehicles.

**Argentina:** Argentina is rapidly becoming one of Iran's most important sources of weapons. Confirmed information, which investigators did not discover until the last few weeks, reports that Argentina and Iran signed an important armaments agreement, estimated at about \$170 million, which provides that the Iranian Army be supplied with about 100 new TAM main battle tanks. This tank, which Argentina is producing locally at the present time, is of West German design. It weighs 30 tons and is armed with a 105-mm gun. In addition, a few months ago Iran obtained weapons from Argentina that included 60 heavy machineguns and 5,000 automatic rifles and pistols.

**Poland:** Toward the end of 1981 Iran contracted an armaments deal with Poland valued at about \$50 million. It included supplying the Iranian forces with Soviet-designed weapons produced in Poland, including 23- and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and RPG-7 anti-armor rocket launchers.

**East Germany:** Information brought out recently by British military sources reports that for some time East Germany has been training about 200 personnel of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to pilot Soviet aircraft, including MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighters. The information does not indicate the date these new Iranian pilots will complete their training, but it is likely that it will be sometime in the 1984-85 time frame. This will then enable the Iranian Air Force to begin operation of the F-6 and F-7 fighters it may have received from China and North Korea.

**Italy:** In the second half of the seventies, the shah's government had signed a contract with the Italian company Agusta, which specialized in manufacturing helicopters, to buy 50 Chinook heavy transport helicopters (this is an aircraft of American origin produced in Italy under official American license). The value of the contract approached \$425 million. The desired aircraft were being delivered one by one when the American hostage crisis emerged in Tehran and the military boycott that followed it was imposed on Iran by the Western nations. This stopped the delivery of the

remaining aircraft (at that time numbering 21) to the Iranian Army. However, the Italian company resumed delivery of 10 of these aircraft at the beginning of 1982. The Agusta company is still currently holding 11 of these aircraft, which are capable of carrying 50 soldiers or almost 10 tons of equipment. They are all that remain of the original deal with Iran, and the Italian government so far has not made a final decision if it should deliver these aircraft to the Iranian Air Force.

Switzerland: In September 1983 the Swiss company Pilatus sold the Iranian Air Force six BC-7 Turbotrainer aircraft, although it knew that Swiss laws prohibit the sale of military equipment to "areas of tension" in the world. It was reported later that the aforementioned aircraft were part of a deal Iran made with the Swiss company which included the purchase of about 50 Turbotrainer aircraft. It was learned that the Swiss government permitted the articles of this contract to be carried out in view of the fact that this aircraft was not classified as war materiel. In this regard it was reported that about 2 years ago Iraq, in turn, contracted to buy 52 of these aircraft. It is normally used for training missions and tactical support and can be armed with machineguns, rocket pylons and bombs of various weights.

Israel: The available information is contradictory with regard to the scope and extent of the arms cooperation established several years ago between Iran and Israel, while various American and European sources are beginning to agree that this cooperation played a vital role in enabling Iran to operate its American weapons and prolong their life. On this topic, it has been confirmed that Iran, through Israel, has obtained considerable quantities of the spare and maintenance parts needed to repair and use the weapons mentioned above. This includes a deal signed in 1981 that stipulated that the Iranian Air Force be supplied with \$300,000 worth of wheels for the F-4 Phantom fighters and another deal signed the same year, valued at about \$28 million, that included supplying the Iranian Army with about 360 tons of spare parts for its American M-60 and M-48 Patton tanks. American military sources also cite information about the two parties reaching another important deal in 1981 that included sundry ammunition. This information reports that this deal was concluded through a British company, which played the role of middleman between the two parties. It included the Iranian Army obtaining 150,000 155-mm and 100,000 203-mm artillery projectiles, 50,000 projectiles for 105-mm tank guns and 100,000 projectiles for 106-mm antitank guns. According to this information, this deal was signed on Cyprus with the help of the British company, the identity of which could not be determined, during the month of August 1981.

Subsequently, a specialized American defense publication reported that Iran made an agreement with Israel in November 1982 in which German, Swiss and British companies acted as middlemen. It included supplying the Iranian Army with American TOW antitank missiles valued at \$50 million which Israel had obtained originally from the United States.

In May 1983, U.S. Department of State sources confirmed reports that discussed Israel's supplying Iran during the 1981-83 period with spare parts

and munitions for F-4 Phantom fighters, M-60 and M-48 tanks and guns of various calibers. The German newspaper ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG also published information last April reporting that the Iranian-Israeli arms deals were concluded through European intermediaries in Cyprus, Greece, Switzerland and Holland. The newspaper said that so far, Iran had obtained \$500 million worth of military equipment via Israel, including American weapons and others of Israeli manufacture, in addition to weapons of Soviet origin that the Israelis captured during their invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. The German newspaper added that in 1982 Israel supplied the Iranian Army with about 200 105-mm tank guns, in addition to a like number of these guns contracted for at the beginning of 1984. It is anticipated that they will be delivered to Iran later this summer. It is worth noting that Israel is producing this model of tank gun under official license from the United States.

France: In spite of the tense political relations between Iran and France, at the beginning of 1982 the latter sent to the Iranian Navy three missile attack ships of the Combatant class. The shah's government had placed an order for these ships with France in the mid-seventies. When the shah fell in 1979, Iran had received 9 of the 12 ships originally contracted. The government of the previous French president, Valery Giscard D'Estaing, froze delivery of the three remaining ships to Iran, but President Mitterrand's government subsequently decided to go ahead with it. In August 1981 a group of opponents to the Iranian regime seized one of these ships, named "Tabarzin," for the purpose of preventing it from reaching Iran. However, this action was not carried to completion, as the perpetrators were quickly turned over to the French authorities, who sent the ship back to the Iranian Navy, where it entered into service with the other two ships of the same class at the beginning of 1982.

Britain: In 1980 the British government imposed an embargo on the sale of arms and military equipment to Iran in solidarity with the United States at the time of the American Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran. Contrary to continuous British assurances in this regard, which are based on the continued execution of the embargo, American sources report that in the last 2 years, Iran has actually obtained limited amounts of equipment through British companies. In particular, these sources point to Iran's acquisition of engines and spare parts for the British tanks it owns, the Chieftains and Scorpions. The same sources also report that Iran recently revealed its intention to obtain British Jaguar attack fighters as a response to France supplying Iraq with Super Etendard fighters. This came at a time when it was not exactly clear whether the Iranians had intended to submit an official request for these fighters or whether the request was merely an initial action to feel the pulse. In any case, nothing has been issued yet from the British government that can be construed as a confirmation or denial of this American information.

#### [Sidebar, p 11] Current Iranian Defense Budget

Certain information indicates that in 1982 the Iranian defense budget reached a total estimated by Western sources to range from \$13-15 billion.



These sources think it likely that the budget increased during 1983, ranging from \$17-18 billion, and in the current year it reached about \$20 billion.

[Sidebar, p 9] Nations That Arm Iran

North Korea -- South Korea -- People's Republic of China and Taiwan -- India -- Pakistan -- Argentina -- Brazil -- Poland -- East Germany -- Italy -- Switzerland -- Israel -- France -- Britain.

The value and size of the military relations which tie Iran with each state vary, just as the aspects of cooperation between the state and the Iranian forces differ. It is still not established that the result of that cooperation enabled those forces to secure a very considerable degree of their combat, field and logistical needs, in a manner which guarantees the continuation and operation of a not insignificant part of the arsenal which were in their possession since the shah's days.

[Sidebar, p 12] Two Destroyers from Argentina: Negotiations were carried out recently between Argentina and Iran with regard to Argentina's sale of two missile destroyers to the Iranian fleet. The Argentine Navy decided to dispense with them because they were made in Britain and to hasten their replacement with new German destroyers. The two destroyers are named "Hercules" and "Santisima Trinidad." They are of the Type-42 class of British destroyers armed with Exocet antiship missiles and Sea Dart anti-aircraft missiles.

9605

CSO: 4604/30



BRIEFS

LAW, JUSTICE MINISTER--Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand will be in charge of the affairs of the Law and Justice Ministry until Mr Radheshyam Kamaro, who has been appointed the minister of state for law and justice, returns to Katmandu from the United Nations, New York, and assumes his office. According to a notice issued today by the Principal Press Secretariat of his majesty the king, an arrangement to this effect has been made as Mr Kamaro has gone to New York as a member of the Nepalese delegation to the 39th UN General Assembly. [Text] [Katmandu External Service in English 1450 GMT 17 Sep 84]

CSO: 4600/763

QUESTIONS RAISED ABOUT LIBYA-MOROCCO UNION

GF151358 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Sep 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Maghreb Unity"]

[Text] The surprise union between Morocco and Libya has already taken effect on 1 September, the 15th anniversary of the Libyan revolution which overthrew the old monarchy. The Libyan Parliament as well as the Moroccan electorate, in a massive popular affirmation of this decision, have supported this most recent "political wedding" in the Arab world. While the specifics of the decision are not clear as yet, its impact is being felt all over the region. The visit of the Syrian president to Tripoli and French President Mitterrand's dash to Morocco underline the political ramifications of the proposed alliance in terms of its fall-out on Middle East politics. Libya's weighty moral and military support of the Arab struggle against the Zionists was a factor of considerable satisfaction and confidence to embattled Syria. With Morocco, as evidenced in the two Islamic moots held in that country, Syrian relations appeared to be heading for a breakdown.

Aborted "unions" of "front-line" Arab states provide the background of their desire for unity against Israel, which the United States has never allowed to fructify. Egypt had a union with Syria; Syria proposed one with Jordan; Libya ardently desired a union with Egypt; Egypt and Sudan have recently "united" (the term is loosely applied). To the United States, more than another country, friendly Morocco's union with Libya--a country with which the U.S. has been in confrontation just short of war, would, possibly come as a shock and generate a complete revision of policy in North Africa and elsewhere. In the U.S. strategic deployment, Morocco is the "take off" point of a vast U.S. military commitment whose "second" and "third" halts are, respectively, Egypt and Oman and final destination, for the time being, the U.S. base in Diego Garcia.

From the proposed union follows a string of intriguing questions which time alone will answer. Maghreb politics have been thrown into a jumble of confusion and speculation; and a snake and ladder game which retracts every forward move back to square one. America is affected because the

U.S. moves the pawns. Why should two countries, miles apart geographically, ideologically and with differing systems, agree on a federation? Does Libya feel it can no longer take it alone against U.S. threats and needs U.S. friend Morocco to put things right? Has the alliance been engineered by the U.S. itself? Would it mean a softening of Libyan confrontation with Israel? Does the Moroccan king expect the Polisario struggle to be crushed with Libyan help? Will Libya get back into conservative Arab graces with the move? How will it go down with Syria and with Israel? Finally, if the U.S. is as alarmed over the pact as Syria and France manifestly are, what will happen to its strategic perceptions covering the entire region? Answers to these riddles can be provided by time alone. While any move towards Arab unity is commendable, it needs to be based on shared interests rather than worn-out cliches that peter out in real life.

CSO: 4600/762

U. S. ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA, PAKISTAN CRITICIZED

Karachi AMN in Urdu 12 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Juma Khan: "U. S. Treatment of Its Two Friends, China and Pakistan, Does Not Befit the Dignity of a Superpower"]

[Excerpt] The atomic agreement between China and the United States involved billions of dollars, and it was expected that the Reagan administration would send the agreement to the House and Senate for speedy approval. But this did not happen; and the United States is said to have discovered through secret sources that China was already engaged in atomic cooperation with Pakistan and that the Pakistanis were being taught how to design atomic bombs and being kept informed of the results of Chinese atomic experiments. Two Chinese scientists were said to be training Pakistani scientists at an atomic center in Pakistan. When such reports circulated in the newspapers and other media, public opinion leaders in the United States demanded that the atomic treaty with China be abrogated and aid to Pakistan ended. On the other side, both Pakistan and China declared unequivocally that the reports of atomic cooperation were false. General Zia reiterated his stand that Pakistan had no intention of using atomic energy for military purposes. But these clarifications did not satisfy the Reagan administration, and it has not as yet sent the atomic agreement to the U.S. Congress for ratification.

Both China and Pakistan are friends of the United States. President Reagan himself declared in the capital of China that the United States did not consider it necessary to obtain written assurance from Chinese leaders because it trusted their word. But now Mr Reagan is not willing to believe either the Chinese Government's denials or the Pakistani leader's explanations. The reason may be that this year he will be running for the presidency and thus he does not want to do anything that might turn public opinion against him.

U. S. treatment of its friends China and Pakistan over atomic technology is not worthy of a superpower. Pakistan is a small, developing country that cannot even meet its annual budget without American aid and is deeply in debt to the United States; hence, it has had to hear the bitter experience in silence. But it is different with China. From the point of view of population, it is the world's largest country; only Russia and the United States are

considered superpowers, but the combined populations of these two countries is less than that of China. China is also an atomic power as well as a country with an ideology; it is a permanent member of the Security Council. China could not tolerate the broken American promise and said in no uncertain terms that because the United States did not believe China's reassurances, it had thus insulted and disgraced China in the eyes of the world.

Countries who are accustomed to having their own way are always like the proverbial duck's back: They pay no heed to the angry outbursts of friends and foes and what they hear in one ear comes out the other. This is how the U.S. Government behaves; it does not care that it has offended a large country like China nor does it pay any attention to Pakistan's reaction. But it wants Pakistan and China to continue to trust in its friendship. The United States may be under the impression that one can clap with one hand. Field Marshal Ayub Kahn was correct in his judgment that the United States does not want to be a friend but has the effrontery to use friendship as a cover for acting as the master.

Following the atomic agreement between the United States and China and the rumors about Pak-China atomic cooperation, Yaqub Khan, Pakistan's foreign minister, visited China where he held official talks on the highest level. Later, he unequivocally denied reports that Pakistan and China were cooperating in the atomic sector for military purposes. But this announcement made no impression on the U. S. administration, and U. S. authorities stated that they had obtained proof of atomic cooperation between China and Pakistan and hence there was no further need for clarification.

U. S. President Reagan had said in China that the United States did not need a written guarantee from Chinese leaders because it trusted their verbal promise; but today, the Reagan administration is not ready to believe China's declaration. The statements of other U. S. authorities as well have no value and their policies seem to be based on lies. They accept their own accusations as true while refusing even to consider another's concrete proof of his innocence.

U. S. authorities claim that they have received verification of atomic cooperation between China and Pakistan; however, if there was the slightest truth in this assertion, would the U. S. Government have continued to sell weapons to China and Pakistan? The U. S. Government has stated more than once that if Pakistan tries to build an atomic bomb, explode an atomic device or obtain [?] an atomic bomb, the United States will abrogate all agreements with Pakistan and cancel all aid. It is not possible for Pakistan to hide from the United States its efforts to build an atomic bomb on its own or in cooperation with China. The Government of Pakistan is well aware that if it tries to use atomic energy for military purposes, its relations with the United States and its allies will come to an end. How is it possible, then, that Pakistan would risk losing all economic and military aid from the United States and the countries under its influence merely for the sake of building an atom bomb? If the United States will not trust its friends, it will only continue to lose their friendship. If the United States wishes to enhance its dignity, it should treat its friends as such and not conspire to become their master. We need friends, not masters.



# REAGAN ADMINISTRATION URGED TO CONTINUE, RAISE AID

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 27 Aug 84 p 2

[Editorial: "More Than This Is Needed"]

[Text] President Reagan has lauded the struggle of the freedom fighters of Afghanistan and promised to continue American aid for the economic and military programs in Pakistan. He made this declaration at the Republican convention in Dallas, where he was nominated for a second term as the party's candidate in the presidential election to be held in November. This is not President Reagan's personal decision but is part of his party's political platform, which includes sections about giving help to Afghan freedom fighters and economic and military aid to Pakistan. In his acceptance speech, President Reagan made a strong attack on his adversary, Walter Mondale, who compared America's attack on Grenada to the Soviet invasion and destruction of the Islamic country of Afghanistan. He said that there was not the slightest resemblance between the two situations. American forces, said President Reagan, went to Grenada at the request of six countries in that region and returned as soon as Grenada had been liberated. No intelligent person can tell us who invited the Soviets into Afghanistan and why they are still there.

Even the Democrats are against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and former president Carter ordered the grain embargo and the boycott of the 1980 Olympics because of this invasion. But the attitude of the U.S. Democratic Party, like that of the Labor Party in the UK, has always been cold and unsympathetic to Pakistan. President Carter offered to give Pakistan military and economic aid of \$400 million. He also sent Dr Brzezinski, the national security adviser, who visited the Afghan refugee camps and delivered a spirited speech there. Pakistan, however, refused the aid that Carter offered, calling it a "mere peanut." But as soon as President Reagan came into power, a long-term program of \$3.02 billion in economic aid and arms sales for Pakistan was prepared. The Democrats opposed this aid to Pakistan on the grounds that Pakistan would use this money to make atomic weapons. This party's antagonism to Pakistan has increased with the passage of time, and senators like Cranston, Galbraith and Glenn have been defaming Pakistan on charges that are entirely the products of their own imaginations.

It is commendable that despite the efforts of the Zionist lobby and pro-Indian circles, the Reagan administration has always tried to fulfill its promises of help to Pakistan. They have not allowed anybody to deter them from giving economic help to Pakistan or selling it arms. They have helped Pakistan in its economic and defense programs. It is comforting to know that despite the conspiracies of the Zionist lobby and the Democrats, President Reagan has voiced his determination to give Pakistan arms as well as economic help according to his party's platform.

Nobody can tell who will be the next president of the United States, though the pollsters tell us that Reagan is leading Mondale in the opinion polls. This is no sure indication that more people will vote for Reagan in November. But if Reagan wins the election it will be more satisfactory for Pakistan, because in that case the United States will continue to give us economic help and arms. At this time, the Soviets have not only increased their destructive measures in Afghanistan but are also threatening Pakistan's security. The planes and artillery of the Soviets bomb and shell inside the borders of Pakistan. At the same time, Russia's ally and agent, India, has increased its anti-Pakistan activities. This harassment of Pakistan from two sides can lead to detrimental results in the future. President Reagan, after his reelection, should remember that Pakistan needs more help than has been promised by the United States if it is to successfully resist Soviet expansionism in this region.

12476

CSO: 4656/200

USSR ACCUSED OF USING AFGHANISTAN TO INTIMIDATE PAKISTAN

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 21 Aug 84 p 3

[Editorial: "Efforts To Intimidate Pakistan"]

[Text] Sixteen more people have been killed due to a second bombardment by the Afghan Army of Pakistani territory. At this, the Afghan charge d'affaires was summoned to the foreign office where a protest was lodged with him. But just as the previous protests have proved ineffective, this one also will be in vain, and the manner of provocation and instigation adopted by Afghanistan will continue on our borders. As for the bombing of Pakistan by the Afghan Air Force, the Chinese newspaper PEOPLE'S DAILY has expressed a valid opinion that the Karmal administration is carrying out such attacks to accomplish Soviet objectives. The Soviet Union, by terrifying Pakistan through such attacks by Afghanistan, wishes to prevent Pakistan from supporting the just struggle of the Afghan people against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. However, as President Ziaul Haq has said, Pakistan may be a small country, but it will not be intimidated by the recent bombing incidents by Afghan planes along the Pakistani borders. Actually, the Soviet Union wishes to frighten and terrify Pakistan.

It thinks that by terrifying Pakistan it can make it accept the Soviet Union's unlawful occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, will never accept Babrak Karmal's government, and it is not alone in this. Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Muslim countries as a whole hold a similar viewpoint. Besides, America and the European countries also do not accept the Babrak Karmal government as lawful. In the socialist bloc, too, there are several countries that believe that the entry and presence of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan is an act of aggression and imperialism. China in particular has condemned this imperialist action of the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, therefore, Pakistan will never feel that it is alone, and it will never feel the need to deviate from its stand. The Soviet Union must also bear in mind that its policy of terrifying Pakistan can affect Pakistan's neutral foreign policy. Because if Afghanistan, at the Soviet instigation, continues to bombard our borders, it can lead Pakistan to believe that since the Soviet Union under the guise of Afghanistan is fighting against it, it should quit its attitude of neutrality and seek the refuge of America and openly join with the U.S. bloc so that it can be safeguarded. The actions of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan against Pakistan will produce no other

result but to push Pakistan toward America. If the Soviet Union hopes that Pakistan, in the true sense of the word, remain a neutral country and that relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan prosper, it is essential that it stop encouraging India and Afghanistan against us and move toward a peaceful settlement of issues and disputes through mutual dialogue. Because when measures are taken that endanger the peace, and when Pakistan faces danger with regard to its security, it will become difficult for Pakistan to adhere to a policy of neutrality. Afghanistan, India and the Soviet Union should understand that Pakistan wishes to relinquish its dependence on the West and not be a slave of any superpower. To transform this desire into a reality, Pakistan needs the cooperation of its neighbors. Regretably, however, instead of cooperating with Pakistan, a policy of intimidation and harrassment is being pursued. Nevertheless, no one will benefit from this; instead, everyone will lose.

9779

CSO: 4656/203

## HIGHHANDEDNESS OF INDIAN AMBASSADORS CRITICIZED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 1 Sep 84 p 5

[Article by Jamal Yaldram: "The Giants of India"]

[Text] Speakers of Hindi and Urdu often use the old metaphor "everything in Ceylon is 52 yards long." This refers to the famous villain in the "Ramayna." Ravana was supposedly 52 yards tall. Since the partition of the subcontinent, everything in India appears to be "52 yards tall" to us Pakistanis. One example of this disposition is the holier-than-thou attitude of India's two ambassadors to Pakistan. K.D. Sharma is the present ambassador. He succeeded Natwar Lal 2 1/2 years ago. K.D. Sharma publicly expressed his anger at the way Pakistan handled the Indian hijackers. He was telling Pakistanis how to do things in the manner of a headmaster. Some reporter who knew his Ghali should have asked him, "Hey, who gave you permission to use such a tone?" This attitude is characteristic of Indian official's superiority complex and the way they deal with their various neighbors.

In March 1982, at the end of his term, Kanwar Natwar Singh made some unnecessary and uncalled-for comments that were not only against diplomatic etiquette but also detrimental to Indo-Pakistan relations. During his tenure as ambassador in Islamabad, he was fairly docile, but he took parting shots at the end of this term. He said that Pakistan should have reduced its army by half after 1971. In other words, he did not understand why Pakistan needed a big army after losing half of its territory. Even more provoking was his comment that he never considered Pakistan as a separate country nor will he ever do so. Imagine an ambassador making such insulting remarks about a host country right there! As long as they are suffering from a superiority complex, Indian officers and their representatives will continue to make such provocative remarks about their neighbors. Mr Subramaniam, Mrs Gandhi's military adviser, habitually says such things and goes so far as to declare that Pakistan should not worry about its defense. He added that India, being the strongest country in this area, will be responsible for defending Pakistan.

Kanwar Natwar Singh's successor, K.D. Sharma, continued the verbal tirade. Judges and ambassadors are often referred to as models for seriousness, integrity and gentleness. The late Chandigar was Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan when relations between the two countries were at their lowest



ebb. Sardar Naim and Sardar Daud used to call him and make provocative remarks about our country. Mr Chandrigar, however, never lost his composure. His self-control was considered exemplary in Kabul. That is how an ambassador should act. When a high foreign officer from India arrives in Pakistan as an ambassador, he forgets that he is in the capital of the world's eighth largest country; he thinks he is in Maler Kotla or Mangrool [small Indian kingdoms during the British era] and begins to order people around. They want to decide how large an army we should have and where our borders should be. They also want to manage our airports, and if a hijacked plane lands there, they will take over management of the entire airport and order us around. Mr Sharma must have been thinking in these terms when he questioned us about why the hijacked plane was allowed to fill up, why was it cleared for flight, why did we not use our commando units and why the plane was allowed to go to Dubai from Karachi. This is called a good turn being paid in wickedness.

When this hijacked plane returned to Delhi with its passengers safe, a few passengers told a rehearsed story about the hijackers not having any guns at Chandigarh but having gotten hold of some in Lahore. One passenger added that at Lahore, hijackers and Pakistani officials were very friendly with each other and were joking among themselves. Such low blows do not suit those who claim to be superior. The question arises: Why are people not searched at your airports for weapons? If your airport security is ineffective, then why blame a neighboring country that has cooperated with you in every hijacking incident? Second question: Should Pakistani officials have greeted the hijackers with fists and swore at them at Lahore airport? Why do you not accept the fact that most of India's provinces are tired of Indira Gandhi's rule and would like to get rid of it? India's Punjab is especially angry and young Akali freedom fighters are very active at various airports. These freedom fighters will remain active against Indira's government as long as the Indian Army is stationed in the Golden Temple or even in any part of Punjab. Mrs Gandhi and her official as well as unofficial followers have tried to assert that the Akali terrorists have been taken care of and that all this hue and cry is being raised by Sikhs living abroad. Mrs Gandhi thinks that this movement will die once all the Akali leaders are behind bars and that is why she ordered the arrest of all Akali leaders instead of negotiating with them.

The fact is that by attacking the Golden Temple Mrs Gandhi has caused such a great rift between Hindus and Sikhs that the two groups will never be close again.

Akali young men have come out fighting. In addition to hijacking airplanes they will take all kinds of revolutionary steps that will be detrimental to Indira Gandhi.

Pakistan will continue to do its duty as a good neighbor. In return, all we ask of Mrs Gandhi is that she instruct her ambassador not to forget diplomatic etiquette.

## LOCAL RESOLUTIONS ASKING ZIA TO REMAIN CRITICIZED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 26 Aug 34 p 2

[Editorial: "Government Policy or ....?"]

[Excerpt] In a special meeting of the Lahore Corporation, Mian Shujaur Rahman, the mayor, had a resolution passed by a majority vote in which President Zia is asked to continue to rule the country until he has fulfilled the goal of making it an Islamic welfare state. A group of councilors, however, abstained from voting on the grounds that the resolution has a political tinge and goes against the ideal of keeping local bodies free from politics. The first resolution of this kind was sponsored by Mohammad Ayub Warog, mayor of Quetta, in which the president was asked to take part in the coming presidential elections, because he has done so much for the progress and prosperity of the country, and the people do not want to be deprived of his services. A few days earlier, the municipal councils of Khairpur and Nawabshah, too, passed similar resolutions at a signal from those at the helm. Probably other local bodies will follow suit, and resolutions will be (or be caused to be) passed similar to those passed during Ayub Khan's rule in which he was asked to become president for life.

We cannot say whether these resolutions at meetings of local bodies were adopted at a signal from above or are inspired by a genuine feeling of gratitude and loyalty toward the president. Such opinions have been expressed in some other quarters, too, and it has been said that it would be better if the president remained in office while the power is transferred from the military regime to a representative government. But since the situation is ambiguous, such resolutions by the local bodies will only add to the confusion in the country. The regime has said from the outset that the local institutions must remain nonpolitical. That is why anybody who belonged to a political party or was helped by a political party lost his candidacy. Hence, the resolutions asking the president to remain in power are against the rules and ethics of the local bodies. If the door is opened for such resolutions, soon somebody will propose the name of another man to be president in place of Ziaul Haq. The need of the hour is to hold elections according to the proclamation of 12 August 1983 and keep out all controversial matters.

12476

CSO: 4656/200

## POSSIBLE IMPACT OF PIR PAGARA ON COMING ELECTIONS ANALYZED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 11 Aug 84 Magazine p 12

[Special report on Sind by Mohammad Ali: "Pir Pagara's Policy in the Elections"]

[Excerpt] Pir Pagara has a key role in the present situation in Sind. He has given clear-cut proof of being with the regime by ordering his party of Hurs to join the government in its drive against criminals. The Pir claimed that the Hurs would protect the country as a duty and expect or desire no reward for doing so. But it is a fact that Pir Pagara's political power will have an impact on the coming elections, and he will be able to get the candidates of his own choice elected. If the political parties boycott the elections, it will mean that most of the seats in the rural area will go to the Pagara group. To make plans for the elections, Pir Pagara has formed a three-member committee, including Mohammad Khan Juneju, Zulfiqar Ali Shah Jamot and Khalifa Mohammad Aqil. Mohammad Khan is a former federal minister and is Pir Pagara's political advisor. Zulfiqar Ali Jamot is his close friend, and Khalifa Aqil is the chairman of the divisional liaison committee. He is the Khalifa of the Hur force and was a member of the provincial assembly in 1970. This election committee is studying the present situation in Sind and making preliminary proposals about the candidates. We can call it the Pir's nonpolitical parliamentary board. The special thing about this board is that it does not include any representatives from Sind's urban areas. Perhaps another committee will be appointed to choose candidates from the cities. At present it seems to be Pir Pagara's policy to make a list of candidates for the rural areas and take part in the election of these candidates. If he does so, his candidates are likely to get government support. Different agencies have been sending names of candidates from every district in Sind to the election department of the federal government. These names have undergone primary scrutiny, and now a high-level committee, whose meetings took place in Karachi, has made a decision about these names. The biographic data of 18 candidates from district of Hyderabad were placed before the committee. The following three names are also under consideration: Sayed Ahmed Yusaf, provincial education minister from Hyderabad city; former mayor Maulana Wasi Mazhar Nadvi; Nawab Mohammad Yasin Khan, member of the Shoora; Maulana Mohammad Ali Rizvi; former member of National Assembly; and Aftab Shaykh, advocate. If representatives of the political parties take part in the elections, the situation will be a little different, since the defunct Pakistan People's Party can prove its hold on the rural population of the region. True, the Pir has great influence in the districts of Sanghar

and Khairpur, but the opposition forces are not weak there. Only the Pagara group can dare to put up a candidate for every seat in the rural areas, but the question is whether the different political parties will be able to influence the election if they boycott it. Perhaps the regime wants to annihilate the political parties, after giving them a short-lived exposure during the elections. As no political news is being published, the regime thinks that the political parties cannot be active without the crutches of the media and will soon become powerless. Previous regimes, too, when they thought political parties were weak, tried to bring about a political system of their own liking and failed. The weakness of political parties can breed discontent in the country. Pir Pagara is thought to be a friend of the regime, but he is not its slave. Nor is he aware of the ups and down of political life. He does not want to join any of the parties antagonistic to the regime, because he thinks a wise man does not make the same mistake twice.

Pir Pagara expects to gain power through the force of the Hurs. The Hurs have joined the police force in order to combat criminals in Sind. The Pir's Khalifa, Qaisar Jamal Mangrio, was killed in the rural area of Khairpur while pursuing and attacking a band of robbers that had tried to loot a branch of the National Bank. Khalifa Jamal was the leader of the military department of the Hur force in Sukkur. He fought bravely against the Indian Army in 1965 and 1971. He was 45 and belonged to the state of Jaisalmer. He was a devout Muslim. The crackdown against the criminals was carried out under his leadership, and he compelled many robbers to surrender. Some in the rural area of Khairpur had radio sets that kept them informed of the movements of the police, and they took cover in the jungles before the police arrived. The death of the Pir's Khalifa has emboldened the robbers and they are now committing robberies relentlessly and causing a feeling of insecurity in the public. The Hur force is studying the situation with care. They are fighting against the criminals in the police leadership, but they say that their action against the robbers cannot be fruitful unless they are allowed to act independently of the police. Despite the death of a very important member of their party, the morale of the Hur force is very high, and they have decided to annihilate the robbers completely. The Sind Government can depend on the cooperation of a strong man like Pir Pagara. They know that the robbers are constantly being defeated. If the elections have to take place in the near future, internal security is very important for the government.

12476

CSO: 4056/194

PAKISTAN

LAWYERS REFUSE TO DEFEND ALLEGED CONSPIRATORS

BK271400 London BBC World Service in English 12 GMT 27 Sep 84

[From the 'Radio Newsreel' program]

[Text] Seven prominent lawyers in Pakistan have refused a request from the military authorities to conduct the defense of 54 people accused of plotting to overthrow the government of General Ziaul Haq. The lawyers say the invitation was a ploy to give respectability to a trial in which the accused--all members of the Al-Zulfiqar organization founded by the sons of the executed former prime minister, Mr Bhutto--would not be given justice. Alex Brodie in Islamabad has the details:

[Begin recording] The trial in Lahore prison has stalled because the 54 accused, many of whom have been in jail for 3 years dismissed their original lawyers and refused to defend themselves saying that a fair trial was impossible. They refused to be represented by lawyers then appointed by the state. The military court then asked the seven prominent civil-right lawyers to take on the defense. This gave the lawyers in refusing the opportunity to air once again their objections to the proceedings. One of the lawyers said that the invitation was an attempt by the government to give respectability to the proceedings. He said they want us to go there at least once so that they can tell the world, and particularly the American Congress, that the most prominent opposition lawyers were allowed to defend the accused.

In a statement the lawyers said it was impossible for them to participate in proceedings held in camera, inside a jail, in which the accused were constantly (? inspected) in handcuffs, where traditional rules of evidence and procedure were discarded and superseded by arbitrary rules introduced under the President's Order No. 4 of 1982. This places the burden of proof upon the accused who are presumed guilty, unless they can prove otherwise.

The lawyers also said fair and free interviews between accused and lawyers were not allowed and the military court had gone back on an undertaking that prosecution witness would be required to taken oath on the Koran.

CSO: 4600/5



## PROJECT TO MANUFACTURE FARM IMPLEMENTS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Aug 84 p 7

[Text]

A project envisaging setting up of modern engineering facilities for the assembly and manufacture of essential farm implements would be established at Hattar, NWF in technical collaboration with some reputed international firm of modern agricultural implements manufacturers.

The plant facilities would have the capacity to manufacture or fabricate approximately 2700 pieces of different types of modern farm implements comprising three different types of threshers and Cutters Binders, Cultivators, Seed Drills and two types of Trolleys. This will be a downstream project of Pakistan Steel Mills, and its entire requirement of M.S. steel in various forms, would be met from the Pakistan Steel Mills. Imported raw materials/components would include diesel engines and bearings. The cost of imported raw materials and components is not expected to exceed 30% of the total raw material requirements.

The project involves an estimated cost of Rs.28.500 million inclusive of the initial working capital of Rs.3,200 million while the requirement of foreign exchange resources, for the import of plant and machinery and payment to foreign engineers and erectors, is estimated at Rs.14.00 million which is reported to have been sanctioned as long terms loans partly by Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (SAPICO) and partly by another local financing agency. A local currency loan has also been sanctioned by a financing institution for the procurement of

indigenously-produced machinery and equipment.

In addition to providing a foreign currency loan, SAPICO is stated to have also to participate in the equity capital of the proposed company. Another important agency participating in the equity capitals is the Sarhad Development Authority. The proposed enterprise would be launched as a public limited company and its shares would be offered to general investing public subscription.

Mechanisation of agricultural operations is of prime importance in man's efforts to maximise agricultural production from the available cultivable land. Tractor plays a pivotal role in the mechanised farming but tractor alone cannot do the needful. In fact in the absence of adequate availability of modern tractor-drawn implements, for use in various agricultural operations, the tractor is rendered unproductive and much of its capacity remains idle. Thus, the need to speedily increase the production of modern farm implements simultaneously with the rapid increase in tractor population through liberal imports and local assembly/manufacture, can hardly be overemphasised.

With fiscal and other incentives provided by the government, the development of farm implements manufacturing industry has been picking up pace during the last few years. Farm implements are manufactured both in the organised sector and unorganised sector. According to a survey, at present nine units with medium to large size capacity and integrated facilities, are reported to be operating in the organised sector. The combined capacity of these units

is stated to be around 33,000 units of different types of agricultural implements per annum. Some of the implements manufactured locally are: cultivators/tillers, ploughs, border disc, harrow disc, blades and levellers, cotton planter, dills for cottonseeds and grains, rotavator, thresher, maize sheller, grader, etc.

However, production is found to be considerably lower than capacity. As against the rated capacity for the manufacture of about 33,000 units, actual production was stated to be around 15,000 pieces in 1981-82, on the basis of which capacity utilisation worked out to about 45 percent. The low-capacity utilisation is attributed to relatively/unplanned sort of production programme in most of the smaller units which undertake production of specific types of implements on orders from customers. Moreover, being relatively small or medium size organisations and scattered in different towns, they lack in marketing facilities and techniques.

The demand for agricultural implements is met largely from imports specially for improved types of implements. Imports of various types of implements during 1981-82 were stated to be of the order of 18,000 pieces comprising ploughs, cultivators, lawn mowers, harvesting machinery, air pumps for tractors, sprayers, poultry machinery, etc.

The demand for agricultural implements is bound to increase with a sustained pace due to increasing awareness among the farming class about the usefulness of improved types of implements. In view of this, there is need to promote this industry actively.

## FRANCE SAID 'A HAVEN' FOR PAKISTANIS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Sep 84 p 8

[Article by Saeed Qureshi]

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Aug. 31: As against the rapidly shrinking number of Pakistani immigrants and guest workers in most European countries, the number of Pakistanis in France is increasing. According to a reliable estimate, the number of Pakistanis now in France is around 25,000 and could shoot up further.

France has turned out to be a haven for all those aliens, including Pakistanis, who had to leave other European countries following the adoption of stringent anti-immigration measures. West Germany took the lead by forcing a large number of political exiles and other categories of Pakistani nationals to leave the country and seek refuge elsewhere in Europe. Last month, the United Kingdom abolished the status of political asylum for all visitors, the bulk of whom came from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. It was 1982 that France announced acceptance of all aliens expelled from West Germany. The number of Pakistanis already present in France varied between five to ten thousand and the new arrivals pushed the figure to an unprecedented 25,000 mark.

This liberal French policy has led to an influx of illegal immigrants. The modus operandi adopted by such people is to hire the services of professionals in France who take them there through clandestine routes. Those coming from England sneak into France from across the English channel by projecting themselves as week-end holiday makers. The conditions laid down by the French Government for obtaining visas were easily met by those who have money to produce a return ticket and some foreign exchange. In late 1983, however, France tightened the rules regarding the holiday makers. That led to an unprecedented uproar among foreigners staying in England who described the measure as racist and discriminatory.

Eye-witnesses and those who have stayed in France legally say that the massive inflow of visitors from all over Europe has led to multiple social and economic problems both for the hosts and guests. The French Government, unlike the West German and British governments, has allowed the aliens, including the political refugees, to earn their livelihood by taking any job that comes their way. The Pakistanis, most of whom are residing in Paris, have to be content with very low salaries, which seldom exceed 2200 francs. Those who cannot find a job sell cigarettes on the roadsides, or drive

taxis or indulge in drug trafficking. One small cubicle in Paris costs a Pakistani 800 rupees a month, which leaves very little for his other needs and remittances back home. The Pakistanis are therefore obliged to live in groups of six and seven in small rooms which adversely affects their health and social behaviour.

When asked why the Pakistanis do not return to their homeland when living and working conditions in France are so degrading, a Paris-returned Pakistani said that those who are attuned to the European way of life prefer a lower living standard in France than the abysmal misery at home. He said even if they cannot remit money home they can at least live a relatively tension-free life in France. But the heavy exodus of foreigners to France has generated many problems for the French, such as social disorders and a spurt in unemployment. Besides, the eye witnesses say, the rate of crime has also increased in the city of Paris where Algerians, Spanish, Asians and Africans are increasingly resorting to robberies.

These observers are of the view that it is only a question of time before France follows the German and British example and cracks down on the immigrants.

CSO: 4600/754

## GENETIC ENGINEERING CENTER ESTABLISHED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 2 Sep 84 p 6

[Text]

LAHORE, Sept. 1: Molecular biology has emerged as the most exciting field of science today, and the excitement has come about after the advent of techniques of 'recombinant DNA technology', commonly known as genetic engineering.

Dr. S. Riazuddin, a renowned scientist and director of the Centre for Studies in Molecular Biology, University of the Punjab, in an interview here today said the new technology offered tremendous opportunities and an inexpensive solution to some of our most urgent and difficult problems.

Dr. Riaz said it seemed certain that during the 1980s and 1990s, the new technology will bring about a revolution in the fields of agriculture, health, energy and industry similar to the industrial revolutions in plastics in the 1940s, transistors in the 1950s, computers in the 1960s and microelectronics in the 1970s.

He said that genetic engineering used scientific information obtained in research in the basic molecular biology of the nucleic acids. He said this sea of scientific research had largely been ignored in this country, and as a consequence, neither trained manpower nor infrastructure was available to embark on a national programme of genetic engineering.

Dr. Riaz said the University of the Punjab has taken a pioneering role in this direction and established the Centre for Studies in Molecular Biology at New Campus here.

He said the newly set up centre will work on the frontiers of molecular biology related to genetic engineering. Initially, the centre will carry out research in genetic restriction and modification enzymology of nucleic acids, gene-function, and construction of

vehicles for the transfer of genetic material into bacteria and plant cells.

He said research in the centre will be undertaken in collaboration with Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University and Cold Spring Harbour Laboratory in the USA.

He said it had also been decided to start M. Phil. and Ph.D. classes at New Campus by the end of the current financial year where teaching and practical facilities, in addition to foreign study tours, will be provided to scholars with a view to meeting the shortage of scientists in the field of molecular biology. He said teachers and researchers from different universities and research establishments will also be invited to work at the centre for short durations.

Dr. Riaz said the centre will be one of the few places in the country conducting molecular biological research. The scientific research programme of the centre will reveal to young students the current thinking in molecular biology so vitally important for the maturity of their scientific thinking and in planning their future research careers.

He said it was anticipated that the successful running of this centre will provide, in a span of three to five years, the required scientific manpower to initiate genetic engineering research programmes in our various national research institutes.

Dr. Riaz said the centre will organise an international symposium on 'The application of genetic engineering to basic biology' here in the first week of September, preceded by a two-week international training course on 'Gene cloning in bacteria'.

He said the symposium will be attended by a galaxy of eminent world scientists whose discoveries have been instrumental in the development of genetic engineering and DNA recombinant technology.

# BRIEFS

DETENTIONS EXTENDED--ATTOCK, Sept 1: The Martial Law authorities have extended the detention period of the former Punjab Minister Chaudhry Mohammad Irshad of Multan and former MPA Chaudhry Hanif of Shakargarh, District Sialkot for further three months. They were detained on Sept 5, 1983, at Islamabad airport under MLO 77 when they arrived from London. The other seven persons, including former MPA Mian Sajid Pervaiz, Noor Mohammad Mahi were released some months back. Chaudhry Irshad and Chaudhry Hanif, who are in the District Jail, Attock, are in first and second class respectively. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Sep 84 p 2]

MINISTRY SWITCHES TO URDU--RAWALPINDI, Sept 3: Chairman, National Language Authority, Doctor Abdul Waheed Qureshi, has stated that the Ministry of Communications has also decided to switch over to Urdu as office language whereas the Ministries of Information and Religious Affairs have already adopted national language. He was addressing a meeting of District Language Committee Rawalpindi where he was a chief guest on this occasion. He distributed certificates among the officials of the various government departments who were imparted training in Urdu typing. The meeting was presided over by Deputy Commissioner, Nazir Ahmed Chaudhry. Doctor Waheed Qureshi said that National Language Authority has translated about 3,000 forms of five Federal Ministries into Urdu besides completing translation of 1,000 such forms for Baluchistan Government and a large number of reports and forms pertaining to 25 institutions and authorities in Pakistan. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 4 Sep 84 p 2]

TENDERS FOR OIL RIGS--KARACHI, Sept 3: Pakistan will float international tenders within next few months for acquiring two or three rigs for oil drilling in the country. This was stated by the Minister in-Charge Petroleum and Natural Resources, Dr Mohammed Asad Khan, while talking to newsmen on the occasion of foundation stone-laying ceremony of head office building of Sui Gas Transmission Company (SGTC) at University Road here today. Dr Asad said that one important condition strung to the tender would be that maximum possible parts for use in these rigs would be manufactured locally. He said that the Heavy Mechanical Complex and Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works have the capability of producing rigs and their parts. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 4 Sep 84 Business Supplement p 1]



PRAYER ADMINISTRATORS FOR WOMEN--LAHORE, Aug. 29: Hufti Mohammad Hussain Naeemi, a prominent religious scholar and member, Federal Council, has called upon the government to appoint Nazimaat-i-Salat for motivating women to offer their prayers regularly. He was speaking as chief guest at a discussion on the launching of the Nizam-i-Salat organised by the Pakistan National Centre here on Tuesday. Nazimeen-i-Salat from different parts of the provincial capital were introduced at the meeting. Mufti Naeemi said that the Iqamat-i-Namaz was undoubtedly the foremost and the greatest duty of a believer, and it was the best possible method for the reformation of the society (Islahi Moashira). He was of the view that if this movement had been launched in the early days of the present government, it would have already revolutionised the entire society and imbued it with a true Islamic spirit. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Aug 84 p 6]

PAMPHLETS, POSTERS FORFEITED--LAHORE, Aug. 29: The Government of Punjab has forfeited the following posters, leaflets and monthlies: The Urdu monthly 'Pakistan issue No. 12 and 13 dated March 1984 and April 1984, published from Maktaba Mansoor, Multan Road, Lahore, pamphlet entitled Akhbar-e-Tuleba' the leaflet entitled 'Paigham' dated January 1984, the Urdu monthly 'Khalid' for the month of May 1984, published by Mubank Ahmed Khalid, office monthly 'Khalid', Darul Sadar South, Rabwah, and printed by Ziaul Islam Press, Rabwah, the Urdu monthly 'Misbah' dated May 1984, published by Sh. Khurshid Ahmad and printed by Ziaul Islam Press Rabwah and the contents of the poster entitled 'May Day 1984' published by All Pakistan Trade Union Federation, Faisalabad Division, Faisalabad. [Text] [Islamabad the MUSLIM in English 30 Aug 84 p 8]

BOOKS, PUBLICATIONS BANNED--KARACHI, Aug. 29: The Home Department of Sind has banned two foreign publications and a local book under the Press and Publications Ordinance 1963, and has ordered immediate forfeiture of all their copies available. Urdu weekly 'Akhbare Watan' of London (June 6 issue) and Urdu monthly 'Awam', London (June issue) have been banned for containing objectionable material. Book 'Raza Khani Mazhab' written by Allama Saeed Ahmed Qadri and published by Islami Kutub Khana, Allama Binori Town, Karachi, has also been banned for containing material intended to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes of citizens of Pakistan, according to notifications of the Home Department. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Aug 84 p 8]

INCREASE IN TRADE WITH IRAN--Tehran, Sep 19--Trade between Iran and Pakistan has increased 400 percent compared to 1977, a Commerce Ministry official said on Tuesday. Speaking during the Pakistani ceremony at the International Trade Fair here, Deputy Commerce Minister, Iraj Tutunchian, said that Iran, at present, imported rice, sugar, sugar cubes and chemical fertilisers from Pakistan. The two countries were also seeking to establish joint cooperation in oil and natural gas exploration, the repair and manufacture of spareparts for locomotives and ships as well as port services and land transportation, he said. Tutunchian expressed hope that Iran could increase its non-oil exports to Pakistan. Pakistan Ambassador to Iran, Bashir Khan Babar, said the Islamic Republic had taken great strides to expand economic relations with his country--IRNA. [From the Economic and Business Review Supplement] [Text] [GF251300 Karachi DAWN in English 20 Sep 84 p 1]



ROLE OF SALAT COMMITTEES--President Ziaul Haq's announcement that the members of the Salat (Prayer) Committees will not be dragged into politics and their responsibilities will be limited to exhortations to prayer, bears bright prospects. However, it is also essential that the administration's course of action should be in accord with the president's announcement. It should not happen that despite the president's announcement, members of the administration at various levels try to involve the Salat Committees and their members in local politics or election politics and seek their endorsements in support of or against particular candidates. If this happens, respect for the Salat Committees will be undone. The people also will not cooperate with them, thinking that they are a political necessity or a political instrument of the administration. The members of the Salat Committees, too, are entrusted with responsibility for not being connected with anything but the purpose for which they have been elected. At no stage should they be prepared to become an instrument of the administration. They should keep away from all political divisions and sectarian quarrels, and they should not participate in or be a party to any dispute. [Editorial] [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 22 Aug 84 p 3] 9779

NEW DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS--Mr Khalid Saleem, the director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been appointed as the Pakistani ambassador to Kuwait, and Mr Mehdi Masood has been appointed as the ambassador to Belgium. [Text] [Rawalpindi HAIDAR in Urdu 2 Sep 84 p 2]

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17 Oct 1984